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THE

WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER

1870

THE

WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER

1870

ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY

BY

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7. 9th
8. 31
9. 10th } North German Army Corps.

FRENCH—
16th Army Corps.
20th "
15th "
17th "
18th "

Scale 502,000

20 0 10 20 30 Miles

THE WAR

FOR

THE RHINE FRONTIER.

CHAPTER XL.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG AGAINST THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE FROM THE 16TH TO THE 19TH OF NOVEMBER 1870.

After the battle of Coulmier, Gambetta, who, as we have seen, greatly overestimated the importance of the victory gained there, projected a great enterprise for the relief of Paris.

Troops after troops, some barely equipped at all, and all of them untrained, were despatched to the middle Loire, to form there a mighty host under D'Aurelle des Paladines. By the end of November this force was said to comprise seven Army Corps; the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st—the last having yet to be formed from the troops by this time available in the camp at Conlie. The strength

of this army was given at 350,000 men; and, counting by the ration-list, it may very possibly have reached that number. Of available troops, there would be, however, at the most 200,000, even if we interpret most liberally the idea conveyed by the phrase "available forces;" but, nevertheless, an army of 200,000 men is not to be despised under any circumstances.

This Army of the Loire was now to advance upon Paris from the west or south-west, driving back before it any corps of observation which the Germans might have pushed forward; while Trochu was to make at the same time a sortie from the capital with the active army which he had formed there, and the strength of which, according to the usual mode of reckoning, might likewise be estimated at 200,000 men. With it the Governor of Paris was to break through the investing lines, and was then to undertake, in concert with D'Aurelle, the pursuit of the Germans to the Rhine; the Army of the North occupying meanwhile the attention of a portion of the German forces.

The plan for the relief of the capital was simple and good, but the first essential for its success was that D'Aurelle and Trochu should be able to unite in the neighbourhood of Paris. This effected, the chief thing was really done. But now the great question had to be considered, How would it fare with the solidity of the young French formations when opposed

to the firm compactness of the German troops, the latter being now, moreover, accustomed to victory? Would these latter be anywhere overthrown or shaken? To the impartial observer the attainment of such a result must from the very outset have seemed to be extremely doubtful.

The decision of this question was postponed until the last days of November and the first of December. After the battle of Coulmier the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had received the commandership-in-chief of the army of observation, which was for the present to oppose the French Army of the Loire. This army of observation was composed of the 1st Bavarian Corps, Von der Tann; of the 22d division, Wittich; of the 17th division (from the 13th Army Corps), commanded by Von Treskow, Adjutant-General of the King of Prussia, in place of Schimmelmann, who was sick; and of the three divisions of cavalry commanded by Prince Albrecht, Rheinbaben, and Stolberg respectively. The total strength of these troops, after deducting losses already sustained, would amount at the most to 45,000 infantry and cavalry.

On the 10th of November the 1st Bavarian Corps was at Toury, the 17th division at Dourdan, and the 22d division at Chartres on the Eure, the cavalry divisions being on the flanks.

On the 11th of November the 17th division was pushed forward to Angerville, to form an immediate reserve for the 1st Bavarian Corps; while the 22d

division received orders to remain at Chartres, to cover the right flank.

After the occurrence of the events which are already known to us, it was impossible for D'Aurelle des Paladine to contemplate the immediate commencement of any serious enterprise against the Germans; and therefore, for the time being, he occupied himself in fortifying the town of Orleans, and in organising, as well as he could, the troops which were daily sent to him from the south. Still it did not seem to him right to refrain from all operations during this interval of constrained inaction, and he therefore initiated a series of manœuvres by causing his left wing to make a movement towards the north-west. Had the forces of Prince Frederic Charles been still occupied, this opening manœuvre might possibly have had a successful issue; for in that case, if the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg could have been enticed westward, D'Aurelle himself could, as soon as he had collected the mass of his army, have advanced with it against the forces investing the capital by the shortest road from Orleans to Paris.

And in fact the Grand Duke did follow the left wing of the French; for after repulsing on the 12th of November a demonstration made by it from Artenay towards Toury, he pushed forward the 1st Bavarian Corps on the 13th into a position at Epernon and Gallardon on the Voise, whence Von der Tann de-

spatched a detachment to Gasville to connect with Wittich, who occupied Chartres.

The Grand Duke himself marched with the 17th division from Angerville by Auneau, where he arrived on the 15th of November, to Houdan. There he attacked a French detachment on the 17th, and driving back the ruins of it towards the Seine, upon Mantes, occupied Dreux on the same day after a very brief contest.

During this advance upon Dreux, the 22d division, which was following Von der Tann's Corps, was sent to Chateauneuf en Thymerais. On the 18th General von Wittich took Chateauneuf, and advancing further, sustained, on the 19th, unimportant encounters at Ardelles and Digny, and on the 21st at La Loupe.

By this time the force under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was fronting west, and was only further engaged with some of the numerous French detachments which now sprang up on all sides, but which, owing to the want of a powerful, uniform guidance, and because of the endeavour to utilise every trivial advantage, and of the disposition of individual towns to severally offer resistance, were of the most varied strength and composition, and without any proper connection with one another.

Meanwhile D'Aurelle deployed the Corps, which he had up to this time organised, on a long line to

the north of the Loire, extending at last from Montargis in the east to Orgères in the west, a length of about 50 miles. The Corps which he had at his disposal were the 15th, 16th, 17th, 19th, and 20th, the 19th being very incomplete. The 21st was still in process of formation in the camp at Conlie; and the 18th at Nevers under Bourbaki, was also by no means ready to take the field.

Thus posted, D'Aurelle contemplated a forward march upon Paris along one or other of the two lines by Toury or by Pithiviers, according to the course events might take; but, before all things were ready for the movement, the approach of Prince Frederic Charles from the eastward compelled him once more to fall back upon the defensive.

CHAPTER XLI.

ADVANCE OF PRINCE FREDERIC CHARLES UPON THE LOIRE—THE BATTLES OF LADON, 24TH OF NOVEMBER, AND OF BEAUNE LA ROLANDE, 28TH OF NOVEMBER.

We left Prince Frederic Charles at Sens advancing towards the Loire. During the following days his headquarters moved thence by Cheroy, Nemours, and Puiseaux, to Pithiviers.

In addition to his own army, the forces of the Grand Duke of Schwerin were also placed under the command of the Prince. The immediate objective of this latter now was to unite the Second Army with that of the Grand Duke, and this junction he proposed effecting between Toury and Pithiviers. The whole army of the Prince, which would then consist of five Army Corps (the 1st Bavarian, the 17th and 22d divisions, the 3d, 9th, and 10th North German Corps) and of four divisions of cavalry, of which Hartmann's division was advancing with the Second Army, which was to be joined also by Stolberg's division from the Grand Duke's detachment, was to deploy fronting south, to the north of

the French and opposite the forest of Orleans, in order to drive back D'Aurelle to the left bank of the Loire; and to this end the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg also received orders to wheel up out of his positions facing westward, so that he might be fronting southward when the Second Army came up.

But the junction of the Prince with the Grand Duke was not destined to be effected without fighting: for, to oppose the former, General D'Aurelle in the first place had the 15th Corps, Martin de Pallières, at Orleans itself; to the right of it the 20th, Crouzat, holding the passage of the Loire at Jargeau; and based upon the Loire at Sully, 23½ miles above Orleans, so much of the 18th Corps as was ready to take the field, under Bourbaki.

On the 24th of November, the 10th Army Corps, belonging to the Second Army, was to concentrate about Beaune la Rolande.

On the 23d of November, its commander, General Voigts-Rhetz, was himself at Beaune la Rolande, having with him the 38th brigade of infantry (Wedell) and Rautzau's brigade of Hessian cavalry; while the rest of the Corps was in the neighbourhood of Montargis. From these positions patrols were pushed out in every direction, and found the adjacent localities everywhere occupied by detachments of French.

At 7 A.M. on the 24th, the 39th brigade, now commanded by Valentini in place of General von Woyna, who had been transferred to the 19th division,

marched, supported by the reserve artillery of the 10th Corps, from Montargis by Panne and Mignières upon Beaune la Rolande. To the south of it the 37th brigade, Lehmann, which only left Montargis at eight o'clock in the morning, moved by way of Ladon, where, at 11 A.M., it encountered the advanced-guard of the 20th French Corps. Ladon was taken by the Prussians after a short action, and the French retired early in the afternoon upon Bellegarde, pursued only by a few companies of Prussians, while the mass of Lehmann's brigade continued its march upon Beaune la Rolande.

Shortly after 1 P.M. the reserve artillery of the 10th Corps had reached this latter place, and Valentini's brigade had arrived at the same time at Juranville. There the latter received orders to wheel to its right towards Maizières to support Lehmann's brigade; and this order being promptly executed, Valentini, advancing by L'Archemont, drove the French back towards Fréville. Lehmann's brigade now marched under his protection upon Beaune, so that on the 25th of November nearly the whole of the 10th Army Corps was concentrated there.

Meanwhile the 9th North German Corps moved upon Pithiviers; Stülpnagel's division of the 3d Corps was also drawn towards Beaune, on the left wing of the Second Army; and near this latter place a violent action took place on the 28th of November against the 20th French Corps.

In consequence of this, D'Aurelle des Paladines concentrated his army on the northern edge of the forest of Orleans, and to the west of it; and Prince Frederic Charles had now every possibility of collecting all his forces to retake the key of the line of the Loire, Orleans. On the 29th and 30th of November various collisions ensued during the execution of this manœuvre, but they were of so little military importance that it is not worth while to speak of them in detail. On the evening of the latter day, however, M. de Freycinet brought to Orleans a formal order from the Delegate Government at Tours for the Army of the Loire to march upon Pithiviers. This order, by which the army was led directly upon the point of concentration of the forces of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and of Prince Frederic Charles, was naturally not received by the French generals without much hesitation. Still its execution had been commenced, when on the 2d of December the fighting began which ended with the loss of Orleans.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE REOCCUPATION OF ORLEANS BY THE GERMANS.

In accordance with the orders of Prince Frederic Charles, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had caused his detachment to change front to the south, and on the 1st of December his troops stood in the following positions:—

The 1st Bavarian Corps, with its right flank covered by the 4th division of cavalry, near Orgères, at the junction of the roads from Chartres to Orleans, and from Toury to Chateaudun;

The 17th division at Allaines;

The 22d division, supported by the 2d division of cavalry near Toury, on the direct railway from Paris by Angerville to Orleans.

On the 2d of December Von der Tann was to advance from Orgères upon Loigny in the direction of Orleans; but, as he commenced his march on that day, his advanced-guard immediately encountered that of the 16th French Corps, Chanzy, which had been concentrated at Terminiers; and the French,

being continually reinforced, succeeded, after prolonged fighting, in throwing the Bavarians back upon Villeprevost and Goury-Chateau.

Here, then, Von der Tann established himself at noon in the woods, and proceeded to bring up his reserves. Meanwhile, however, the 17th division had advanced on his left flank upon Lumeau, and not encountering any superior forces, had been able to occupy the place by mid-day. Simultaneously with this movement, also, Prince Albrecht of Prussia had pushed forward with his division of cavalry on the right of the Bavarians upon Loigny, and, thus supported, the latter again assumed the offensive. This time the attack was successful; and at one o'clock the German forces, operating convergently, gained possession of Loigny.

The 22d division marched on the morning of the 2d of December upon Baigneaux, to the north-east of Lumeau, where it met with some resistance, but nevertheless succeeded in taking the village after a short encounter. The French troops which fought there belonged to the 15th Corps, and, when defeated, retreated in the first place upon Poupry. Many detached struggles ensued for the woods to the north of this latter village; but the final result was that the 22d division obtained possession of Poupry, and of the road from Orleans to Allaines.

Parallel with the 22d division, a brigade of the 2d division of cavalry advanced along the road by

Artenay to Orleans, and succeeded in maintaining itself on it against repeated attacks.

In the afternoon the French once more made an offensive thrust against the right wing of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, by sending forward against Loigny the 17th Corps, General De Colomb, which had just come up. The attack was in so far successful that the French retook the town; but towards evening they were again driven out of it after very severe fighting, and compelled to retreat upon Terminiers, and thus by nightfall the Grand Duke held possession of the line Loigny-Lumeau-Poupry-Dambron.

As early as the 2d of December, Prince Frederic Charles, whose headquarters had been at Pithiviers since the 29th of November, had despatched the 6th division of cavalry by Bazoches les Gallerandes to the east of Toury upon Oison, and the 9th Corps from Pithiviers by Chatillon le Roi upon Jouy, to support the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment; and he now determined to make a convergent attack upon Orleans on the 3d of December.

To carry out this manœuvre, the detachment of the Grand Duke was to push forward from the front Terminiers-Poupry towards Chevilly on the Paris-Orleans railway, and towards the north-west corner of the forest of Orleans. Prior to this the Second Army had been brought forward—the 9th Corps to the front Toury-Bazoches les Gallerandes, the 3d Corps on its left to Pithiviers, the 10th on the left of

this again to Boynes; and now, on the 3d of December, the 9th Corps was to advance on the west of the railway by Artenay, the 3d Corps along the Fontainebleau road, and the 10th by Nibelle against the canal of Orleans—Prince Frederic Charles himself marching with the 9th North German Corps.

This last-named Corps, advancing in the direction assigned to it, turned first by Dambron against the village of Assas, took it, and soon afterwards Artenay also. Pushing forward beyond this latter place, it had to sustain a stubborn encounter at the mill of Anvillers with troops of the 15th French Corps; but overthrowing these also, its advanced-guard hurried forward upon Chevilly, only, however, to find it already occupied by the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's troops.

Meanwhile the 3d North German Corps, marching through Chilleurs aux Bois, reached Loury, and the 10th Corps arrived as far as Nibelle. We have seen that on the right the detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had reached Chevilly, so that on the evening of the 3d of December the main body of Prince Frederic Charles's army, at least 100,000 strong, stood concentrated on a front of only about ten miles, from Chevilly to Loury, the headquarters of the Prince himself being at Artenay.

D'Aurelle des Paladines recognised at once that for the moment a serious advance upon Paris was not to be thought of. His young soldiers had fought

right well during the last few days, but the want of cohesion in their organisation was very manifest; and with troops of such a quality, too persevering operations must not be attempted; more must not be demanded from them than they can perform. On the evening of the 3d, therefore, D'Aurelle determined to give up Orleans and retire into the Sologne, and he informed the Delegation of the Government at Tours of this intention by telegraph. Such intelligence was naturally very disagreeable to it, and D'Aurelle received despatches after despatches, some of them of a very offensive character. But on the morning of the 4th he still resolved to remain near Orleans, and to concentrate there, in addition to the 15th Corps, the 20th and 18th from the right wing, by way of Jargeau and Sully, and the 16th and 17th by Meung and Beaugency, sending at noon on the same day a telegraphic despatch to Tours announcing his intentions, which message crossed one from M. Gambetta giving him full freedom of action.

Meanwhile, on the morning of the 4th of December, Prince Frederic Charles had recommenced his operations.

On the extreme right the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg advanced against Orleans, moving between the roads from Chateaudun and Chartres. On his left the 9th North German Corps marched by Chevilly, with a left flanking detachment by St Lyé; the 3d North German Corps proceeded by Loury upon St

Loup, close to Orleans on the eastward; and the 10th North German Corps along the canal of Orleans upon Vitry aux Loges; while Hartmann's division of cavalry occupied the interval between the two last-named Corps.

Towards dusk on the 4th of December, the main body of the Germans stood close around Orleans, having only met with serious resistance from the 15th Corps on the direct railway from Paris to Orleans. The other French Corps, both those of the right wing (the 20th and 18th) and those of the left (the 16th and 17th), were retiring behind the Loire in pursuance of D'Aurelle's orders—the former by Jargeau and Sully, the latter by Meung and Beaugency, only opposing the Germans with rear-guards sufficiently strong to cover the retreat.

The troops of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg hardly came into action at all during their march upon Orleans on the 4th of December, as the line of retreat of the French left wing necessarily withdrew it from the line of the German advance. The 3d and 10th North German Corps, and Hartmann's division of cavalry, also only came upon weak detachments of French; but still their march was rendered difficult by the fact that they had to advance through the forest of Orleans, and were thereby prevented from ascertaining the strength of their opponents.

On the evening of the 4th of December, Prince Frederic Charles established his headquarters in Cer-

cottes, and thence summoned General Martin de Pallières, who commanded in Orleans, to surrender the town, under pain of its being bombarded.

Pallières, who knew that neither the right nor the left wing of the army would be able to unite with the remainder of the 15th Corps in time to offer sufficient resistance to the concentrated attack of the German forces, evacuated Orleans during the night between the 4th and 5th of December, having previously spiked the heavy naval guns in the intrenchments before the town.

Early on the morning of the 5th of December, therefore, detachments of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's army, then of the 9th Corps, and finally of the 3d Corps, entered Orleans, whither Prince Frederic Charles also removed his headquarters at noon.

But before this, the Prince, immediately after he received information that the French would evacuate Orleans, issued orders for detachments to be pushed forward on the left bank of the Loire in every important direction; up the river towards Gien, down the stream towards Blois and Tours, and in a central direction between these two through the Sologne upon Vierzon and Bourges. The consequence of these dispositions was, that the French Army of the Loire was thrown asunder into two separate wings—the one on the Loire above Orleans, consisting not only of the 18th and 20th Corps, but also of the 15th, which was no longer able to withdraw westward; the

other below the town, composed of the 16th and 17th Corps, which had hitherto been opposed to the Duke of Mecklenburg, and of the 21st, which had been sent to support them, but had never come into action.

Gambetta, meanwhile, who shortly after mid-day had received D'Aurelle's despatch, in which he announced his intention of concentrating at Orleans, had started by train to take part personally in the events about to happen, and to bring everything into order. The train by which he travelled reached the village of La Chapelle to the west of Orleans at 4.30 P.M., but was there obliged to stop by the carbine-fire of the horsemen of Prince Albrecht. Still it would not have been impossible for Gambetta, who possessed such plenipotence, to have repaired to Orleans; but as it was, he returned to Tours, where at midnight he received Pallières' despatch announcing the evacuation of Orleans.

Thus the Army of the Loire, which was to relieve Paris, was not only thrown back behind the Loire, but was also divided into two fractions, the reunion of which could only be effected by rapid marching upon some point far in rear. Simultaneously with these events, a great sortie from Paris had also been repulsed; and we turn now to the narrative of that event.

SKETCH OF THE ENVIRONS OF PARIS.



GERMANS.— Line of Investment.
a Landwehr of the Guard.
b II. North German Corps.
c XI. German Corps.
d IV. North German Corps.
e Wurtemburgers.
f Saxons.
g Prussian Guard.
h IV. North German Corps.
Boundary of the part of Paris occupied by the Germans on the 1st of March 1871.

FRENCH.— The Positions of Defence of the Enceinte of the Forts are distinguished by their Numbers, and the Numbers of the Bastions and Lunettes in each are shown. The Position of the French Works of Defence show the French Position.

Scale 1/80000

1 ½ 0 1 2 3 4 Miles

THE ATTACK OF THE GERMANS ON THE 2D OF DECEMBER 1871 (BATTLE OF THE MARNE).

FRENCH.— A. Ducrot's Main Army.
B. Vinoy's Division.
C. Pont Bridges over the Marne.

GERMANS.— D Stolchoff's Saxon Division.
E I. Wurtemburg Brigade.
F De Tumpel's Prussian Brigade.
G Barbanegi's Prussian Division. } II. Army Corps.
H Keller's Prussian Brigade.
Prussian Brigade from the VI. Corps.
J II. and III. Wurtemburg Brigades.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE SORTIES FROM PARIS BETWEEN THE 29TH OF NOVEMBER AND THE 3D OF DECEMBER.

General Trochu's plan for breaking through the investing lines of the Germans before Paris was in general this: To occupy the enemy at all points with demonstrations on a large scale; to break out with the mass and most mobile portion of his troops across the lower Marne into the Brie; and then, by moving through this cheese-producing district along the road by Melun to Fontainebleau, seek to effect a junction with D'Aurelle's army which was expected from Orleans.

In pursuance of these ideas, Admiral Saisset on the 28th of November occupied with his marines, supported by the 6th division of the Third Army, the plateau of Avron, opposite Rosny and between the railways to Strasburg and Mülhausen. A large battery was at once thrown up upon the Grande Pelouse, and armed with heavy naval guns, which must have rendered the preservation of the German connection across the Marne at Chelles and Gournay

very difficult. At the same time preparations were made for throwing bridges across the Marne between the peninsula of St Maur and Nogent sur Marne; and the batteries at Joinville, Perreux, and Nogent, which command the peninsula of Champigny, were strengthened.

While these things were being done on the east of Paris, considerable bodies of troops belonging to the Third Army, Vinoy, were also assembled on the north, on the plain of Aubervillers, under the protection of St Denis, the chief command over them being given to Admiral De la Roncière. More to the west, upon the peninsula of Nanterre, new intrenchments were constructed along the Rouen railroad and on the islands of the Seine at Bezons. About these points two divisions of the Third Army were collected: in the first line the 4th, De Beaufort; in the second, the 3d, De Liniers.

The demonstrations themselves were commenced on the 29th of November. In the north, Admiral De la Roncière seized the village of Epinay les St Denis—the name Epinay was destined to play a great part in the drama of that day—situated on the Seine about a mile and a half distant from St Denis. To the westward, on the peninsula of Nanterre, General de Beaufort made a reconnaissance in force towards Malmaison and Buzanval; while in the south, General Vinoy, with several divisions of the Third Army, pushed forward on the left bank of the Seine above Paris from Forts

Bicêtre and Ivry against L'Hay, Chevilly, and Thiais. There he encountered the 6th North German Corps; but, spite of the opposition made by it, succeeded in obtaining possession for a lengthened period of the cattle railway station (*gare aux bœufs*) of Choisy-le-Roi on the Orleans line.

These demonstrations were to be followed on the 30th by the great sortie into the Brie, which was to be undertaken by the whole of the Second Army under General Ducrot, who informed the Parisians in a proclamation that he would return into the capital a victor or a corpse. But there is always much uncertainty about the fulfilment of promises such as these, which allow no margin for the influence of fortune; and this was destined to be again exemplified here. The President of the Government, General Trochu, also issued a proclamation, in which he laid the blood now about to be shed upon the heads of the King of Prussia and Count Bismark. These two men, however, as is ofttimes the case under like circumstances, sat warm and well fed in Versailles; and it is said that, even when later on they came to a knowledge of the contents of General Trochu's proclamation, they were not especially troubled thereby.

Early on the morning of the 30th, Trochu, who had removed his headquarters to Fort Vincennes, caused eight previously-prepared bridges to be thrown across the Marne between Joinville and Nogent. The first two Corps of the Second Army, under Blanchard and

Renault, the latter with two divisions, then crossed by them on to the peninsula of Champigny, and advanced towards the Brie; the 1st division (Susbielle) of the 2d Corps moving from Charenton by Creteil upon Mesly and Montmesly.

On the German side the Würtembergers stood in first line between the Seine and the Marne above Paris, having the 1st brigade, Reitzenstein, at Villiers sur Marne and Cœuilly, with outposts near Champigny; and the 2d and 3d brigades extended from Ormesson to Boissy St Leger, with outposts at Mesly.

The right wing of the Würtembergers could be supported by the 12th (Saxon) Army Corps, one part of which watched the bridge over the Marne at Chelles, having a detachment on the left bank of the river, while the main body of the Corps stood on the east of Paris close to the Marne. Behind the left wing of the Würtembergers, the 7th brigade, Du Trossel, of the 2d North German Army Corps, was posted at Valenton.

Next to the Würtembergers on the left bank of the Seine stood the 6th North German Army Corps; and in rear of it, serving as a reserve against the south fronts of Paris, the greater part of the 2d Corps lay in cantonments between Palaiseau and Longjumeau, under the command of General Fransecky, the hero of Benatek.

The Würtembergers and the 7th Prussian brigade, the only troops which were available on the forenoon

of the 30th for action between the Seine and the Marne, numbered together, at the most, 16,000 men, infantry and cavalry—of whom, at the highest computation, 5000 might form the right wing at Villiers, Cœuilly, and Champigny. On the other hand, the two Corps which on the morning of that same day crossed the Marne under Ducrot, counted, including Susbielle's division, between 60,000 and 70,000 men.

It naturally followed, therefore, that the Germans were thrown back in the first rush, and Susbielle's division at once gained possession of Montmesly, which was only held by a few companies of Würtembergers. But the Germans speedily rallied, and forthwith themselves assumed the offensive. Du Trossel's brigade of the 2d North German Corps pushed forward from Valenton to the support of the Würtembergers under General Obernitz, whose headquarters were in Chateau le Piple, and Susbielle was compelled to retire again upon Creteil. By noon the numbers on either side were about equal at this point, 10,000 against 10,000.

But on the right wing of the Germans, at Champigny, Cœuilly, and Villiers, the state of things was very different. There, there stood at the most 6000 Swabians, Reitzenstein's brigade with a few reinforcements, opposed to at least 50,000 French. And yet, by the evening of the 30th, Ducrot had only gained possession of the front Brie sur Marne-Champigny, and had not been able to push forward any force greater than

an advanced-guard to Villiers, Cœuilly, and Chennevières. In the course of the day, too, the Swabians had more than once assumed the offensive: their artillery at Chennevières sur Marne had hindered the advance of General Planchard's Corps, and their infantry had checked by furious counter-blows the rush of Renault's 2d French Corps at Villiers sur Marne.

While the Swabians and the 7th North German Brigade were thus gallantly defending themselves during the 30th of November, the German leaders had arrived at a clear appreciation of the designs of Trochu, and had still time to take measures to oppose them.

Improvised forces—such as were nearly all the French troops from this time forward—will not only always lose more in killed and wounded, and especially in prisoners, than well-drilled and long-organised troops, but they will also lose more time; and thus it came to pass that the French generals could not immediately follow up their successes by at once pushing forward to fresh attacks, for their soldiers lacked the endurance and discipline necessary for prolonged exertions.

The main body of the 2d North German Army Corps had been concentrated in a rendezvous formation near Massy, but had been again dismissed, when at noon the order was received to push forward at once to the left bank of the Seine opposite Villeneuve St Georges; and afterwards in the night further in-

structions arrived directing them to cross the Seine, so that they might be able to support the Würtembergers.

Simultaneously with this the greater part of the 24th division of the Saxon Corps was concentrated under General Nehrhoff on the left bank of the Marne, towards Noisy le Grand and Villiers sur Marne. The commander of the Corps himself, Prince George of Saxony, removed his headquarters to the left bank of the river, to La Grenouillère; and, moreover, on the left wing a brigade of the 6th Army Corps was brought to the right bank of the Seine to Villeneuve St Georges.

The command over all the troops thus concentrated between the right bank of the Seine and the left bank of the Marne, on the line Villeneuve-Champs, was intrusted to General Fransecky; and he, determining to throw back Ducrot's army on to the right bank of the Marne on the 2d of December, commenced his dispositions to that end in the course of the 1st.

During the whole of this latter day Trochu and Ducrot were solely occupied in establishing themselves on the peninsula of Champigny, on the chain of heights which runs from the village of Champigny to Brie sur Marne. The dead also were buried, and the wounded transported back to Paris. An intense coldness had set in, of a degree very unusual in Paris and its environs—especially exceptional for the town, which is usually much warmer than the

surrounding country, partly owing to the assemblage of so many human beings in a limited space, partly because of the large consumption of wood and coal used in the town in private kitchens and for industrial purposes, and partly because of the luxurious gas illumination kept up in ordinary times. But now wood and coals had to be economised, the lighting by gas had to be curtailed to the utmost for many reasons, and even the town of Paris, where otherwise even the poor suffer but little from the inclemency of winter, had to learn, by bitter experience, what this means. This, again, was felt the more because all trade was paralysed; there was nothing to be earned, and it had become very difficult to procure fuel. Ducrot's soldiers, moreover, had come out without blankets, so that they might move more rapidly. Their clothing was scanty in the extreme, and it was impossible to find covered accommodation for more than the smallest fraction of their numbers, as the country on all sides had been desolated. They therefore suffered terribly from the cold; and it is by no means strange that under these circumstances Trochu allowed the 1st of December to pass away unemployed—the more so, as nothing could be heard of the approach of the Army of the Loire.

By early morning on the 2d of December, Fransecky had arranged his hosts for the attack of the French positions. On the extreme right, between

the left bank of the Marne and the Mülhausen railway, stood the Saxon troops; to the south of these, at Cœuilly, Reitzenstein's Würtemberg brigade. These latter troops were also placed under the command of Prince George of Saxony, who was thus able to bring into action some fifteen battalions, seconded by a numerous artillery.

These troops were to regain possession of the positions of Brie and Champigny by a surprise at dawn on the 2d of December. To support them the 7th brigade, Du Trossel, was directed upon Chennevières. The 3d division of infantry, Hartmann, and the reserve artillery of the 2d Corps, were also called up to Sucy en Brie, where they arrived at noon on the 1st of December. Behind them were stationed in reserve the 8th brigade of infantry, Kettler, and a brigade of the 6th Army Corps. The collective force which thus stood at the disposal of Fransecky numbered about 50,000 men, including the 2d and 3d Würtemberg brigades, which remained halted towards Mesly.

On their side the French also had on the 1st of December brought over the 3d Corps, D'Exéa, of the Second Army, to the left bank of the Marne; so that Ducrot had now under his command more than 100,000 men.

The battle of the 2d of December began about 7 A.M., the Saxons advancing upon Brie sur Marne, the Würtembergers upon Champigny. In the first

few moments the French were surprised; but the Germans were not able to maintain the ground which they gained in the first confusion, and a most obstinate and stubborn fight ensued for the villages of Brie and Champigny and the adjacent heights, success wavering from side to side.

Very early in the contest, Reitzenstein's brigade was reinforced by Du Trossel's Prussian brigade, and at nine o'clock in the forenoon Franseeky ordered Hartmann's North German division and the reserve artillery of the 2d Corps to advance to support the Saxons, Würtembergers, and Trossel's brigade. These supporting troops deployed in separate detachments along a front extending from Villiers sur Marne by Cœuilly to Champigny; while the last reserves, consisting of a brigade of the 2d and a brigade of the 6th Corps, were removed up to Chennevières.

All this time the battle raged furiously, and was most obstinately fought out along the whole line from Champigny to Brie sur Marne. The French had in their favour a numerical superiority and the aid of the batteries which played upon the German troops from the right bank of the Marne; the Germans had on their side the greater solidity of their organisation, their field-artillery both tactically and technically superior to that of their adversaries, and the advantages derivable from the long extent of their position, which this very excellence of their artillery enable them to utilise properly. Moreover,

the use the Germans drew from their long front shows, that had the French generals been able to operate on the 1st of December with the troops under their command, and had they omitted, from secondary considerations only, to occupy the front Gournay-Chennevières—which, as far as mere numbers were concerned, they could easily have done—they would, in neglecting the opportunity, have been guilty of an unpardonable fault.

The fighting on the 2d of December was only stopped at about 5 P.M. by the approach of night. The Saxons had not been able to maintain themselves in the village of Brie sur Marne, into which they had penetrated; and though they had repeatedly advanced gallantly to the attack, they were finally compelled, by the great superiority of their foes, to abandon the village and the adjacent heights. At the other end of the line the Swabians and the Prussians supporting them established themselves in the eastern part of Champigny.

On the 3d of December Trochu determined to retreat, chiefly because of the increasing inclemency of the weather, and of the scarcity of covering for his men. In the early morning, therefore, the French advanced troops pushed forward to a new and vigorous attack, especially at Champigny; and under cover of this, and of a similar offensive sally from Brie, the Second Army (Ducrot) retired to the right bank of the Marne, and encamped during the night from the

3d to the 4th of December in the wood of Vincennes. Still the fighting of these days between the Seine and the Marne had been of such importance that, between the 3d and 4th of December, another brigade of the 6th Corps was sent to reinforce the troops of General Fransecky.

The French give their losses during these sorties at 6030 men, and among them 414 officers, or nearly one to every fourteen men.

The 2d North German Army Corps lost 1606 men, 89 of whom were officers—that is, one to every seventeen men. The Saxons lost 1151 men; among them 55 officers, or one to every twenty men. The Würtembergers give their loss at 2028 men, of whom 61 were officers, or one to every thirty men. If to these numbers are added the casual losses of the smaller detachments, especially of the supporting brigades of the 6th Corps, the total loss of the Germans will reach at least 5000 men. The Germans, therefore, lost more men in proportion to the numbers engaged than the French did, a fact which must be attributed mainly to the action of the heavy guns in the eastern forts and in the newly-constructed batteries.

Thus, then, this great sortie was also repulsed; and now only new combinations could give General Trochu fresh courage to undertake a repetition of it; for unless aided by co-operation from without, every attempt to break through the investing lines would be senseless. Even were such an isolated effort to be

successful, the only result would be that the mobile part of the Army of Paris would find itself in districts completely exhausted by a long German occupation, and offering no means of subsistence—a situation which would be all the more critical, as the army was very badly provided with trains, and was composed of elements which could not be supposed to possess any great capability of marching. And even supposing the most favourable possible issue to the enterprise, and that the army from the capital succeeded in joining some other French army, still it must be borne in mind that this would be achieved at the cost of robbing Paris of the best forces available for its defence.

In the night between the 30th of November and the 1st of December, the balloon "Jules Favre" ascended from Paris with the intention of carrying the latest intelligence to the Delegation of the Government at Tours.

Driven by favourable winds, the balloon flew westward. On the morning of the 1st of December it was hovering over the ocean on the coast of Brittany; there it ran a great risk of falling into the sea, but it finally succeeded in effecting a descent upon the island of Belle Isle, to the west of the estuary of the Vilaine. Thence the despatches from Paris, which up to that time were favourable enough, were forwarded with all haste to Tours, where they arrived in the form of telegrams at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st of December.

M. Gambetta at once filled up from his glowing imagination the details of the events thus announced to him. It had not been notified to him that the despatches had been conveyed by a balloon, and therefore he concluded that they were not balloon despatches, and that Ducrot's army by its sortie had re-established communication with the open country. Another circumstance served to confirm him in this view. It was said, namely, in the despatches, that Admiral De la Roncière had occupied Epinay. We know that this was Epinay les St Denis; but Gambetta, calling for a map of France and examining it, could only find Epinay sur Orge. This latter town lies to the south-east of Longjumeau, and about 9½ miles from the southern forts of Paris. Artenay, where the French Army of the Loire under D'Aurelle must have been about this time, is only 59 miles from the same forts. De la Roncière could only be commanding Trochu's or Ducrot's advanced-guards! Trochu and D'Aurelle were therefore only some 49 miles distant from one another, and must unite within two days, if both sides pushed forward victoriously, as it was assumed they would. Even this short time Gambetta could easily further abbreviate, for in one of his despatches he says that Brie sur Marne is 12½ miles distant from Paris. In reality it is less than two miles from Fort Nogent, from the main enceinte only five, and even from the centre of the town, the Louvre, but a little more than eight.

By applying this scale, and removing Epinay sur Orge and Artenay corresponding distances from Paris and Orleans, Gambetta could easily bring Trochu and D'Aurelle to within 31 miles of one another on the 30th of November, and they might therefore have been in communication by the hour on the 1st of December when Gambetta received his balloon despatches.

According to this apprehension of events, Gambetta addressed the people of Tours on the afternoon of the 1st of December. In the same spirit, also, and not by simply communicating the despatches of General Schmitz, Trochu's Chief of the Staff, he sent orders to all the generals commanding, and intelligence and summonses to the prefects. The great hour, according to him, had struck—the hour for the deliverance of France and the annihilation of the German army.

Such delirious dreams, when they are moreover supported by faulty maps, are evil things for the conduct of war; and after three short days, even Gambetta had to bring himself to understand how greatly he had allowed his imagination to deceive him.

Threatened by the approach of the Germans along the Loire, the Delegation of the Government migrated on the 9th of December from Tours to Bordeaux, Gambetta himself spending several days in visiting the different armies before he followed his colleagues.

During these journeys he necessarily had to hear disagreeable truths from the various generals, and he was made to understand, among other things, that, in however great contempt a man might hold the art and science of war, still he who had never troubled himself with such useless knowledge would not make the best and most infallible general and minister of war, and that the knowledge how to read a map was not an absolutely superfluous accomplishment.

But in spite of all this, a new plan of campaign was now formed.

The separation of the army which had been brought about by the advance of the Germans through Orleans, was still to be kept up, and, from the 5th of December, the *quondam* Army of the Loire was divided into two fractions. Its general also had disappeared; for Gambetta, furious because his dreams of the 1st of December had not proved to be realities, had desired to appoint a commission to inquire into the proceedings of General D'Aurelle des Paladines. The General, as may be easily understood, tendered his resignation. This was accepted; and when, later on, Gambetta offered him another command, it was most decidedly declined. No reasonable man will hold that D'Aurelle did wrong in acting thus; for a general who is to command an army cannot possibly be made dependent upon what, at the very least, must be called half-witted fantasies.

The first of the two new divisions, the Army of the East, was placed under the commandership-in-chief of General Bourbaki, and was composed of three Corps —the 15th, Martin des Pallières; the 18th, Billot; and the 20th, Crouzat.

The Second, or the Army of the West, under the command of General Chanzy, was to consist of the 16th Corps, now under the command of Rear-Admiral Jauréguiberry; of the 17th, De Colomb; and the 21st Corps, Jaurés.

General Chanzy only left the School of St Cyr in 1844, made his career in Algeria, and at the end of 1869 was a brigadier-general. He had the reputation generally of being a shrewd and clever man.

According to the plan now projected, Bourbaki was to move with his three Corps by Dijon upon Besançon, to draw in there a fourth Corps, the 24th, under General Bressoles, which had been formed at Lyons, and then, with these concentrated forces, which would amount at the least to 120,000 men, infantry and cavalry, to relieve Belfort and cut the German communications between Paris and Strasburg. Gambetta and his advisers expected to reap the greatest advantages from this operation; and they would have been justified in hoping for great results from it, if it were not necessary in war to consider the quality as well as the quantity of opposing forces. We know how numerically weak the troops were which General von

Werder had at his disposal for work in the open field, and we know what tasks he had to perform with these slender forces; but we shall see later on in what an ill-fated manner Bourbaki's mission was shipwrecked.

To replace this army on the middle Loire, at least for defensive purposes, a newly-raised Corps, the 25th, was concentrated about Bourges under General Mazure.

Gambetta's dream was, that Bourbaki's march to the east would at once draw thither the whole of Prince Frederic Charles's army, and then Chanzy, with his four Army Corps, to which it might also be possible to unite the two of the Army of the North, would only have to deal with the detachment under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Chanzy was to operate between the Loire and the Seine; and if Gambetta's assumption—of participation in which, however, the generals were by no means altogether innocent—came true, to advance upon Paris. Moreover, he was to seek to unite with the Army of the North, of which Gambetta entertained extraordinary and purely imaginary ideas.

Before we turn to the operations in the north, we must relate that General von Moltke, as soon as he received intelligence of the occurrences on the Loire and of the reoccupation of Orleans, sent information of them on the 5th to General Trochu, and offered to

allow him to send an officer to the Loire, to certify himself by ocular inspection of the actual state of affairs there. Trochu in his answer of the 6th, declined to send such a messenger, for the hopes of relief were still very great in Paris—a state of things which is rendered explicable by remembering the existing dearth of real and authentic information.

CHAPTER XLIV.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH FROM THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER TO THE END OF DECEMBER—THE BATTLE OF AMIENS AND THE OCCUPATION OF ROUEN — THE ENCOUNTER ON THE HALLUE.

We left the First Army under General von Manteuffel on its march from Metz towards the west.* We know that the 7th Army Corps had a special destination, and that three brigades of the 1st Corps were also employed before Mezières and La Fère, so that for the present the only troops of this latter Corps available were Memerty's brigade and the reserve artillery. These formed the right of Manteuffel's mobile army; and the 8th Corps, Göben, which was completely disposable, the left.

On the 20th of November the head of the First Army arrived on the Oise, the right wing at Noyon, the left at Compiègne; and from this position advanced-guards, consisting of cavalry, of the 1st and 8th battalions of Rifles and of artillery, were pushed forward on the one side northwards towards St Quentin, and

* Vol. ii. p. 377.

on the other in a north-westerly direction towards Amiens.

On the 23d of November news came in that considerable detachments of French were assembled at Amiens, and thereupon the troops were again set in motion—the right wing marching upon Roye, the left upon Montdidier.

The city of Amiens lies upon the Somme, the greater portion on the left bank of the river. It has a population of 62,000 inhabitants, and is an extremely wealthy business town. Its linen-spun and woollen-wove goods, and its manufactories in cashmere and velvet, have a world-wide reputation. Its ancient walls have long since been transformed into promenades, and the only fragment of them preserved is the citadel, a bastioned pentagon of very weak construction.

The French had taken up a position to the south of the town between the right bank of the Celle and the left of the Somme, extending along a front of fourteen miles from Saleaux on the Celle, by Dury, Boves, St Nicolas, and Villers Bretonneux, to Corbie, and intrenched at many points. The troops which occupied this position were the part of the Army of the North at that time available, which consisted mainly of the 22d Army Corps, and of the beginning of the 23d. General Briand commanded a detached Corps in the Department of the Lower Seine, with the special mission of protecting Havre and the neighbouring harbours.

The command of the Army of the North had been given in the beginning to General Bourbaki, as we have before related; but when he was called away to the south, to the Loire, it had been transferred to General Faidherbe. Faidherbe, who was born in 1818, left the Polytechnic School to enter the Engineers. After 1844 he served in Algeria until 1852, when he was removed to Senegambia. In 1854 he was promoted to the rank of chief of battalion, and appointed governor of the last-named colony, which, during his tenure of office, he extended by various bold enterprises, especially along the coasts, and by the subjection of a number of the most important Moorish princes. In the midst of all his military occupations he never forgot science, and issued and revised works which are of the highest importance for the knowledge of Western Africa and of the languages of the country. In the latter part of 1851 he was temporarily relieved in the government of Senegambia by Captain Jauréguiberry of the navy, but was only permanently recalled in 1865, after he had been appointed brigadier-general in 1863. After 1865 he commanded the subdivision Bona of the province of Constantine in Algeria, and thence he was called to take his place at the head of the Army of the North. At the time, however, of which we are speaking, he had not arrived in France, and was provisionally represented by General Farre.

On the 23d of November, the Prussian advanced-

guard, under Colonel von Lüderitz, had to sustain an encounter at Quesnel, on the road from Roye to Amiens; and on the 26th the advanced-guard of the 8th Prussian Corps came upon the French outposts at Thennes on the Luce, a tributary on the right to the Avre.

General Manteuffel therefore at once made preparations for an attack on the 27th upon the French position before Amiens. The first division of infantry, which had been left behind before Mezières, had been relieved by Schuler von Senden's landwehr division, and it was now possible to bring up from it the 1st brigade (Gayl), the 1st regiment of dragoons, and the detachment of artillery. These troops were forwarded by railway from Mezières to Laon, and then marched from this latter place through Noyon and Roye.

On the right the disposable troops of the 1st Corps marched on the 27th of November against the positions of Villers-Bretonneux and Gentelles, covered on the side of the Somme by the 3d division of cavalry; while the 8th Corps moved along the road from Montdidier against the positions of Boves and Dury.

The French, who, every one included, numbered at the most 35,000 men, had a very weak artillery, and a still weaker cavalry; moreover, they were very much scattered along their extended position, being much stronger on their left than on their right wing. With the Prussians the case was exactly the reverse.

The first opposition encountered by the 1st Prussian

Corps was on the Luce, and as it attacked the line of the river, it was itself assailed in the right flank from Corbie. Supported by the 3d division of cavalry, it had to form front in that direction, and then decided the battle at these points by capturing an intrenchment thrown up at Villers-Bretonneux.

The 8th North German Corps met with still less resistance than the 1st. It advanced fighting as far as the line Boves-Dury, when the absolute impossibility of holding his position must have become apparent to the French commander-in-chief, and early in the afternoon he commenced his retreat northwards upon Arras.

The Prussians had lost 1400 men in the encounters of the 27th of November. The French, it is true, suffered more severely, for besides 1383 killed and wounded, they lost 1000 in missing; and, moreover, many Mobiles disbanded themselves: but still, under the circumstances, the Prussian loss must be called a very considerable one.

General Manteuffel did not occupy the town of Amiens until the 28th of November. The citadel, poorly garrisoned, capitulated on the 29th, after its defenders had made an insignificant sortie. And in fact, since September, the population of these northern Departments had generally become much more disinclined to continue the war than were the people of the western and southern provinces; and therefore the Prussians did not encounter here even that pas-

sive resistance which gave them so much trouble in other districts of France.

During the 29th and 30th of November, Manteuffel caused small detachments of his troops to carry on the pursuit of the French in a northerly direction towards Arras, and in a north-westerly direction along the Somme towards Abbeville; but the mass of his disposable troops were destined to march upon Rouen, and were set in motion for that place on the 1st of December.

Rouen, the old capital of Normandy, is celebrated for the large number of its churches, but is also now a commercial town of the first rank on the Seine, with a population of more than 102,000 inhabitants.

During the march on Rouen, Manteuffel placed the 8th Corps on the right, while the 1st Corps, which by the 1st of December had drawn in the greater part of its detachments, occupied the left: the first-named Corps marching by Poix, Forges, and Buchy; the latter by Ailly, Breteuil, Marseille, and Gournay.

The French troops assembled about Rouen could not attempt resistance with any reasonable hope of success, and therefore, as soon as the 8th North German Corps arrived between Forges and Buchy, they retired. On the 6th of December Rouen was occupied by the Germans, and the town, long since weary of the lengthened quarrel, received its victors in a friendly manner—in a spirit much too friendly in the opinion of the adherents of Gambetta.

At Rouen Manteuffel allowed the greater part of his troops to rest. The French Army of the North prevented him from undertaking any operations on a large scale elsewhere, either beyond the Seine to the westward, or down the river against the fortified position of Havre. Still he caused the town of Dieppe, with its excellent harbour, to be occupied on the 9th of December, acquiring for himself thereby the power of drawing provisions from England, and denying the like opportunities to the French.

Meanwhile, on the 4th of December, General Faidherbe had arrived at Lille, and had undertaken there the command of the Army of the North. The Government of National Defence placed great confidence in this General, and he also was to co-operate in bringing about the relief of Paris, an enterprise which was to be again undertaken in combination with a large sortie from the capital.

But however much energy Faidherbe might display in gathering troops together, and however great might be his talent for organisation, it would nevertheless be impossible for him to concentrate in the north more than some 30,000 mobile troops. With these alone he could not march to the relief of Paris, and therefore the immediate objective of his operations must undoubtedly be to unite with the forces at Havre—the Army of Normandy—and also with the Army of the West, that of General Chanzy. He could therefore, for the present, only manœuvre towards the Lower Seine,

endeavouring at the same time to throw back the Army of General Manteuffel. Should he succeed in this, the union with the Army of Normandy would be attained; whether the junction with Chanzy would be also effected, depended upon the circumstances in which the latter General might be at the time the union was sought, and consequently upon the influence which Bourbaki's departure to the east might exercise upon the operations of the Germans.

Towards the middle of December, then, Faidherbe moved with all his disposable forces southwards upon Amiens, and by the 22d had taken up a position on the Hallue, his right resting upon Contay, on the upper course of the stream, and his front extending by Beaucourt, Querrieux, and Pont Noyelles, to Daours, at the confluence of the Hallue and Somme. From this position he intended to advance on the 23d against Amiens.

But Manteuffel had received information of Faidherbe's movements almost as soon as they were commenced. He had in consequence rapidly concentrated the available part of his army upon Amiens, and on the 23d himself attacked Faidherbe's position on the Hallue. According to all accounts, the forces of the opposing parties were numerically nearly equal, but the Germans were superior in artillery and cavalry.

The position taken up by Faidherbe was very extended, having a front of at least 17,000 paces; so that, on the average, there were not more than five men to

every two paces. Still the fighting was very stubborn, and was continued for seven hours. On Faidherbe's right and Manteuffel's left neither side gained any advantage throughout the day. But on the other flank, Manteuffel with his right succeeded ultimately in obtaining possession of the line of the lower Hallue between Daours and Pont Noyelles, and thence he threatened Faidherbe's rear. The latter was therefore compelled to retire—in the first place, upon Albert, which he reached, moving very leisurely, on the 25th, and thence on the 26th upon Bapaume; his headquarters being moved at first from Albert to Vitry, and afterwards to Douai. On the 27th Manteuffel invested the small fortress of Perrone (4500 inhabitants) on the Somme. Faidherbe, without altogether giving up every effort, did not attempt another serious battle; thus this effort at least to unite a large mass of field-troops with which to march to the relief of Paris was again frustrated.

The losses sustained by General Faidherbe's army during the fighting on the Hallue were comparatively small, amounting only to 141 killed, 905 wounded, and from 1200 to 1300 missing.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE SORTIE FROM PARIS ON THE 21ST OF DECEMBER 1870.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the events recorded in the previous chapter, another great sortie had been made from Paris.

In consequence of the numerous losses sustained by Ducrot's forces in the last days of November and the first of December, and of the various irregularities which had come to light on that occasion, his whole army was afterwards subjected to a reorganisation. Its 1st Corps, Blanchard, was dissolved; the 1st division, De Malroy, was distributed among the divisions of the Third Army; the 3d division, Faron, was also made over to the Third Army; the 2d division, De Maudhuy, was given to the 3d Corps of the Second Army, and thus Ducrot's army was left with six divisions of infantry and one weak division of cavalry.

The plan for the new sortie, which was to be undertaken on the 21st of December in connection with Faidherbe's operations, was calculated to strike a chief blow against the investing line on the north,

and therefore especially against the Prussian Guard; and this main effort was to be accompanied by demonstrations in the east against the Saxons, and in the west upon the peninsula of Nanterre against the 5th North German Corps.

The want of mobility in the French masses, which obliged the highest in command to arrange the very smallest details, necessitated that the troops should always be set in motion very early, and as this could never be effected without a considerable noise, the Prussians were always informed betimes of any movements on a large scale; and, moreover, the French troops were greatly fatigued by the preparations alone.

The line of outposts of the Prussian Guard ran from Pierrefitte by Stains along the Mollette to Le Bourget, the Corps itself being quartered far in rear, along the line Garges, Dugny, Pont Iblon, Le Blanc-Mesnil, Aunay, and Sévran.

Against these troops the disposable part of Ducrot's army and the Corps of St Denis, Admiral De la Roncière, formerly the 2d division of the 3d Corps, were to operate on the 21st of December. But the preparatory movements were commenced in the French camp to a great extent on the 20th; for the troops of De la Roncière, which were to attack Le Bourget, were moved up early in the day into the neighbourhood of Aubervillers, where they encamped; while on their right Ducrot deployed his masses about Bobigny.

Thus, by the afternoon of the 20th the Prussians were fully aware that something important was about to be carried out on the following day. The 1st division of the Guard, Pape, therefore received orders to hold all its disposable troops in readiness between 7 and 8 A.M. on the 21st, in the vicinity of Le Blanc Mesnil, on the road from Gonesse to Aunay; while the 2d division, Budritzky, was to be prepared to deploy on the left of the 1st as soon as the alarm should be sounded.

De la Roncière commenced the battle at 7 A.M. on the 21st of December by attacking simultaneously Stains, Dugny, and Le Bourget, at the same time making a demonstration against Epinay les St Denis with five battalions, supported by two floating-batteries on the Seine. The course of the fighting about the first-named places was similar to that in all struggles for localities. Success wavered from side to side, and the combat was stubbornly fought out—the contest for Le Bourget being especially obstinate, and ending only at three o'clock in the afternoon, when the Prussians were finally victorious there. Then, for the first time in the day, Ducrot brought his artillery into action, particularly against Pont Iblon and Le Blanc Mesnil, and later on in the evening he occupied with his infantry Drancy and Le Groslay, a movement which it was of no importance to the Prussians to prevent.

These attacks in the north, as well as all the

sorties at other points, were supported by the artillery of the forts, but its action did not prove very effective.

The Saxon Corps in its positions from Sévran to the Marne at Chelles was only disturbed during the forenoon by the fire of the forts, especially by that of the marine-battery on Mont Avron. At noon, however, a strong division of the Third Army under Generals De Malroy and Blaise issued from Forts Rosny and Nogent, and advanced through Neuilly sur Marne against La Maison Blanche on the Strasburg Railway, and Ville Evrart on the Chelles Canal, near the Marne. The weak outposts of the Saxons in La Maison Blanche and Ville Evrart were easily driven in, but as the French pushed forward eastward, they came upon the inundation on the right bank of the Marne, between Gournay, Le Chenay, and Chelles, and being taken in flank at the same time by the Würtemberg batteries at Noisy le Grand on the left bank of the Marne, they were unable to penetrate further. And now the Saxon General, Von Nehrhoff, determined in turn to assume the offensive, and to retake La Maison Blanche and Ville Evrart. The attack was made at five o'clock with five battalions, and by half-past six La Maison Blanche was again in the hands of the Saxons. But the struggle for Ville Evrart was much more stubborn. There the French maintained themselves in some of the houses, while the Saxons occupied the

others; but as during the night the waters of the Marne rose rapidly, and threatened to transform Ville Evrart into an island, the Saxons evacuated it at 3 A.M. on the 22d of December, the French likewise withdrawing some hours afterwards.

The 4th division—belonging to the 2d North German Corps—had been placed in readiness to act as a reserve for the Saxons, but it did not become necessary to bring it into action.

The demonstration upon the peninsula of Nanterre under the command of General Noël, which was supported by a furious but ineffective fire from Mont Valérien, only resulted in an insignificant encounter at Buzanval.

The losses of the Germans on the 21st of December amounted to about 500 men, killed and wounded. Those of the French were much more considerable; and on this occasion, also, they left behind many unwounded prisoners in the hands of the Germans.

In general, it may be said that the sortie of the 21st of December was conducted without spirit or endurance. The coldness of the weather may have partly contributed to this, but it must in any case be attributed in a greater degree to the prevailing despondency of success,—a feeling which, however, it was essential for the leaders in Paris to subdue. A well-defined hope of a good result from a great sortie from Paris, before the Germans had even commenced the bombardment, could only exist if a relieving army

was in the neighbourhood, and only a few days' march distant; and although M. Gambetta in the despatches which he sent to Paris boldly confounded his dreams with realities, still the generals in the capital necessarily sought more minutely for facts than seemed requisite to Gambetta, and they unavoidably began to be sceptical of the correctness of the communications forwarded to them by the Minister of War, especially when they remembered his confusion of the two Epinays, and the consequent boldness with which he read maps and reports.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE WEST FROM THE REOCCUPATION OF ORLEANS BY THE GERMANS UNTIL THE ARMISTICE.

We have seen how towards the end of December 1870 the endeavours of General Faidherbe to relieve Paris from the north, and to effect a junction with the Army of the West, were frustrated by the encounter on the Hallue, and the fighting which ensued during the pursuit. We have also seen how the sortie from Paris on the 21st of December terminated fruitlessly. But simultaneously with these events the French Army of the West had also been prevented from contributing towards the realisation of the object for which all the French armies were in those days necessarily compelled to strive.

After the reverses sustained at Orleans, the greater part of this Army of the West, the so-called Second Army under General Chanzy, consisting of the 16th, 17th, and 21st Corps, was concentrated on the right bank of the Loire below Orleans, on the line Beaugency-Marchenoir, between the rivers Loire and Loir.

In this position Chanzy remained for the next few days covering Tours, which still remained the seat of the Delegate Government; and it was only after it had been determined on the 9th of December to remove this to Bordeaux, that the French General received greater liberty of movement.

Bourbaki meanwhile assembled the First Army, the greater part of the future Army of the East, about Bourges, between the left bank of the Loire and the Cher. The Corps which he collected there, had suffered very severely, had fallen into considerable disorder during the retreat, and required reorganising; but it was calculated that this could be effected to some extent by the 20th of December, and that measures for the great operations in the East might be taken accordingly.

On the German side Prince Frederic Charles, immediately after the reoccupation of Orleans, divided his army as follows:—

The detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg took up a position on the right bank of the Loire below Orleans, between the river and the road to Chateaudun;

The 9th Army Corps moved forward on the left bank of the Loire along the road to Blois;

The 6th division of cavalry, supported by detachments of infantry from the 3d Corps, followed the railway through the Sologne to Vierzon;

The main body of the 3d Corps ascended the Loire to Gien;

The 10th Corps finally was kept in reserve in and near Orleans.

The 17th division, which formed the left wing of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment, as it advanced along the left bank of the Loire, came on the 7th of December, near La Corne before Meung, upon Camô's division, the nucleus of the 19th Corps, which had been pushed forward by Chanzy from Beaugency. The French were defeated, but on the following day Chanzy himself advanced with his main body from the positions of Beaugency and Marchenoir. On the other side the Grand Duke of Mecklenberg brought into action the 17th and 22d North German and the 1st Bavarian divisions, and again the issue of the day was in favour of the Germans. This definitely decided the Delegation of the French Government to evacuate Tours. The troops of the Grand Duke occupied on the same day, the 8th, Beaugency, and on the 9th the villages of Grand Bonvalet, Villorceau, and Cernay, which lie to the north of it.

The character of these battles was always the same, and their tactical value extremely small. The Germans were victorious owing to the superior solidity of their troops; the French legions, improvised though they were, went bravely into action, but recognising speedily that their courage was of little avail when

opposed to the firmer leadership and cohesion of the other side, relaxed their efforts, and the reserves hurrying up were soon affected in the same manner. The commanding officers, valiant though they might be, could not remain with every separate battalion, and as soon as they had witnessed a few disbandments—such as took place here, for instance—ordered the retreat, and applied all their energies to securing its execution in as orderly a manner as possible.

On the other hand, the Germans had reason enough to acknowledge the bravery of these improvised French troops, and especially the effective action of their artillery, although it was as badly horsed as it possibly could be.

As soon as the first intelligence of the occurrences of the 7th of December was received from the Grand Duke, Prince Frederic Charles ordered his general reserve, the 10th Corps, to march to its right to support the Mecklenburg General, and at the same time directed the 9th Corps to co-operate with him on the left bank of the Loire, wherever an opportunity might present itself. This latter Corps therefore manœuvred accordingly, and on the 9th of December had to sustain an encounter near Montlivault and the castle of Chambord, to the north-west of Blois.

On the 10th the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg purposed giving his troops a day of rest in the positions they had taken up between Beaugency and Cernay; but Chanzy would not allow them any repose, for on

the 10th he attacked them again: the battle, carried on chiefly by artillery, continued until dusk.

Chanzy's design in making this attack was chiefly to reconnoitre once more the German position, and to secure for a few days his march northwards through Vendôme. It will be remembered that Faidherbe had undertaken the command of the Army of the North at Lille on the 4th, and Chanzy now wished to unite with him, as it was no longer requisite to cover Tours after the Delegation of the Government had migrated thence to Bordeaux.

The battles of the 10th of December, and the reports of them which he received, decided Prince Frederic Charles to give the following orders:—

The 10th and 9th Corps were to advance along the right and left banks of the Loire upon Blois, to prevent the passage of French troops from the left to the right bank of the river;

The 3d Corps was to give up its operations on the Loire above Orleans, and draw near to Beaugency to support directly the main army.

The Prince himself moved his headquarters on the 12th of December to Beaugency, and on the 13th still further down the river to Suèvres.

The 6th division of cavalry meanwhile, pursuing the right wing of the Army of the Loire through the Sologne, had overtaken the French rearguard on the 7th of December at Salbris, and had fought a successful action with it; on the 9th the division occupied

Vierzon on the Cher and on the railway from Bourges to Tours.

While these things were taking place below Orleans, the 3d Corps had, on the 8th of December, defeated at Nevoy, to the north-west of Gien, the detachments of Bourbaki's army pushed forward on the right bank of the Loire, and was pursuing them up the river above Briare, when it received orders to return to the lower Loire.

On the 13th of December the troops of the 10th North German Corps occupied Blois, which had been evacuated by the enemy. Here its commander, General Voigts-Rhetz, learned that the French had drawn off towards Vendôme, and thither he followed them, while the detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg also advanced in the same direction upon the Loir, somewhat more towards its upper portion, by way of Maves and Oucques on Morée. On the 13th the advanced-guard of these latter troops engaged with the French at several places along this line, and made many prisoners.

On the 15th of December the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg on the right, and General Voigts-Rhetz on the left, encountered violent opposition along the line of the Loir, from Morée to Vendôme; the battle remaining on the whole undecided, although its issue was in places in favour of the Germans.

Meanwhile Prince Frederic Charles, whose headquarters remained at Suèvres until the 17th of Decem-

ber, ordered that the 3d Corps, as soon as it arrived at Beaugency, should at once continue its march on Vendôme; while the 9th Corps, crossing the Loire at Blois, was also to proceed to the same place. The assumption entertained was, that Chanzy would either offer a decisive battle at Vendôme—in which case it would be necessary to collect there as many troops as possible—or that he would seek to push forward northwards towards the Seine below Paris, to attempt anew the relief of the capital, and to unite with Faidherbe.

But on the 16th of December a council of war of the French generals was held at Vendôme, at which it is said that Gambetta also was present. At this council the "plan" was again changed. It had been primarily assumed that Prince Frederic Charles would be altogether occupied in observing Bourbaki, and that, consequently, Chanzy would be left free to manœuvre as he wished. But the very reverse had actually taken place; for the Prince had concentrated all his forces against Chanzy, and therefore it was Bourbaki who was left undisturbed.

It was now hoped that Bourbaki would gain a great start for the intended operations in the east, if Chanzy, by simply retreating westward by Le Mans upon the camp at Conlie, were to draw all the forces of Prince Frederic Charles after him. It was hoped that the Germans would not then have any force worth naming left to prevent Bourbaki relieving Belfort, cutting

the German communications along the Strasburg-Paris line, or even invading southern Germany.

A retreat upon Le Mans was therefore decided upon, and was commenced on the 16th of December in such haste that a number of important papers were left behind which explained many things to the head-quarters of the Prince. The bridges also over the Loir had been blown up by the retreating French, but so imperfectly that the 10th North German Corps was able to repair them in a few hours.

During this retreat westward, also, grave symptoms of the unwillingness of the mass of the French people to continue the war began to manifest themselves; and in truth the nation now despaired of success. General Chanzy was obliged to order his *gendarmerie* to make prisoners of the soldiers who deserted from the army, many of whom made use of the railway to effect their escape. He complained also of the want of enterprise of his cavalry when compared with the German horsemen, who were continually disturbing the French outposts with small detachments, and thus occasioned great losses in the enemy's army, with a very inconsiderable expenditure of their own men. Moreover, he complained of the irregularities in the conduct of the business of the army, the omission of sending in the most necessary reports, and the independent manner in which the generals refused to obey the most positive orders.

When Prince Frederic Charles became aware of

Chanzy's retreat, he determined not to send by any means the whole of his force in pursuit to the westward, but to keep only sufficient detachments near Chanzy to be able to procure the requisite information of his further movements. Two reasons caused him to adopt this resolution. In the first place, those troops of the Second Army which during the last weeks had been continually making great exertions imperatively required rest, especially as the weather was very inclement; and, secondly, because reports were coming in from Gien of the assemblage of considerable French forces—Bourbaki's army—between that place and Bourges. From the information which he received about their movements, Prince Frederic Charles concluded—wrongly, indeed, as we know—that Bourbaki intended to undertake an enterprise against the German investing-line on the south of Paris; and should this be the case, he did not wish to move away so far to the west that he would not be able to fall upon Bourbaki with sufficient force.

Consequently the Prince ordered the 9th and 3d Corps to turn and again ascend the Loire, although the 3d Corps had drawn so near that its leading troops had been able to take part in the action of Vendôme on the 15th, and the 9th Corps had on the same day arrived in the neighbourhood of Amboise and Montrichard, on the left bank of the Loire.

For the present, the detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and the 10th Corps were to remain

behind to observe Chanzy. They were to occupy, for this purpose, in very disseminated order, a line running from Chartres on the right across the Upper Loir, and terminating finally at Blois on the Loire, the 10th Corps, General Voigts-Rhetz, being on the left, and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg on the right—the 1st Bavarian Corps, however, being separated from the forces of this latter General, and detached to watch the neighbourhood of the Loire about Orleans.

On the 17th of December, Prince Frederic Charles caused the French to be pursued from Vendôme to Epuisay, and northward towards Droue, and on the 19th detachments following closely upon the enemy, who offered no resistance, came to St Calais. During this pursuit the truth of the reports of Chanzy's retreat westward was fully confirmed, and thereupon the Prince removed his headquarters on the 18th of December to Meung, and on the 19th back to Orleans.

Of the 10th Corps, the 19th division, Schwarzkoppen, moved from Vendôme southwards by Chateau-Renault upon Tours, not with the intention of occupying the latter town, but to ascertain whether any considerable masses of French were still concentrated there, and also to cut the railway from Tours to Le Mans. As it was executing this mission, the division came on the 19th of December upon detachments of French at Monnaie, and drove them back by

Notre Dame d'Oé. On the 21st it stood before Tours, into which a few shells were thrown. Negotiations were forthwith commenced, but General Schwarzkoppen did not enter the town, preferring to take up his quarters to the eastward of it. On the same day the headquarters of the 10th Corps were at Blois.

During these movements the 1st division of cavalry, Hartmann, was attached to the 10th Corps, and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had also two divisions of horse at his disposal. The principal task assigned to these horsemen, who were, when necessary, supported by a few battalions of infantry, was to cling closely to the enemy, and ascertain whether he was actually doing anything, or what he might be intending to do. Consequently, in the latter part of December various collisions took place between the Loir and the Sarthe, for the most part skirmishes of no essential importance, and which at the most could show the Germans that Chanzy had even more urgent need than they themselves of rest and time to re-establish his troops.

One, however, of these smaller enterprises has been held to be worthy of special narration. On the 25th of December a small detachment of Prussian cavalry, descending the Loir from Vendôme, was received, on entering the villages of Troo and Sougé, with a fire of musketry from the houses. For this offence these places were to be punished; and for this purpose General Kraatz-Koschlau ordered, on the 26th of

December, a detachment of six companies of the 79th regiment, one squadron of the 12th Uhlan regiment, and two guns to proceed from Vendôme by Montoire, Troo, and Sougé, to the Braye, giving them instructions to burn and scourge every place where any sort of resistance had been offered; and, in short, to carry out rigorously the system which had been for some months adopted by the Germans.

The detachment from the 79th regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel von Boltenstern, marched on the 26th of December to Montoire, left posts behind there and in Les Roches, and marched upon Troo. There it was received with a fire of musketry, and remained for about two hours searching the place. It then proceeded further to Sougé, where it encountered hostile troops, and became engaged in an action with them. While this was going on, Boltenstern remarked that other troops were deploying in considerable numbers on his right flank, and were moving in the direction of Troo and Les Roches to cut off his retreat. Thereupon he determined to retire, and succeeded in arriving safely at Troo. There he drew in a company which he had left behind, and then continued his march upon Montoire. But on his way thither, as he drew near to St Quentin, he was fired upon by French artillery posted on the heights which lie to the northward, and rise up to an altitude of 150 feet above the valley of the Loire. To the east of St Quentin, also, he came upon French infantry, which,

having the right resting on the northern heights, and the left on the Loire, completely barred his road of retreat. Hereupon he at once extended the whole of his remaining infantry—four companies—in a dense line of skirmishers; ordered the two guns, which were very badly horsed, as many draught-horses had been recently lost, to keep close up to them, and the squadron to act in a similar manner. Thus arrayed, he pushed forward to the attack, forced his way through, making 240 prisoners, and, moreover, carrying off with him to Montoire the hostages he had taken in Troo and Sougé, fifty in number. At Montoire he had to sustain another encounter with a French detachment, which had driven in the post he had left behind, and now opposed his march. There again he was victorious, and finally succeeded in reaching Vendôme at eleven o'clock in the evening, having only lost about 100 men during the expedition.

Another detachment which General Voigts-Rhetz despatched from Blois on the 26th of December along the left bank of the Loire towards Amboise, encountered at Rilly a weak French detachment, which retired upon Montrichard on the Cher without striking a blow.

While these reconnaissances were being carried out on the right, the left wing of Prince Frederic Charles's army, consisting of the 3d and 9th Corps, and the cavalry allotted to them, also sent out numerous scouting-parties during the latter part of December through

the Sologne to Vierzon, by Aubigny as far as La Chapelle in the direction of Bourges, and on the other side from Montargis on the right bank of the Loire to Gien and Briare, and even higher up the river. One of these expeditions, a Bavarian detachment, had been obliged to withdraw on the 15th of December from Gien to Ouzouer; and another from the 9th Corps, despatched from Montargis to Briare to break up the railway along the Loire from Gien to Nevers, encountered French forces between Miennes and Cosnes.

But in spite of the activity of his left wing, Prince Frederic Charles was not informed of Bourbaki's intentions until very late—not indeed until the beginning of January, and therefore not until the French general had already commenced his movement. The question then once more arose whether the Prince should follow Bourbaki to the east or fall upon Chanzy in the west; and in agreement with the great headquarters in Versailles, it was determined to pursue the latter course, as other forces could be rendered disposable for action against Bourbaki.

The 3d Army Corps was therefore concentrated with all speed at Beaugency, the 9th at Orleans, the 10th was already at Blois—the 20th division, Kraatz-Koschlau, holding Vendôme on the Loir—and the 13th Corps was in the neighbourhood of Chartres.

The great operations from the line of the Loir towards the west were to be commenced on the 6th

of January, and by that day the troops were to have taken up the following positions :—

The 13th Corps, Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, was to be at Brou on the Ozanne, between the Huisne and Loir, with a detachment on the right at Nogent le Rotrou—the 4th division of cavalry was also given to this Corps ;

The 9th Corps (18th division of infantry and reserve of artillery) and the 2d division of cavalry at Morée on the Loir ;

The 3d Corps at Vendôme on both banks of the Loir, relieving Kraatz-Koschlau's division ;

The 10th Corps and the 1st and 6th divisions of cavalry at Montoire.

From these positions a convergent advance of the German columns was to take place upon Le Mans, the centre of the French positions. The conditions for this manœuvre were not in themselves favourable. The country between the Loir and the Sarthe, well known through the war in the Vendée during the great Revolution, is covered with detached homesteads, but has comparatively few villages. The gardens, farms, and meadows are enclosed by quickset hedges and cut up by avenues of trees ; the country is slightly undulating, and the elevated points are crowned with country seats, which, dating many of them from times long gone by, offer excellent opportunities for local defence. Still, if these houses were absent from the landscape, the aspect of the country would not be

unfamiliar to the older German soldiers, if they only recalled to mind what they had seen in Schleswig-Holstein. Individually far superior, especially to the present French troops, they had no occasion to fear fighting in such a district. The weather certainly was very disagreeable during the period when the battles were fought which we are about to relate. Frost and snow alternated with thaws. These latter brought mud, which made the march and the bivouac equally unpleasant; and the frost after the thaws covered the roads with glazed ice, which made a rapid advance impossible, and brought snowstorms which circumscribed the view.

On the 4th of January Prince Frederic Charles removed his headquarters from Orleans to Beaugency, on the 5th to Oucques, and on the 6th fighting ensued along the whole line. On the right wing the right flanking detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had to sustain encounters at La Loupe, and afterwards at La Fourche, the point where the road to Dreux branches off from the highway from Nogent le Rotrou by Chartres to Paris, and consequently these troops failed to reach their assigned post, Nogent le Rotrou, on the named day. The main body of the 13th Corps concentrated to the west of Brou.

In the centre the main body of Kraatz-Koschlau's division had marched in the early morning from the neighbourhood of Vendôme upon Montoire. The

outposts which were left behind at Azay and in the forest of Vendôme were at once attacked by the French. At mid-day, however, the head of the 3d Corps, advancing from Villetreun and Villeromain, came into line, and succeeded before dusk in driving back the French troops behind Azay.

The detachments of the 10th Corps from Vendôme and St Amand on the Brenne concentrated in the neighbourhood of Les Roches and Lavardin near Montoire, after a few insignificant encounters.

The 1st and 6th divisions of cavalry had been left behind at St Amand to cover the advance of the 10th Corps. At noon they were attacked from the south, from Chateau Renault, and were compelled to retreat northwards upon Ambloy and Huisseau en Beauce; whereupon General Voigts-Rhetz, chief of the 10th Corps, in order not to be delayed on the further march on the morrow upon La Chartre sur Loir, sent four battalions of infantry from the 37th brigade under Colonel Lehmann to reinforce General Hartmann, who commanded the two cavalry divisions.

On this same day, the 6th of January, Prince Frederic Charles established his headquarters at Vendôme, and thence he gave, as the general work for the 7th, the advance of the whole army to the line of the Braye, a tributary on the right of the Loir.

Accordingly the main body of the 13th Corps moved on this latter day to Authon, the right flanking detachment marching by Nogent le Rotrou, where it

became engaged with the enemy, to Le Theil on the Huisne.

In the centre the 9th Corps moved by Danzé upon Epuisay, and the 3d Corps upon the same place by way of Azay, sending out a left flanking detachment under Stülpnagel, six battalions and six batteries, in the direction of Savigny. The day was foggy, and both at Epuisay and Savigny combats ensued in which, owing to the thickness of the weather, the employment of artillery was impossible; but by evening the 3d Corps occupied the positions of Sargé and Savigny, while the 9th remained in rear at Epuisay.

The 10th Corps, not feeling certain of being able to accomplish its object, remained halted about Montoire; but even the detachment on its extreme left, under General Hartmann, was not attacked during the 7th, the French troops opposite to it rather withdrawing westward; for Chanzy, who in the middle of December had calculated upon Prince Frederic Charles following him, and upon Bourbaki thereby obtaining freedom of action, was now, in the beginning of January, astonished that the Prince had not followed Bourbaki.

The task for the Germans on the 8th of January was: the centre to force the line of the Braye by the highway from Vendôme to St Calais—the 9th Corps on the north, the 3d on the south, of the road; the right and left wings to take the line of the Braye in

rear, the 13th Corps by manœuvring down the valley of the Huisne, the 10th down that of the Loir.

In executing this movement the centre did not meet with any opposition, and advanced to Ecorpain and St Calais, to which latter town Prince Frederic Charles also removed his headquarters. On the right the main body of the 13th Corps arrived as far as La Ferté Bernard, in the valley of the Huisne; a left flanking detachment, pushed out to seek connection with the centre, came by way of Vibraye to Berfay; and a right flanking detachment (4th division of cavalry), sent out to explore the country in the direction of Alençon, arrived before Bellesme, but was unable to occupy the place.

On the left the main body of the 10th Corps came to La Chartre on the Loir; Lehmann's brigade, which had been recalled from Hartmann's detachment to Sougé while Hartmann's main body remained halted on both banks of the Brenne, sending out scouting-parties southwards about St Amand; while the 14th brigade of cavalry, Schmidt, kept up the communication between the 3d and 10th Corps by Vancé.

On the 9th of January Prince Frederic Charles purposed concentrating his army on the narrow front of Montfort on the Huisne—Parigné l'Evêque; the 13th Corps at the former place, the 10th at the latter, the 3d between them at Ardenay, and the 9th following the centre in reserve upon Bouloire. Thus the 10th Corps would have to change its direction to the

north instead of following its former route from east and to west. Meanwhile flank detachments were to endeavour to break up the railway communication from Le Mans southwards to Tours, and northwards to Alençon.

The 8th of January had been a cold, bright winter day, but during the night before the 9th snow fell, and the roads became extremely slippery. Moreover, during the whole of the 9th frequent snowstorms prevailed.

Nevertheless, on the right the 13th Corps succeeded in pushing forward, sustaining during its advance frequent encounters, especially in the neighbourhood of Sceaux, as far as the line Connerre-Thorigné, on the Nogue brook and on the left bank of the Huisne. In the centre the 6th division of the 3d Corps seized the village and castle of Ardenay, and established itself on the right bank of the Nărais; while on its left the 5th division advanced as far as the front Surfond-Challes, occupying at the latter place the left bank of the Narais.

On the left the main body of the 10th Corps (20th division and reserve of artillery) marched from La Chartre along the Grand Lucé road as far as Brives, after having been engaged near the latter place, and also at L'Homme. On his right General Voigts-Rhetz had detached Lehmann's brigade towards Vancé, to reinforce Schmidt's cavalry; while on his left he allowed General Hartmann's detachment, strengthened by the

38th brigade of infantry (Cranach), to remain halted on the Brenne, to cover the communications with Vendôme, taking from it, however, the 15th brigade of cavalry (belonging to the 6th division of cavalry), and ordering it to follow the 20th division upon Brives.

The reserve of the army, the 9th Corps, followed the centre along the road from St Calais, and arrived at Bouloire, where Prince Frederic Charles also established his headquarters, on the 9th of January.

On the French side on this same day, the 9th of January, Chanzy ordered a general offensive movement to be undertaken on the 10th, complaining bitterly at the same time that his generals had not offered any serious resistance. But in truth their subordinates were not obedient to these generals; and what could these latter do by themselves? The French Corps now stood as follows: the 16th (Jauréguiberry) on the right, on the road Grand Lucé-La Chartre; the 17th (Colomb) on the left, on the St Calais road; and the 21st (Jaurés) on the Huisne. From these positions all the Corps were to attack; none were to think of retreating; and General Bourdillon, of the 16th Corps, was to take post with his *gendarmerie*—two regiments—2½ miles from Le Mans, and seize all who attempted to retreat to that place. In an order of the day of the 9th of January, also, Chanzy announced to his troops that Bourbaki had gained a great victory at Villersexel.

This day, on which the French offensive was to be commenced, the 10th of January, was devoted by Prince Frederic Charles to a still further concentration of his army, essentially in the formerly-prescribed directions, upon Le Mans; but now the 13th Corps was to send a strong detachment to the right bank of the Huisne to support the 4th division of cavalry, which was directed upon Bonnetable.

Of the remainder of the 13th Corps the 22d division crossed in the first place by Sceaux to the right bank of the Huisne, took possession of Beillé, and then advanced further upon Lombron. During this movement it was attacked in its right flank from La Chapelle St Remy, and had to withdraw its right wing; so that on the evening of the day this portion of it stood at Couléon Chateau, and the left at Connerre on the right bank of the Huisne.

The 17th division also received orders in the course of the day to cross the Huisne, and, if possible, to penetrate to Savigné l'Evêque. In pursuance of these, it attempted to gain possession of the passage of Pont de Gesnes below Connerre, but was repulsed by Rousseau's division, which was stationed at Montfort.

In the German centre the 3d Corps advanced on the left bank of the Huisne in the following order: the 12th brigade (Bismark) moved along the road from Ardenay to Le Mans, having a battalion detached to the right to Mars la Bruyère to effect communication with a flanking detachment under Count Lynar,

which had already been sent out to the right, and on the 9th had reached La Belle Inutile, on the road from La Ferlê Bernard to Le Mans. In the afternoon the brigade encountered French troops at St Hubert beyond La Coquillère, and became involved in a prolonged forest action, during which it succeeded towards dusk in seizing a part of the village of Champagné; but shortly afterwards it evacuated the same again, without, as it would appear, being compelled to do so. On the left of the 12th, the 11th brigade of infantry (Flatow) manœuvred by Rossay through the forest upon Gué la Hart towards Changé, becoming also seriously engaged. In this action the right wing of the 5th division of infantry also took part, while its main body drove the French out of Parigné l'Evêque and back as far as the Chateau De la Paillerie; so that on the evening of the 10th, the 3d.Corps stood with its left wing thrown forward upon a line which may be described as passing through the points Mars la Bruyère on the Huisne, St Hubert, Gué la Hart, and La Paillerie.

On the left the 10th Army Corps did not encounter any enemy, but its march was much retarded by numerous barricades across the roads, so that it only succeeded in arriving at Grand Lucé, where it formed a reserve for the left wing of the 3d Corps.

The 9th Army Corps was concentrated as a general reserve about Bouloire.

The objects which General Chanzy had in view

when he issued his instructions on the 9th were not attained during the 10th. On the evening of this latter day, therefore, he promulgated fresh orders, in which, after complaining of the total failure of the operations of the 10th, he pointed out the lines which must be held on the 11th without any thought of retreating from them. These were as follows: On the right wing, the heights in front of Pontlieue, from the west of the Chemin des Bœufs to above the railway station of Yvré l'Evêque; the portion of these hills lying between the Sarthe and the road to Tours was to be defended by the Brittany troops under General Delalande; that between the roads from Tours and Parigné l'Evêque (La Chartre) by Deplanque's division of the 16th Corps; from Parigné l'Evêque to Yvré l'Evêque, by Roquebrune's and Jouffroy's divisions of the 17th Corps—the latter of which was, if possible, to retake Parigné l'Evêque from the Germans on the 11th. The 2d and 3d divisions of the 16th Corps were to place themselves in reserve as soon as they had fallen back as far as Pontlieue, and Admiral Jauréguiberry was to undertake the command of the whole of the right wing.

In the centre, the line to be held consisted of the Plateau of Auvours and the passages of the Huisne at Champagné and St Mars la Bruyère. This portion of the front was to be defended by the 2d division of the 17th Corps and Gougeard's division of the 21st, both under the command of General De Colomb,

commander of the 17th Corps, who was, if possible, to throw the Germans back through Ardenay, the last-named division occupying the passages of the river with detachments.

On the left, the remainder of the 21st Corps under General Jaurés was to hold the heights in front of Sargé between the Huisne and Sarthe; while the Brittany troops brought up from the camp at Conlie were to be posted in reserve on the right bank of the Sarthe.

Simultaneously with these instructions for the occupation of the line of battle, General Chanzy issued a mass of orders relating to details of dispositions which would have taken place as a matter of course in an organised army. Moreover, he threatened a number of measures calculated to oblige his troops to hold their ground—such as breaking the bridges in rear of the army, shooting any one who left the field of battle, &c.

On the German side Prince Frederic Charles prepared for a decisive battle on the 11th of January. In the centre the 3d Corps was, in the first place, not to engage too heavily, partly in order to gain time for the 9th Corps—the reserve—to come up, and partly to allow the two wings—the 13th and 10th Corps—to operate against the flanks of the enemy.

Of the 13th Corps the 17th division, which had not been able to force the passage of the Huisne at Pont de Gesnes on the 10th, crossed the river on the 11th

much higher up at Connerre; and then both the 17th and 22d divisions pushed forwards up to the line Chapelle-Lombron.

Of the 3d Corps the advanced-guard of the right wing had, in the first place, to retake on the morning of the 11th the village of Champagné, which had been evacuated on the 10th. The efforts of the whole Corps were then concentrated on the chateaux of Les Arches and Les Noyers. Both of these points were taken, and the Germans then pushed forward through Changé into the woods towards L'Epau.

Towards noon the 9th Corps had advanced in reserve to the 3d as far as Champagné, and thence fought gallantly for the possession of the Plateau d'Auvours. During the afternoon a portion of the 18th division was detached from it to the right bank of the Huisne to the support of the 13th Corps.

On the left wing the 10th Corps, in compliance with the orders received by it, moved with its main body against the Ecommoy road, only a brigade of cavalry and a small force of artillery and infantry being left behind upon the Grand Lucé road. The Ecommoy road was only weakly occupied by the French, and thus the 20th division of infantry pressed forward as far as Les Mortes-Aures, and Lehmann's brigade, which followed it with the reserve artillery of the 10th Corps, to Mulsanne.

Schmidt's brigade of cavalry, which had been left behind on the right flank of the main body of the

10th Corps on the Grand Lucé road, succeeded in arriving by way of Parigné l'Evêque as far as the Chateau De la Paillerie.

Meanwhile the chief of the 20th division, Kraatz-Koschlau, sent forward from Les Mortes-Aures a few battalions still further to the front against La Tuilerie (Verd Galant), and succeeded in seizing this post, upon which Chanzy laid great value.

On the 12th of January, Prince Frederic Charles, who had established his headquarters on the evening of the 11th in Ardenay, purposed continuing his offensive manœuvre always in the same direction; Chanzy also on the French side assumed the offensive early in the morning at all points.

The early part of the day was cold and foggy, and all the roads were slippery from frost. It was noon before the mist cleared away, but spite of this the 22d division of the 13th Corps advanced on the right of La Chapelle through St Celerin and Torcé against the Bonnetable Le Mans road, and pushed forward along it, although continually engaged, by Chanteloup to St Croix; while on its right the 4th division of cavalry spread out towards the Sarthe as far as Ballon and Souligné.

Meanwhile the 17th division deployed on the left of the 22d over against St Corneille, supported by the 35th brigade (Blumenthal), which was now brought over altogether to the right bank of the Huisne. Two of its battalions which had taken up

a position on the 11th at Fatines, were violently attacked there by the French on the forenoon of the 12th; but still the 17th division and the 35th brigade established themselves by dusk on the Parance brook.

In the centre, the part of the 9th North German Corps disposable on the left bank of the Huisne struggled with varying success for the possession of the Plateau d'Auvours. On the lower Huisne the French, still holding the left bank, had early assumed the offensive against the 3d Corps, and here the battle raged throughout the day without any decisive result being arrived at.

But on the left wing the fortune of the day was decided in favour of the Germans. There the 10th Corps and Schmidt's brigade of cavalry pushed forward along the Ecommoy and Grand Lucé roads, until, at 4 P.M., they were close to Le Mans. Thereupon the left wing of the French became stricken with a panic, and scenes of the utmost horror ensued. The soldiers cast off every semblance of discipline, and even threw the wounded out of the carriages of the trains preparing to start, in order to take their places themselves. Nothing therefore remained for Chanzy but to arrange as speedily as possible for the retreat of his left wing, and also of his centre. The 17th and 16th French Corps were ordered to retire westward upon Laval, being directed on the 13th through the camp at Conlie, to provide themselves from its magazines with ammunition and provisions.

On the evening of the 12th, nothing could be ascertained as to the whereabouts of the 21st Corps (Jaurés); but on the 13th it was directed northwards upon Alençon, and the troops in the fortified camp at Conlie were ordered to evacuate it with all speed. The covering of the retreat, which, however, had now become rather a rout, was intrusted to Admiral Jauréguiberry.

Meanwhile Prince Frederic Charles, who, during the action of the 12th, had repaired to the battle-field of the 3d Army Corps, had come to the conclusion that a decisive result could not be obtained on that day. Accordingly, as dusk came on he had returned to Ardenay, to make fresh dispositions for the renewal of the battle on the morrow. There at 8 P.M. he received information that Le Mans was taken by the 10th Army Corps, and that the 5th division of the 3d Corps, following the retreat of the French centre, had already penetrated beyond the chateau of Les Arches.

The losses of the Second German Army in its advance from Vendôme to Le Mans, or from the Loir to the Sarthe, are estimated at 3500 men in killed and wounded. The losses of the French in the same six days, from the 6th to the 12th of January, were much more considerable — in unwounded prisoners alone the Germans had taken 16,000 men, also 12 guns and mitrailleuses, with many carriages; and it is said that in the days

immediately following the capture of Le Mans, the prisoners who fell into their hands increased the number already made by at least 6000.

After the successes of Le Mans, Prince Frederic Charles had not any intention of advancing further to the westward beyond the line of the Sarthe; but he nevertheless wished to harvest the full fruits of the victory he had gained by a vigorous pursuit with detachments, and to this end he issued orders at once for the 13th of January. His own headquarters he established on the 15th in Le Mans.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, with the 13th Army Corps, the 4th division of cavalry, and the 12th brigade of cavalry from the 5th division, was directed to proceed northwards up the Sarthe upon Alençon. On its way thither the 22d division of infantry became engaged in advanced-guard affairs at Ballon and Beaumont, and on the 15th at Frenay. On the 17th Alençon was occupied; and thence on the 22d a strong detachment was sent forward to Rouen, to establish communication with the First Army, and also to frustrate any attempts which escaped fractions of Chanzy's forces might make to unite with Faidherbe.

While these measures were being taken to carry out the pursuit in the north, the 14th brigade of cavalry, now under the command of General von Schmidt, supported by detachments of the 9th Corps, moved from Le Mans in the direction of Laval. On the 14th of

January, Schmidt encountered the French rear-guard at Chassillé on the Vegre, and drove it in, making many hundred prisoners. On the 16th the Germans had arrived beyond Vaige, and halted in view of Laval. In the interval the great fortified camp at Conlie, where a mass of stores of all kinds had been left behind untouched, was occupied by the Germans on the 14th.

To the south a combined brigade of the 3d Prussian Army Corps followed on the 13th of January upon Angers, whither it seemed that the 17th French Corps was retreating; and lastly, on the 19th of the same month, a portion of the 10th Army Corps occupied Tours without resistance.

Thus the French Army of the West was rendered harmless for a lengthened period. It is true that General Chanzy had designed, after the defeat at Le Mans, to withdraw his whole army northwards upon Alençon, and thence attempt a bold stroke against the German armies before Paris; but an order of Gambetta expressly directed a retreat upon the Mayenne. Now Prince Frederic Charles had required, although constantly victorious, a full week to traverse the 42 miles from Vendôme to Le Mans. Assuming, therefore, that Chanzy, who now stood behind the Mayenne, had been able to assume the offensive at once, some time about the 20th of January, and that he had been able to move to the westward as rapidly as Prince Frederic Charles had done to the eastward, he never-

theless could not have appeared before the walls of Paris before the 20th of February.

As affairs really stood, therefore, Chanzy could not for the present think of again assuming the offensive. Moreover, the number of his troops who were in any degree accustomed to warfare could barely amount to 70,000 men, and he certainly could not hope great things as to the quality of the reinforcements which certainly might be sent to him in the next few weeks. But even if things had been more promising in this respect, still several weeks must elapse before the necessary quantity of fresh troops could arrive to justify a new assumption of the offensive; so that we may say that even were Chanzy to be continually successful in his new attack, he could not arrive in the neighbourhood of Paris before the first week of March.

The Government of National Defence in Paris was totally uninformed of the real state of affairs with the Army of the West. It certainly received information from the Delegate Minister of the Interior and War at Bordeaux, M. Gambetta, that Chanzy had retired behind the Mayenne; but it could only conclude from the framing of the despatches that the French general had voluntarily withdrawn thither in pursuance of some deep plan of Gambetta's: it could not perceive from their wording that Prince Frederic Charles had compelled the French Army of the West to retreat behind the Mayenne. It disapproved of Gambetta's

plans, but the result of them nevertheless remained the same.

This result, and that of other similar schemes throughout France, together with the especial position of Paris, compelled the conclusion of a capitulation and armistice on the 28th of January, the latter of which also became valid on the 31st for the two hostile armies in the west.

During the great operations of Prince Frederic Charles, many minor collisions took place also on the Loire. Of these we will only mention here the advance of a portion of the newly-formed 25th French Corps, General Lecointe, from Nevers, against a weak detachment of Rantzau's brigade of the 9th North German Corps, pushed forward to Briare.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH DURING THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1871.

We left the operations in the north towards the end of December 1870, when General Faidherbe retired upon Douay after the battle of Pont Noyelles, and concentrated his troops in the camp at Vitry, between Douay and Arras.

The First German Army, under General von Manteuffel, after having sent out numerous detachments, stood with the bulk of its forces before Amiens, on the road to Arras and Douay by Bapaume. A strong detachment under General von der Gröben—commanded, however, after the 2d of January 1871, by the younger Prince Albrecht of Prussia, and consisting of the 3d Prussian division of cavalry, the 19th regiment of North German infantry, and the 1st battalion of Saxon Rifles—secured the right wing, patrolling towards the St Quentin canal, which unites the Oise and Scheldt, and towards the whole line from St Quentin to Cambray; while on Manteuffel's left, General von Bentheim, with the greater portion of his division, the 1st, stood on the Seine near Rouen, to command both its banks.

On the 2d of January 1871, Faidherbe, whose activity certainly cannot be denied, again set his troops in motion from the camp at Vitry. The 2d division of the 22d Army Corps, General Robin, encountered on the same day the 30th brigade of Prussian infantry at Sapignies, to the north of Bapaume, on the road to Arras, and a severe engagement ensued, in which the Prussians succeeded in holding their position. Robin's division, which formed Faidherbe's advanced-guard, could not be supported during the day; but towards evening Faidherbe brought up the whole of the 22d Army Corps and deployed it along the line from Achiet to Ervillers, upon which Robin also retreated, in readiness to attack on the following day.

But on the German side, also, larger forces were concentrated for the 3d of January — namely, the whole of the 15th division and the detachment of the younger Prince Albrecht.

On the forenoon of the 3d, General Faidherbe advanced to the attack. On the right, at Achiet, success changed from side to side; while on the left the attempt of the French general to push forward from Ervillers upon Behagnies failed, in spite of the great numerical superiority which he developed there. When evening came on, no decisive result had been gained; but while the Germans had preserved their compactness, the French had become considerably disordered; and Faidherbe therefore judged it to be expedient to commence a retreat. For the time

being, however, he only retired about five miles from the field of battle to Boisleux, on the road to Arras, and there he remained unmolested until the 6th of January. The loss of the Germans during the two days' fighting on the 2d and 3d of January amounted to 1120 men, among whom were 46 officers, killed and wounded; while Faidherbe, according to his own accounts, had lost 4000 men.

The Germans had not pursued Faidherbe, partly because they were unwilling to become entangled among the fortresses of the north, partly because numerous changes were being effected in the First Army about this time; for as soon as it became certainly known at the German headquarters in Versailles that Bourbaki had commenced his movement from west to east, from Nevers to Besançon, in order to fall upon Werder's Corps from the latter place, it was resolved to form a German Army of the South; and General von Manteuffel, hitherto the Chief of the First Army, was appointed to the head of it. The command thus vacated was now given to General von Göben, the post of Chief of the 1st Army Corps to General von Bentheim, formerly commandant of the 1st division, while the command of this last was undertaken by General von Gayl.

In the beginning of January Bentheim stood, as we have related above, at Rouen on the Seine. A French Corps under General Roye was to attack him there on the left bank of the river, supported by another

on the right; but this latter never appeared on the scene. Bentheim, informed of Roye's advance, crossed on the morning of the 4th of January to the left bank of the river below Rouen, fell upon the French in flank and rear at Moulineaux, and compelled them to make a hasty retreat. The Germans pursued vigorously; and, overtaking the French on the afternoon of the same day at Bourgachard, again defeated them, taking many prisoners. On the following day, the 5th of January, Bentheim received his appointment to the command of the 1st Army Corps.

After these events had taken place on his right, Faidherbe, although not pressed by the enemy, began after the 6th of January to withdraw his troops farther northwards between Arras and Douay, in order to obtain greater freedom of action. The new plan for him seems to have been that he was to throw himself by way of Rheims upon the rear of any Corps which might be sent against Bourbaki, and also to seek to unite with the latter General.

But, in the first place, Faidherbe again pushed forward an advanced-guard of Derroja's division (in the beginning of 1870, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 33d Regiment of the line) upon Achiet le Grand, and of Robin's division upon Bapaume, whence also a detachment proceeded further to Albert, upon the road to Amiens. Moreover, the French general caused the news to be spread by means of telegrams to Lille

and Brussels that he was again marching upon Amiens; and one of these despatches stated that, on the 14th of January, Faidherbe had established his headquarters at Albert.

But in reality the chief of the French Army of the North was not directing his main body upon Amiens, but far to the eastward of it upon St Quentin. And, to screen this, the movements indicated above could be carried out without difficulty; for as soon as General von Göben had undertaken the command of the First Army, he withdrew all his disposable troops, excepting the detachment of the younger Prince Albrecht, to the left bank of the Somme, leaving these last-named troops, which consisted principally of cavalry, to observe the French, and obtain intelligence of their movements: and this he did because the task assigned to the First Army obliged it to spread out very much to watch large tracts of country; and Göben, being thus unable to keep any considerable force concentrated on one spot, held it to be better to conceal such troops as he could actually unite, to watch for the right moment, and then break out at the point which seemed most fitting.

On the 10th of January the fortress of Peronne capitulated, after having been closely invested since the 27th of December; and Göben now commanded the whole line of the Somme and of the canal to the Oise. He had La Fère, Ham, Peronne, and Amiens in his power, and could cross from the left to the

right bank of the Somme wherever he wished—on his right, on his left, or on his centre. But the German leader did not allow himself to be deceived by Faidherbe's telegrams, although he duly received them; but, on the contrary, commanded Prince Albrecht's detachment to be doubly vigilant.

When at last Göben heard that Faidherbe was advancing upon St Quentin, he collected all the forces that he was able to, crossed at Ham to the right bank of the Somme, and fell with his advanced-guard upon that of Faidherbe's at Beauvais on the 18th of January, when the French were thrown back upon Vermand towards St Quentin. On the 19th the main battle began, Faidherbe bringing into action the greater part of the 22d and 23d Army Corps, the latter of which was chiefly composed of newly-mobilised troops of the National Guard.

The battle commenced at early dawn. On the French right the 22d Corps maintained itself steadily; but on their left the 19th North German Regiment, belonging to Prince Albrecht's detachment, stormed the railway station of St Quentin at noon, and there the defeat of the French was decisive. A panic seized the 23d Corps, and the 22d was also obliged to commence a retreat. The Germans pursued with energy, and during the 20th, 21st, and 22d of January, their cavalry pushed forward as far as the line Le Cateau, Cambresis, Cambray, Douay, and Arras, making nearly 12,000 prisoners. The whole French

Army of the North consequently became broken up, and Faidherbe himself repaired to Lille, whence he ordered the country surrounding the northern fortresses to be inundated.

Thus at almost the same time that the Army of the West was crippled for a lengthened period, a like fate happened to the Army of the North. It chanced, too, that in these very days Gambetta was making a tour of visits to the armies. On the 17th of January he was at Laval, and met there Chanzy on his retreat from Le Mans. Thence he repaired to Lille, and there met Faidherbe after the defeat at St Quentin; but still Gambetta failed to see anything of the truth. It is almost impossible to believe that the generals did not say anything of this to him. Either he heard not or he understood not. Like a prophet, or like one bereft of sense, he only repeated the same phrase of "War to the end" (*la guerre à outrance*). To teach him the truth, it would perhaps have been well to have clad him in one of the rags with which the French Mobile Guard and soldiers were clothed for their winter campaign, and have compelled him to share it with them for eight days. All the officers complained that the soldiers, and especially the Mobile Guards, would no longer grapple with their foes; but the matter was easily explicable. It was not only that the French were continually defeated, even where they were numerically superior, but the soldiers saw that with their equipment, clothing, guid-

ance, and instruction, such must inevitably be the case, and consequently they lost all confidence of future success; and how can a soldier fight unless he be inspired with such a confidence?

Good strategy is undoubtedly of great value, but it is not everything; nor is it even the chief element of success. Gambetta might select the best and first generals, but they could not achieve anything with soldiers such as the French had now become; while a moderately skilful leader, who simply did his duty methodically, working with the excellent troops of the Germans, would be able to gain great successes, if opposed to an enemy who was not equal to him in every respect. It is arrogance engendered by false science which causes many an officer to overrate the value of genius in strategy, and undervalue the influence of the quality of the *personnel* of armies.

On the 20th of January General von Göben was master of the country northwards to the line Le Cateau Cambresis-Cambray-Arras, and for the present he had not any intention of advancing beyond this boundary; but he ordered the fortress of Cambray to be summoned, and on its refusing to surrender, to be bombarded.

Meanwhile the armistice was concluded, which at the end of January also affected the northern theatre of war.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE FALL OF THE FORTRESSES OF PHALSBOURG, MONTMEDY, MEZIÈRES, ROCROY, AND LONGWY.

BEFORE we proceed to relate the details of the supreme agony of Paris, we propose reverting briefly to those French fortresses which were compelled to surrender more or less independently of the great operations in December and January.

Phalsbourg was first threatened by German troops from the 6th Corps on the 8th of August. On the 14th the fortress was bombarded by 60 field-guns belonging to the same Corps, and on the 15th it was summoned to surrender. But notwithstanding that many houses in the small town had been burned down by the bombardment, the commandant, Chief of Battalion Taillaut, would not enter into negotiations for a capitulation. For a few days after this only two line battalions were left behind before Phalsbourg; but after the 18th and 19th of August three Thuringian landwehr battalions were employed in investing it, together with a squadron of cavalry, but without artillery. The whole of this small Corps only numbered 1700 men.

The garrison of Phalsbourg was about 1900 strong, and it could therefore venture upon sorties, especially as it could be supported in them by artillery. On the 24th of August, accordingly, a sortie was made towards the south against Les Baraques du bois de Chênes d'en bas, on the 25th a second against Mittelbronn on the west, and on the 27th a third against Les Baraques d'en bas.

Although these various sorties were repulsed by the Prussian landwehr troops with small loss, still they had rendered the scarcity of artillery very apparent; and, consequent on the reports on this point, a 4-pounder battery was at once assigned to the investing Corps, and from this fire was immediately opened upon the town.

On the 14th of September the garrison made yet another sortie, and this time to the northward against Büchelberg. About this period, also, bands of Franc-tireurs began to assemble in the Vosges to the south of the Strasburg-Paris railway, and the reports which came in to the commandant of the weak investing force made things assume a serious aspect. In any case, the work of the besieging troops was greatly increased by these menaces, for they had now not only to observe the fortress, but also to look out more carefully for their rear, although the only real sign of life which these dreaded free-shooters showed was in an attack on the 29th of September upon a Prussian field-post at the railway tunnel to the west of Lützelburg.

As soon as the news of the fall of Strasburg became known to the investing force, information of the fact was sent into Phalsbourg. The same had been also done on previous occasions—as, for example, after the capitulation of Sedan; but still the commandant was not induced by the tidings to abandon the further defence of the fortress.

The fall of Strasburg was followed by the departure of the Franc-tireurs from the neighbourhood of Dabo (Dachsburg) towards the south upon Besançon. This movement lessened materially the work of the investing force before Phalsbourg, and though the besiegers now and again received small reinforcements, these were always mere passers-by. It is true that the idea of a formal siege had been entertained, but it was finally determined that the undertaking was not worth the trouble, considering the small strategical importance of the place, and the fact that with its weak garrison it could not in any case hold out long.

Meanwhile the French artillery kept up a continued firing from the fortress, the Germans firing but very little into it.

During the night from the 24th to the 25th of November a bombardment on a small scale was opened from six field-guns on three points—namely, from Les Baraques des Trois Maisons on the south, Les Quatre Vents on the east, and from the neighbourhood of Wescheim on the north. The for-

tress answered with vigour, but neither party did any great damage to the other.

By this time a decided scarcity of provisions began to be felt in the fortress, especially of salt and meat. There was still corn, but the besieged had no means of grinding it. In the beginning of the investment, intercourse between the fortress and the immediate vicinity had been practicable, and the peasants, who were on very friendly terms with the inhabitants of Phalsbourg, smuggled all they could into the town by paths well known to them. But the longer the investment lasted, so much the more thoroughly did the besieging troops become acquainted with the ground which they had to watch, and so much the more difficult became the smuggling traffic. These circumstances compelled the commandant to entertain the idea of negotiating for a capitulation, and on the 30th of November he made overtures. But in the terms he demanded free departure to the south for the garrison; and as the commandant of the investing troops would not allow this condition, the negotiations failed.

Thenceforth the state of things in Phalsbourg became worse from day to day, and among other evils the smallpox, which had been raging throughout France since the end of 1869, carried off an ever-increasing number of victims in the beleaguered city. Such being the condition of the town, the commandant of the fortress notified to the chief of the investing

force on the 12th of December that the gates of Phalsbourg stood open, and that he could enter. No formal capitulation was concluded, and the French commander even caused his 65 guns to be spiked, 12,000 of his muskets to be broken, and the stores of powder and ammunition to be destroyed. The garrison, consisting at the time of the surrender of 52 officers and 1838 men, became prisoners of war.

After Thionville had fallen, and the artillery *matériel* used against it had thus become available, General von Kamecke was commissioned to take the fortress of Montmédy. He was also to command the detachment which was destined to invest the small fortress of Longwy, and which left Thionville for this purpose on the 27th of November.

On the 28th of November the main body of the 14th division quitted Thionville for Montmédy. The companies of garrison artillery and the siege *matériel* were transported by railway to Longuyon, and marched thence upon Juvigny sur Loison, to the south of Montmédy.

On the 7th of December the erection of batteries on the heights to the south of the town was commenced, at a distance of from 2000 to 3800 paces from the fortress. Only a battery for four rifled mortars was thrown up in the valley of Chiers at Vigneulles, while the great park was established at Iré le Sec.

By the morning of the 12th of December 62 Ger-

man guns were ready to open fire against Montmédy; but before the cannonade was commenced, the commandant of the fortress was once more summoned to surrender. This he refused to do, and therefore at 7.30 A.M. the batteries began the bombardment, which was vigorously answered by the fortress. At noon it commenced to rain, and the whole of the following day was foggy. The firing, therefore, was only carried on slowly; but nevertheless flames broke out in several places in the town, and towards the evening of the 13th the commandant requested to negotiate. At two o'clock in the morning of the 14th the treaty of capitulation was concluded, by 8 A.M. it was ratified, and soon after mid-day the Prussians entered the town. About 2000 prisoners, more than 60 guns, and various stores of different kinds, fell into the hands of the conquerors, who, moreover, had the satisfaction of setting free 8 Prussian officers and 228 men, who were prisoners in Montmédy. Altogether, 2985 projectiles were thrown into the town.

Mezières had become a base for the Francs-tireurs of the Ardennes, who had thence made many successful expeditions against the Germans, and more than once brought in prisoners and other booty. After the beginning of November the fortress had therefore been more strictly watched; but it was only after the fall of Montmédy that a closer investment had been undertaken, and on the 25th of December

preparations for a siege or for a bombardment were commenced under the command of General von Woyna. After a murderous cannonade, which lasted several days, the fortress capitulated on the 2d of January, when 2000 prisoners, 106 guns, and large stores of provisions were given over to the Germans.

Three days after this, five battalions and two squadrons of Senden's landwehr division, with 36 guns, made an attack by surprise upon Rocroy. The small fortress, which, although it had 72 guns, was only garrisoned by 300 men, capitulated at once on the 5th of January, and was taken possession of by the Germans on the 6th.

Longwy, which lies close to the Belgian and Dutch-Luxemburg frontier, was closely invested at the same time that Mezières was. On this occasion Count Bismark issued a threatening note, in which he announced that owing to the behaviour of the Luxemburgers the Germans would not be able to respect any longer the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, and that, if the Luxemburgers supplied Longwy with provisions, as they had done Thionville, their country would be treated without regard to its neutrality. Longwy, bombarded from the 19th January, capitulated on the 25th of the same month with 4000 men and 200 guns.

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE LAST FIGHTING ABOUT PARIS—THE BOMBARDMENT.

WHEN, in December, Prince Frederic Charles had thrown back the Army of the Loire behind Orleans, and Manteuffel had gained his first victories in the north, debates again arose at the German headquarters as to the expediency of adopting against Paris other measures besides the investment.

The question was answered in the affirmative, and it was decided to commence an artillery attack upon Paris, a bombardment of the detached forts and of the town; for the hesitation which existed in Versailles about undertaking the latter was overcome by those who regarded the matter from a purely military point of view, and who were now in a majority. There was now also an abundant supply of artillery and ammunition collected before Paris, so that but little fear was felt of being compelled to cease the bombardment from a scarcity of these stores. Enterprises from without to relieve the capital, which might have disturbed the bombardment, and perhaps have led to a loss of siege *matériel*, were no longer to

be feared, considering the state of affairs at all points of the theatre of war. Neither could sorties undertaken from Paris by General Trochu give any ground for alarm, as all the positions of the Germans were now well intrenched, and this to some extent by making use of the fortifications thrown up by the French themselves, and afterwards taken from them. Therefore it could be safely assumed that, although Paris would be compelled by famine to surrender within a very short time, still this period would be considerably curtailed if the horrors of a bombardment were added to the pangs of hunger.

Moreover, it is possible that the manifold protests of the entire neutral press against the bombardment of Paris had precisely the very effect of determining some of the influential men in the leading circles of Versailles to undertake it.

The great majority of the German papers demanded the bombardment more loudly every day. Germany yearned for peace, excepting only the few people who derived, or believed they derived, advantage from the continuation of the war; and in the journals it ran: "It is full time to make an end of the war. With Paris we shall get peace, and Paris we shall get by a bombardment. Why then do the German leaders hesitate so long? Can it be that their preparations were not sufficient, although up to Sedan all went so merrily, and although it was said that 'the rupture had been worked out to five places of

decimals'? Or can the delay be explained by the hesitation felt in bombarding the 'Holy City'? If this be the case, we must ask whether the lives of a few hundred Parisians are of greater worth than those of the thousands of Germans sacrificed by sickness during the long investment, and by French bullets during the sorties?"

Such was the language held by the most influential of the German newspapers, and the German leaders behaved as was desired of them. The main bombardment was to be carried on from the batteries on the heights of Sèvres, Meudon, Clamart, and Chatillon, opposite to which stood Forts Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge, the fire from which it was necessary to silence in the first place, so that the bombardment could be continued against the town in greater quietness. The above-mentioned heights rise to a considerable altitude above the level of the Seine and of the inner town—a circumstance which was in so far favourable for the bombardment, as thereby the range of shells thrown into the lower part of the capital would be increased, and it might be assumed that projectiles, passing over the outlying districts, would fall into the very heart of the city. But, on the other hand, the position was in a measure unfavourable, because the shells could hardly be expected to range beyond the parts of the town on the left bank of the Seine; and these were in every respect of much less importance than the quarters on the right of the river.

This bombardment from the heights of Clamart was also to be supported by an artillery attack on the east and north — in the first place, against the eastern groups of forts, and against St Denis and its fortifications; for at present the German shells could not reach the town itself from either of these quarters. The attack was to be initiated by a cannonade against the batteries on Mont Avron on the east, in order to draw away the attention of the French from the south side of the town, and thus facilitate the completion and arming of the batteries there.

The batteries on Mont Avron were first constructed shortly before the great sortie of the 30th of November, and had rendered good service on that and the following days against the Würtembergers, the Saxons, and the 2d North German Corps. They had also taken a very useful part in the struggle for Le Bourget on the 21st of December, when they checked the advance of the artillery of the left wing of the Prussians against Bondy. These and other services which Mont Avron has passingly rendered, were greatly glorified by the Paris journals, and in such a manner that the uninitiated—the great mass of the inhabitants of Paris—were led to believe that Mont Avron was "the key of Paris." Military men did nothing to check betimes the growth of this belief, which consequently spread ever wider and deeper, although in reality Mont Avron had not even the least pretensions

to the importance of a fort which could be held independently.

Gradually, however, batteries of earth were thrown up on it, amounting at last to eight in number; and on the 25th of December four 30-pounder naval guns were transported thither. These batteries were all very rapidly constructed, and were so much the more inefficient, and less capable of offering resistance, as they had been mostly built during very severe weather; and consequently the clods, which had been hewn and hacked from the frozen ground, had now no compactness. The embrasures also were not cut on any regular system, but were formed according to the requirements, and it might almost be said the fancy, of the moment, to see this or that point of the enemy's lines which just at the time it may have seemed of importance to bring under fire. Bomb-proofs to shelter the unemployed gunners and garrison were altogether wanting, and there were not even sufficient traverses. On the 26th of December the batteries on Mont Avron were armed with 76 guns—namely, six 30-pounders, six short 24-pounders, twenty-three Reffye 7-pounders, thirty-four 12-pounders, and seven mitrailleuses—and they then commanded the whole line in their front from Bondy by Raincy and Gagny to Chelles, Gournay, and Noisy le Grand.

On the German side the orders to prepare for the attack on Mont Avron were issued on the 18th of December. During the following days the sappers of

the Army of the Meuse (Crown-Prince of Saxony) threw up shelter-trenches along the line from Chateau de Raincy to Pressoir, to the east of Gagny. On the 22d of December the construction of such batteries as were still wanting was commenced under cover of the Saxon infantry, some of whom occupied the shelter-trenches, while others formed up in reserve behind them. The batteries, when completed, were armed on the 26th with 76 guns—that is, with the same number that the French had on Mont Avron; but there was this important difference between the two armaments, that the French guns were crowded closely together, while the German were distributed along an enclosing line.

At 7.30 A.M. on the 27th of December, the German batteries opened fire upon Mont Avron. There was a thick fog hanging over the neighbourhood, so that the effect of the cannonade could not be seen; but all the Saxon troops were on the alert, ready to take part in the action should it be requisite. At first the French were absolutely surprised by the opening of the German fire, but, recovering speedily from the confusion, every man was directed to his post, and the guns from Mont Avron replied vigorously.

But in spite of this, and in spite of the thick fog, the German fire was exceedingly effective, and so great a number of guns were dismounted that Colonel Stoffel, who commanded upon Mont Avron, judged it expedient to give up the defence of the post. General

D'Hugues, however, who at this time was in command of the eastern forts, was of another opinion, and brought forward upon the plateau two divisions and two field-batteries to ward off any attack which the Germans might make during the night. By the morning of the 28th, therefore, there were 24,000 men crowded together upon this narrow space—a mass greatly exceeding that requisite for the defence, too numerous to be sheltered in any way, and therefore certain to be thrown into the utmost confusion when the Germans recommenced their cannonade.

On the morning of the 28th, as the fire from Mont Avron was only very intermittently kept up, the Crown-Prince of Saxony and his staff were in doubt whether they should not at once push forward their infantry to seize the point; but as the patrols which were sent forward in advance encountered everywhere a powerful resistance from the French, the idea was abandoned, and the bombardment continued. As the day wore on, the effects of the fire upon the French were very serious—so much so that it became manifest to every one that their position was untenable; and General Trochu, coming up to the batteries himself at four o'clock in the afternoon, ordered its evacuation. This was consequently carried out. At 5 A.M. on the morrow the heavy guns were first moved back to Rosny, and when this was effected the field-guns and infantry left behind to cover the movement followed.

On the morning of the 29th the Germans had

reopened their fire with fresh vigour, but the reports which came in soon showed them that Mont Avron must have been evacuated. Four companies therefore, followed by detachments of artillery, were sent forward from Villemomble and Gagny—not with the intention of occupying the advanced position, but to obtain certain knowledge of the state of the French batteries, and to bring back whatever arms or ammunition might be found in the deserted works. This mission they accomplished, and then returned to their former quarters.

After Mont Avron had been subdued, the German batteries on the east side directed their fire mainly upon Forts Nogent, Rosny, and Noisy, and upon the reboubts lying between them. This cannonade did but little harm, but nevertheless the French, after a short time, ceased to reply to it. They had discovered that their guns could not act with success against the distant and well-covered artillery positions of the besiegers, and they therefore contented themselves with repairing during the night any damage done to the embrasures and platforms, reserving their fire until the Germans should draw nearer, either by means of regular siege-works or by advancing to an assault.

But in reality it was not in the German plan to undertake anything serious on this side; still, as it was of importance to gain time for the arming of the batteries on the south by constantly diverting the attention of the French from them, a pretence was

made of throwing up batteries against the east front also, and the French outposts were kept constantly alarmed: thus, on the early morning of the 4th of January, a detachment of the 24th division, pushing forward through Neuilly sur Marne, aroused Fort Nogent. Again, on the afternoon of the 5th, the same troops alarmed the village of Nogent, and early on the 5th of January parties from the 23d division attacked Rosny and Bondy.

Meanwhile during the night of the 3d of January the German batteries on the heights of Meudon, Clamart, and Chatillon were completely armed; and on the 5th they began to bombard Forts Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge, as well as the quarters of the town lying on the left bank of the Seine. The result of this cannonade was, that on the afternoon of the 5th the eastern forts of Paris also reopened a heavy fire against the German batteries lying opposite to them.

In the night between the 3d and 4th of January, the German batteries on the south-west side of Paris, from St Cloud by Meudon and the heights of Clamart to Chatillon, were also armed. They did not, however, open fire until nine o'clock in the forenoon of the 5th, as an impenetrable fog hung over the neighbourhood during the whole of the 4th. As a rule, during the succeeding weeks the mornings were always misty; by ten o'clock the weather had generally so far cleared up that the most prominent points of Paris could be

made out from the heights of Clamart, but by three o'clock in the afternoon the fog had usually become again so thick in the valley of the Seine that it was scarcely possible to recognise the nearest of the detached forts. Snow-storms very rarely obstructed the view, so that the hours immediately before and after noon were best suited for the bombardment.

At first the cannonade was chiefly directed against the three forts of Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge, and mainly against the buildings within them, only when the weather was clear against the embrasures and barbettes. Much damage was done to the forts by the destruction of the barracks; and the great accuracy of the German artillery enabled it to dismount many of the guns whenever the weather was sufficiently bright. Still it would be a great mistake to suppose that these detached works were thereby rendered useless; for the French here again very soon determined of their own accord to refrain from firing, so that they might preserve their guns for the moment of the decisive attack, or recommence the fire afresh from time to time. In general, therefore, they contented themselves with using their heavy field-batteries from behind the temporary works by which Forts Issy, Vanves, Montrouge, and Bicêtre were connected, changing their position as soon as the Germans had ascertained the range.

We would here remark that the French made use, especially during the sorties, of armoured railway

batteries. These consisted of an iron-clad locomotive and one or two armoured carriages, each of which carried one heavy gun, which could be trained in all directions as on board an armoured turret-ship; and when a sortie took place, these trains issued forth along the short lines of railway which were open to the Parisians. It is very possible that now and again these contrivances may have produced a peculiar and surprising effect; but it can be easily understood that that they could not change the whole aspect of the situation, as some heated heads and excited minds imagined, or forced themselves to imagine, they would.

If the Germans had even intended to bombard only Forts Issy, Montrouge, and Vanves, the arrondissements No. 14 (Observatoire), No. 15 (Vaugirard), and No. 16 (Passy) must necessarily have suffered from stray, far-ranging projectiles. But in reality the German shells, even at the beginning of the bombardment, ranged much farther than even the above-named arrondissements, and fell in No. 5 (Panthéon), No. 6 (Luxembourg), and No. 7 (Palais Bourbon).

In the arrondissement of the Panthéon the projectiles fell very frequently in the Place du Panthéon itself, in the Rue Soufflot to the west of it, and in and about the hospital of the Val de Grace, where an infirmary for the wounded had been established. The flag of the Geneva Convention waved over the Val de Grace; but as the domes of that

building and of the Panthéon are visible at a very great distance, it is very possible that in the thick fogs they were the only distinct targets that the German artillery had.

In the arrondissement of the Luxembourg, German shells fell in the gardens of the Luxembourg, and to the north and west of them near the church of St Sulpice, and in the Rue de Madame; in the arrondissement of the Palais Bourbon, behind the Hotel des Invalides and near the military school. All these points, upon which the fire of the Germans on the south was concentrated, are particularly easy to distinguish from a distance. Whether all the details—as, for instance, the flag of the Geneva Convention floating over a dome—were equally discernible, is another question.

The distances which many of the shells ranged were enormous—from the heights of Clamart to the Panthéon, more than 10,000 paces, or about five miles. Still it must not be imagined that this bombardment really wrought great devastation, or that it would ever have been necessary to capitulate solely because of it. It is true that on the 8th of January an exodus of the Parisians from the left to the right bank of the Seine began; but this was only on a very limited scale. Most of the inhabitants of the left bank remained in their houses; and no difficulty was experienced in accommodating those who migrated thence across the river, or in providing for their maintenance on the other side.

After the 11th of January, shells from German batteries thrown up further forward on the heights of Notre Dame de Clamart, ranged over the Boulevard St Germain, and as far as the left bank of the Seine opposite the Cité and the island of St Louis.

If Germany was excepted, no man in Europe was pleased with the bombardment of Paris, and the act called forth many direct protestations. On the 9th of January the Government of National Defence entered its protest in a note in which it especially called attention to the circumstance that no forewarning had been given, an omission which was certainly contrary to prevailing usages. On the 14th of January, General Trochu handed over to the enemy's outposts a declaration respecting the bombardment of the hospitals, that of the Val de Grace being particularly named. Count Moltke denied most solemnly that the act was intended by the German artillery, and expressed a hope that such occurrences would be entirely avoided when the bombarding batteries should be advanced nearer to the enceinte of Paris, and clear weather render a good aim possible.

On the 12th of January such members of the Corps Diplomatique as were still in Paris addressed a letter to Count Bismark, in which they demanded that measures should be taken which would allow the subjects of foreign States then in Paris to remove their persons and property from the effects of the bombardment. Count Bismark replied that he had

long ago called attention to the fact that a besieged fortress was not a fit residence for the diplomatic agents of neutral States, and that an exodus on a large scale of the subjects of such States could not now be allowed; but that out of courtesy the diplomatists representing neutral States would even at this stage be permitted to leave Paris. Under these circumstances, it was naturally a point of honour with these representatives to remain in the capital.

At this time, also, an affair took place which, although it was not directly connected with the Franco-Germanic war, nevertheless assumed an extraordinary aspect because of its continuance. In the middle of the war Russia had declared that she no longer considered herself bound by the article of the Paris Treaty of 1856 which rendered the Black Sea neutral. This concise declaration, which, be it said in passing, was in itself perfectly justifiable, created much excitement abroad, especially in England. The English could not brook that one Power should individually declare that a treaty which several Powers had concluded and guaranteed was no longer binding. Many warlike speeches were made in Great Britain, though the arguments employed necessarily lacked the emphasis which an application of force would give. The English spirit also soon calmed itself when it began to count up the existing military forces; and England finally came to the conclusion that Russia must have her way, only

she must observe certain conventional forms. Russia also had no objection to complying with these, and it was agreed to settle the whole affair by a Conference in London. But ought not France also, who had taken so decided a part in the war against Russia and in the Paris Treaty, be represented at the meeting? This was almost impossible. The Government of National Defence was invited to send a representative to London, and it nominated as such M. Jules Favre, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Jules Favre, therefore, on the 13th of January, requested from Count Bismark a safe-conduct to enable him to pass the Prussian lines. Count Bismark refused this, and that in a manner which excited universal disapprobation. He called the attention, namely, of the Minister of National Defence to the fact that it would be unseemly for him to leave Paris in the hour of her supreme agony. In diplomacy, as in other matters, it is impossible for one man to do everything, and if we compare the documents of the Chancellor of the Confederation in the years 1870 and 1871 with those of the year 1866, we must unavoidably conclude that, in the first-named years, Count Bismark was not surrounded and served in the best possible way.

Jules Favre was now, it is true, informed that he could procure a safe-conduct from the German military authorities; but he refused to avail himself of this intelligence, and for the time being France re-

mained unrepresented in the settlement of the Black Sea affair.

General Trochu also did not escape the universal fate of those who are to remedy that which has been done amiss, and who fail in their efforts. And such an endeavour seldom succeeds, unless some especially lucky stroke of good fortune chance to assist it. Even moderate papers, formerly adherents of General Trochu—as, for instance, 'Le Temps'—began in December to accuse him of want of energy, of lack of readiness to assume the initiative. Others went yet further. We will not speak of the cry of treason! When a great misfortune comes, that accusation is never and nowhere absent. Other reproaches seem to us more remarkable. "All our generals," it was said on the French side, "know nothing besides the regulation code, and never get beyond it. In it there stands written that a besieged place can never by itself relieve itself, and this has become with them an article of belief which allows of no exception. But now Paris has an army of 500,000 men within its walls, while the Prussians are much weaker," &c. &c.

We know of what elements this "army of 500,000 men" consisted, and that therefore such a description of it stands in the category of idle figures of speech. Were but the half of this "army of 500,000 men" equal to the Germans—equal in respect of training, of discipline, of armament, of equipment; equal in that transport which makes an army for weeks at least

independent, and therefore mobile—then indeed it would be difficult to see why they should not have thoroughly beaten the investing forces of the Germans, which were scattered along an extended line. But even this condition was not fulfilled. To the largest of the sorties Trochu only led out some 100,000 men, and that for the very sufficient reason that he had no more available for service outside the walls. And even these lacked the first essentials for extended movements, especially that discipline which alone insures that execution shall immediately follow command—a discipline which must by no means be demanded solely from the private soldiers, but which must exist in all ranks without exception, and in the greatest degree in the highest ranks, if any honest work is to be done. Therefore we believe that these 100,000 men were not even capable of forcing their way through the investing lines, especially in the desolated state of the environs of Paris, exhausted as they were by a German occupation of many months.

General Trochu, then, was in a very evil strait. No one could doubt that he would willingly have done something great and decisive. Never was there a better opportunity for acquiring imperishable fame than under the then existing circumstances. But when Trochu regarded the instruments with which he had to work, he must necessarily have been seized with deep despondency.

On the 30th of December 1870 a great council of war was assembled, in which it was unanimously agreed that another vigorous effort must by all means be made; but that it was impossible to decide at that moment upon the exact time, as that must depend upon the course events might take. In the beginning of January, also, a permanent council of war was associated with Trochu, which was to be consulted upon all decisive resolutions, and which thus relieved the Governor of Paris from some of his responsibility. This council was composed of Generals Vinoy, Ducrot, Bellemare, Tripier, De Guyot, Clement Thomas, Chabaud-Latour; and of Admirals De la Roncière, Pothnau, and Saisset.

Between the 12th and 15th of January, too, several small sorties were undertaken. In the night between the 12th and 13th about 4000 men issued from behind Forts Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge against the besieging batteries at Clamart and Chatillon. But the attack was expected; for as usual the troops had been assembled during the afternoon, and remarked from the Germans posts of observation. And in truth the want of cohesion in the army prevented any surprise being carried out. The preparations requisite to bring the troops in any degree under the control of the leader had to be commenced so early that not only were the men wearied, but it was barely possible for the design to escape the attention of their watchful adversary. In this case the French sortie

was directed against the positions held by the Bavarians, who easily repelled it.

On the 13th of January, at ten o'clock in the evening, the weather being cold and foggy, another sortie was made, this time against the portion of the investing line held by the 2d division of the Prussian Guard, especially against the weakly-garrisoned village of Le Bourget. The first attack was repulsed, even before the Prussian supports, which were at once alarmed, could come up. The latter onslaughts, repeated during the night, encountered the fully concentrated and prepared forces of the Germans, and effected even less than the first. Other attacks were also made upon Le Bourget during the nights from the 14th to the 15th, and from the 15th to the 16th of January; but all with the same bad result as the first. The same fate attended other alarms carried out against different parts of the investing lines. They were all made with a too feeble force, and were too weakly supported, to fulfil the proposed object of drawing the attention of the Germans to certain points, and thereby diverting it from others.

Finally, it was determined that the great blow should be struck on the 19th, and it was to be a stroke of desperation — a supreme effort: 100,000 men, concentrated on the peninsula of Nanterre, were to burst through the part of the German investing line which, running from Bougival by Garches to St Cloud, shuts in the peninsula, and were then to fall

upon the German headquarters in Versailles, spreading terror and confusion on all sides; General Trochu himself was to conduct the great undertaking, and delegated to the Minister of War, General Leflo, the command of the forts and town of Paris for the period of his absence.

The attack was to be begun at daybreak, but the whole concentration again took place with incredible slowness, and without the desirable connection between the movements; although both the railways which run from Paris on to the peninsula of Nanterre were employed to transport the troops.

The whole disposable force was divided into three Army Corps. On the right, General Ducrot was to advance by the Porte du Longboyau and Buzanval; in the centre, General Bellemare by the Plateau de la Bergerie and Garches; and on the left, General Vinoy by Montretout, where the Germans had thrown up an intrenchment which they only regarded as a forlorn post.

Bellemare and Vinoy came into action at nearly the same time, about 8 o'clock in the morning, and encountering only a weak outpost of the 10th division (5th North German Army Corps), gained possession in a few hours of the Plateau de la Bergerie and of Montretout.

Meanwhile Ducrot's Corps had been materially delayed. It was first hindered by the crossing of another column; and afterwards, when deploying

near Rueil, was fired upon by batteries of the 4th North German Corps on the peninsula of Argenteuil, and its advance again checked; so that its leading troops only became seriously engaged at Porte du Longboyau at eleven o'clock.

During this time the columns of the left and centre were waiting for the support of the right, and therefore failed to advance with the boldness and vigour necessary for attaining the proposed end.

The reserves of the 10th North German division thus gained time to concentrate at Garches, and were able to oppose a very serious resistance to the French when these latter at length advanced in the afternoon against the village.

The 9th North German division was assembled soon after mid-day at the farm of Jardy to the north of Versailles, to act as a general reserve. The 1st Bavarian Corps was called up to Versailles from the right, and the landwehr division of the Prussian Guard from the left, to be ready for any emergency.

In the early hours of the afternoon, the 9th North German division marched from Jardy northwards to assume the offensive at Garches and Montretout, and at 4 P.M. it became heavily engaged. Up to that time the French had not been able to penetrate beyond Garches and Vaucresson, and their centre and left were now thrown back after a brief encounter. Once again, indeed, they made an offensive rally, but they

did not succeed in gaining any ground. The whole of the French troops, those of the line as well as the Mobiles and the Mobilised National Guards, were fearfully fatigued by the long preparations, and their weariness manifested itself in a very unpleasant manner. It seemed, therefore, to Trochu to be imperatively necessary to retire them during the evening into the intrenched lines between Mont Valerien and La Croix du Roi. The losses of the French in dead, wounded, and missing were very great, and cannot well be estimated at less than 7000 men. The Mobilised National Guards, which were here for the first led on to the field of battle, had fought bravely, but had at the same time shown that they lacked the other qualities necessary to secure victory.

On the German side it was expected that the battle would be renewed by the French on the 20th of January; and this would doubtless have been the right way to gain the object which the French leaders had proposed to themselves. But troops destitute of internal cohesion require an utterly disproportionate period of rest after every exertion, and therefore no fighting ensued on the 20th, save that a French detachment which had remained behind at St Cloud was surrounded and forced to surrender.

On the 21st of January the German siege-artillery opened fire on the north front against the fortifications

and town of St Denis. The former had been hurriedly and badly constructed in a short space of time, so that the Government of National Defence could not possibly have expected a long resistance to be made by them.

CHAPTER L.

THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE.

On the day preceding the last desperate sortie from Paris an event happened which will exercise a great influence—for good or for bad—upon the history of the world.

In the constitution of the North German Confederation of 1867 a paragraph had been inserted which ran—"the entrance of the South German States or of any one of them into the Confederation shall ensue upon a motion of the President of the Confederation in the ordinary way of legislation."

Baden had now long desired to enter the Confederation, and the National Liberals in the North German Diet had sought with excessive importunity to smooth the path for her. But it had always seemed to the Federal Chancellor to be neither necessary nor expedient to strive for the entrance of the South Germans into the Northern Confederation; and as he was not seeking a war with France, but was rather endeavouring to avoid one, he had always regarded with coldness the endeavours of the National Liberals.

But now, after the decisive victories of the Germans over the Empire of Napoleon III., the opinion that a closer connection than had hitherto existed must be brought about between the South German States and the North German Confederation gained ground daily. Consequently in September the Bavarian Government took the initiative in this direction, and declared to the President of the North German Confederation that it was convinced that the time had arrived for a constitutional alliance to take the place of the simply international connection between North and South Germany.

The ingenuous portion of the German people thought it very beautiful and patriotic that Bavaria, which up to this time had always behaved most coyly towards North Germany, should take the lead in this movement. The more shrewd, however, said—"Bavaria knows very well that something must be done in this matter; if she now assumes the initiative, she will be so much the surer of still maintaining a certain position, instead of being simply carried away in the general German whirlpool."

In consequence of the interchange of ideas on the subject which ensued, the Minister of State, Delbrück, President of the North German Federal Chancery, was sent to Munich to hear in the first place what Bavaria wished and proposed. A Würtemberg minister was also present in the Bavarian capital. While the discussion was going on there, Baden formally de-

manded to be received into the North German Confederation, and Würtemberg requested that the negotiations commenced in Munich should be continued at the fountain-head, which was at present in Versailles.

Bismark could not avoid acceding to this wish, and in the middle of October a council of Würtemberg, Baden, and Bavarian ministers, with whom finally a Hesse-Darmstadter was associated, was assembled round the Federal Chancellor.

As the negotiations proceeded, it became evident that Bavaria expected to occupy an exceptional position; for her ministers politely declared that they did not desire to interfere in any way, that the Chancellor might conclude terms with Hesse, Baden, and Würtemberg first, and that then an arrangement might be arrived at with Bavaria.

The treaties with Hesse and Baden as to their entrance into the North German Confederation were signed on the 15th of November. They contained a few, but those really unimportant, reservations. On the same day, Bismark also came to an understanding with Würtemberg, and it was only in consequence of chance circumstances that the treaty with her was not signed before the 25th of the month, even later than the one with Bavaria. The negotiations with this last State were recommenced with vigour on the 15th, and on the 23d a complete settlement had been arrived at. Great concessions were certainly made to

her, and these scarcely in the interest of the Bavarian people; for, in consequence of them, Bavaria still remained in suspense between the condition of a confederate state and of an independent power, a position of things which occasioned serious concern even among the most moderate people in Germany. Spite of this, the treaty of Bavaria with the North German Confederation was only accepted by the Bavarian House of Deputies on the 21st of January, after a ten days' debate; and then only by 102 against 48 votes, which still remained faithful to the old Patriotic Party.

On the 24th of November the North German Diet assembled in Berlin, having by its own decree prolonged its legal existence, which had properly already terminated. In the first place, it sanctioned the required *nervus rerum* for the continuation of the war against France, 100,000,000 thalers;* and on the 9th of December it accepted the treaties concluded with Baden, Hesse, Würtemberg, and Bavaria, the first three almost unanimously, the last with some opposition, with 195 against 32 votes.

In consequence of the adoption of these treaties, the newly-created German State institution — the extended North German Confederation — was to be called the "German Confederation," and the King of Prussia was to be President of it, as he had been of the former body. The title "German Confederation" was

* £15,000,000 sterling.

in very evil repute, for it only too inevitably recalled to mind the musty institution which had wrought so much mischief, and which had so scandalously broken down, in 1866; especially as by the new treaties the right of censorship over the press and unions had been accepted among the attributes of the new "German Confederation." To illustrate this, dozens of only too justifiable verses of Heinrich Heine's on the 'German Address' could be quoted. The North German Diet, however, allowed the title to be quietly revived; and had Bismark proposed instead Chinese appellations for the new institution and its President, it would have accepted the proposition equally readily.

But now an event occurred which altered the state of things.

King Louis II. of Bavaria announced to King William in a letter, which reached Versailles on the 3d of December, that he had proposed to the sovereign German princes, and to the burgomasters of the Free Towns, that they should, together with him, petition the President of the Confederation to assume forthwith the title of "Emperor of Germany."

Now "Emperor" is, as all the world knows, not a German word. There also never was a German Empire, only a Roman Empire of German nations; but nevertheless the highest in authority must bear a different title to those subject to him, or else the people would in the end arrive at the unhealthy idea of regarding the subordinate kings as superflu-

ous. Therefore, now the sovereign princes and burgomasters, whose sovereignty was really balanced upon a scarcely perceptible point, hastened to agree to the proposition of the King of Bavaria.

The North German Diet was naturally just as contented with the "Emperor of Germany" and "German Empire" now laid before them by Bismark, as it had been before with the "German Confederation" and its "President," and it sent a deputation to Versailles to convey to the King their assent and congratulatory addresses. The deputation was not, as was partly wished and partly feared, taken prisoner by the Franc-tireurs, and it arrived safely at the royal headquarters. Its leader was Herr Simson, President of the Diet, the same who in 1849 had offered the German imperial throne to Frederic William IV. in the name of the Frankfort Parliament. Then he was met with a refusal, and the King had declared that the imperial throne of Germany could only be acquired by the consent of the German princes, or upon the field of battle. King William had in his favour the offer of the German princes and the battle-fields, and he graciously received the assent of the Diet; but the latter was at the same time given to understand that its consent would not have been considered indispensably necessary.

Later on, both the Senate and the House of Depu-

ties of the Prussian Diet, which had assembled on the 14th of December, sent deputations to Versailles. All these envoys arrived and returned safely—they travelled under the special protection of God and of the German *etappen* department.

On the 18th of January 1871, 170 years after the Elector Frederic III. of Brandenburg received the title of King of Prussia, King William I. solemnly assumed in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles the dignity of Emperor of Germany, and the event was announced to the Germans in the following proclamation :—

"To the German people.

"We, William, by the grace of God King of Prussia, after the German Princes and Free Towns have addressed to us a unanimous call to renew and to undertake, at the restoration of the German Empire, the dignity of Emperor of Germany, which has been in abeyance for more than 60 years, and after the requisite assents thereto have been provided in the constitution of the German Confederation, hereby announce that we have regarded it as a duty we owe to our common Fatherland to obey this call of the collective German Princes and towns, and to accept the dignity of Emperor of Germany. Therefore, henceforth we and our successors on the throne of Prussia will bear the imperial title in all concerns

and matters relating to the German Empire, and we hope in God that it will be granted to the German nation to meet a blessed future under the emblems of its ancient glory. We undertake the imperial dignity with a consciousness of the duty it lays upon us of protecting with Teutonic faithfulness the rights of the Empire and of its members, of preserving peace, and of defending the independence of Germany, based upon the united power of its people. We accept it in the hope that the German people may be permitted to enjoy in lasting peace within its frontiers the reward of the severe and self-sacrificing battles, which will give it that security against the attacks of France, which have been denied to it for centuries. But God grant that we and our successors may be the 'semper Augustus' of the German Empire, not in the conquests of war, but in the blessings and benefits of peace, and in the field of national prosperity, freedom, and civilisation. Given at our headquarters in Versailles the 17th of January 1871.

WILLIAM."

With the issue of this proclamation an important step had been taken—time alone can show whether for good or for evil, for the kernel of evil is contained equally with the kernel of good in this establishment of the modern German Empire amidst the thunders of a destructive war. For the time being the minor

dignitaries were fully occupied with questions which, from the time of David, and even from earlier ages, have been regarded by them as of great importance, such as the arrangement of titles, the colours of flags, and other material and palpable acquisitions which result from such a change.

CHAPTER LI.

THE CAPITULATION OF PARIS AND THE ARMISTICE.

WHILE Germany was thus proudly raising herself up in the belief that a new era had commenced for her, Paris lay upon her deathbed.

For six weeks the inhabitants had experienced the gnawing of hunger. All the remnants of flour of every kind, with the chance ingredients which they contained, had been mixed together, and a disgusting kind of bread made from the compound; and even this could only be distributed in the very smallest quantities. As the Parisians do not easily lose their good-humour, they managed to say witty things even about their sufferings. The Parisian bread of 1871, which bore so small a resemblance to the Parisian bread of ordinary times, was likened to the Gallo-Romanic arena in the Rue Monge, the exploration of which had been undertaken in the beginning of 1870. Excavations could be made in it; and more trousers-buttons, in a state of good preservation, were found in this bread than Marshal Lebœuf had in hand for the whole French army in July 1870. A cab-driver,

it was said, had even found in his loaf a well-filled purse, and was honest enough to deliver it up to the nearest police officer.

The fall of Mount Avron had created in Paris an unusual despondency, as the value of the fortress had been greatly exaggerated. And now, to add to this feeling, came the failure of the supreme effort, the sortie of the 19th of January, of the chances of success of which even most of the members of the Government itself had deluded themselves in a most wonderful manner.

And now this sortie was absolutely wrecked, and had not succeeded in piercing even the first line of the Germans, much less in penetrating to Versailles and driving all before it. Moreover, there was no longer any hope of relief from without. The Government of National Defence knew exceedingly little of what was going on outside, and what little they did know was for the most part wrong—thanks to Gambetta's telegrams; but still they were aware that during the ensuing weeks no succour from the provinces was to be expected, and that neither Chanzy, nor Faidherbe, nor Bourbaki were in a state to bring them relief.

But Paris could no longer hold out for weeks, for who can fight against hunger? After ten days more it would be no longer possible to issue even the miserable rations of the so-called bread which the Parisians had eaten for six weeks without complaining. The

most obdurate and fanatical men could no longer refuse to recognise the workings of famine; for now four to five thousand human beings died every week in Paris, instead of eleven hundred, as in ordinary times.

The Government of National Defence could not delay another hour. They must forthwith commence negotiations for a capitulation if they did not wish to burden themselves with irreparable guilt. Paris must fall, and France must acknowledge herself to be conquered; for however hard the fate might appear, still an honest consideration of circumstances showed that there was no means of escaping it.

Trochu, as Governor of Paris, could not capitulate, for in a proclamation of the 6th of January he had expressly declared, "the Governor of Paris will never capitulate." Nevertheless, on that same day every one who was at all conversant with the existing circumstances must have known that Paris would be compelled to surrender in a few weeks more, whether the Governor of Paris or any one else signed the convention.

An escape from this dilemma was now found. The post of Governor of Paris was abolished (Trochu, however, still remaining President of the Government of National Defence); and now that there no longer existed a Governor of Paris, that functionary could not conclude a surrender of the capital.

The commandership-in-chief of all the forces of

Paris was transferred to General Vinoy, who devotedly accepted it in order to conclude the necessary final capitulation, and to preserve order in Paris. General Vinoy, born in 1803, and therefore 68 years old at the time we speak of, was originally destined for the Church, and had even entered a seminary; but not feeling any spiritual calling within himself, and his parents being dead, he, in 1823, entered the then existing Royal Guard as a volunteer. In 1826 he was transferred as sergeant to the 14th regiment of the line, and served with it in 1830 in the campaign against Algeria. There he became an officer, and remained in Africa, with the exceptions of short periods of leave, until 1850, when he returned to France as colonel and commandant of the 54th regiment of the line. In 1852 he received the command of the newly-raised 2d regiment of Zouaves; in 1854 he commanded a brigade of Canrobert's division of the Crimean army, and especially distinguished himself at the Alma, and at the storming of the Malakoff on the 8th of September 1855. At the end of this latter year he was nominated general of division, and in 1859 commanded a division of Niel's Corps in Italy. When the war of 1870 broke out, Vinoy had been for some years on the retired list of generals; but after the declaration of hostilities he was recalled to active service, receiving, as we have seen, in the first place the command of the 13th Army Corps, and afterwards of the Third Army of Paris; and now when the

attacks of the press upon General Trochu commenced, Vinoy was set up in opposition to him as a more energetic man, and one more worthy of confidence.

While this new commandership-in-chief of the forces of the capital was being arranged, M. Jules Favre had expressed his wish to Count Bismark to treat with him concerning the capitulation of Paris.

On the 22d of January a totally inexplicable insurrection took place in the capital.

A detachment of the National Guard occupied the houses surrounding the Place de l'Hotel de Ville, and opened fire on the troops of the Mobile Guard on duty there. This mad proceeding was soon put a stop to, but still its occurrence was very deplorable, and no man in his senses could conceive what could be the meaning of such scandalous behaviour during such troubled times.

After the assent of Bismark to the commencement of negotiations had been received, Jules Favre had had a first interview with the Chancellor on the 23d of January, and during the succeeding days Favre was continually journeying backward and forward between Versailles and Paris. MM. Ernst Picard and Dorian were also associated with him for the purpose of giving counsel; and by the 26th of January the negotiations had been so far successful that the transaction might be regarded as concluded. Consequently, in the night between the 26th and 27th of January, the German batteries ceased to fire upon Paris.

On the 27th, Jules Favre took with him to Versailles General Beaufort d'Hautpool, at that time commandant of the 4th division of the Third Army, in order that the latter might arrange the military details on behalf of the French. General d'Hautpool, born 1804, entered the army from the Staff School in 1824, went to Algeria in 1830, and was afterwards frequently employed in diplomatic missions in the East, in Syria, Egypt, and Persia. In 1834 he became a brigadier-general, and commanded various military subdivisions in Algeria. In April 1860 he conducted the works to determine the new frontier line between France and Italy. In August of the same year he undertook the command of the expedition for the protection of the Christians in Syria, and distinguished himself there as elsewhere by his wise moderation. In 1860 he became general of division, and had gone on the retired list in 1869, when the events of 1870 recalled him to a fresh activity.

On the 28th of January, then, Bismark and Favre signed in Versailles a convention which established at the same time the capitulation of Paris and an armistice for the masses of the belligerent armies. The contents of this document were as follows :—

1. A general armistice along the whole line of operations actually being carried on between the German and French armies begins for Paris instantly, and in the Departments after a lapse of three days. The armistice is to continue in force for 21 days

from the 28th of January; so that, unless renewed, it will expire everywhere at noon on the 19th of February.

The belligerent armies maintain their respective positions, which are separated from one another by a line of demarcation. This line runs from Pont l'Evêque at the corner of the Department Calvados (to the south of Honfleur) between Briouze and Fromentel (both on the railway from Argentan to Granville) to Lignère la Doucelle in the north-east of the Department of Mayenne; it then follows the boundary-line between the Departments of Mayenne, Orne, and Sarthe, to the north of Moranne (on the Sarthe), and is continued so that it leaves the Departments Sarthe, Indre-et-Loire, Loir-et-Cher, Loiret, and Yonne in the occupation of the Germans, as far as the point to the east of Quarre les Tombe, where the Departments Côte d'Or, Nièvre, and Yonne touch one another. The further determination of the line of demarcation from this point is reserved until the contracting parties shall be informed of the present condition of the military operations in the Departments Côte d'Or, Doubs, and Jura; but in any case the line will divide these three Departments in such a manner as to leave the northern portion in German and the southern in French occupation.

The Departments Nord and Pas de Calais, the fortresses of Givet and Langres, and a *rayon* of six miles around them, and the peninsula of Havre, as far as a

line from Etretal towards St Romain, remain free from German occupation. The two belligerent armies and their respective outposts will remain at least six miles distant from the line of demarcation, so that they will be separated from one another by a zone of 12 miles —about a day's march.

Each of the two armies reserves to itself the right of maintaining its authority in the district occupied by it, and of using such means for that purpose as their commanders think fit.

The armistice also extends to the maritime forces of the two nations. The meridian of Dunkirk is to be regarded as the line of demarcation between them —the French fleet keeping to the westward of it, and the German fleet withdrawing to the eastward.

Prizes made after the conclusion, but before the promulgation of the armistice, will be given up again; and prisoners made by either side in battles fought during the same interval will be restored. Military operations on the territory in the Departments Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or, as well as the siege of Belfort, will be continued independently of the armistice, until the moment that an understanding shall be arrived at as to a line of demarcation which shall divide the above-named Departments, and the determination of which boundary is reserved.

2. The object of the armistice is to allow the Government of National Defence to convoke a freely-elected Assembly, which shall determine whether the

war shall be continued, or under what conditions peace shall be concluded.

This Assembly will meet at Bordeaux. The commanders of the German armies will facilitate in every way the election and assembling of the Deputies.

3. The French military authorities will at once hand over to the German army the exterior forts of Paris and the *matériel* of war contained in them. The communes and houses which lie without the line of forts or between them, as far as a boundary which will be pointed out by military commissioners, may be occupied by German troops. The ground between this boundary and the fortified enclosure of the town of Paris will be forbidden to armed forces of either side. The manner of surrendering the forts and the above-named boundary-line is laid down in a protocol annexed to the present convention.

4. During the period of the armistice the German army will not enter the town of Paris.

5. The enceinte will be disarmed. The gun-carriages will be removed into forts to be pointed out by a commissioner from the German army.

6. The garrison (troops of the line, Mobile Guards, and sailors) of the forts and town of Paris are prisoners of war, excepting a division of 12,000 men, which the military authorities of Paris will retain for the interior service of the town.

The troops declared prisoners of war are to lay down their arms. These will be collected and deliv-

ered over in the customary manner after an agreement has been made with the Commissioner. The soldiers themselves will remain within the town, and will not be allowed to cross the enceinte during the armistice. The French authorities pledge themselves to keep guard that every individual belonging to the army and the Mobile Guard remains in the interior of the town.

The names of the officers of the troops declared prisoners of war will be recorded in a list which will be handed over to the German authorities.

At the expiration of the armistice, if peace shall not have been concluded, all soldiers belonging to the army in Paris must deliver themselves up to the German army as prisoners of war.

The officers who are prisoners of war retain their arms.

7. The National Guard retains its arms. It undertakes the guard of Paris and the maintenance of order. The *gendarmerie* and the troops employed in municipal service, and therefore the Republican Guard, the custom-house officers and firemen, will be similarly treated. The total number of this last-named detachment shall not exceed 3500 men.

All corps of Franc-tireurs are dissolved by order of the French Government.

8. From the moment this present agreement shall be signed and the forts occupied, the Commander-in-chief of the German armies will facilitate in every

possible way the despatch of commissioners from the French Government into the Departments and abroad to prepare for the reprovisioning of Paris, and will allow all goods sent for the capital to pass.

9. After the surrender of the forts, and after the disarming of the enceinte and garrison, as laid down in articles 5 and 6, the reprovisioning of Paris shall take along the railway and by water without let or hindrance.

Supplies for the revictualment of the capital shall not be drawn from the territory occupied by the German troops; and the French Government pledges itself to procure these supplies from places outside the line of demarcation which surrounds the positions of the German armies, unless the commander of these latter issues an authorisation which enacts otherwise.

10. Every person wishing to leave Paris must be provided with a regular permit, issued by the French military authorities, and *viséd* by the German outposts. These permits will be granted as a matter of right to those who wish to come forward in the provinces as candidates for the National Assembly, and also to the elected Deputies. The persons who receive the above-named permission can only leave Paris, or cross the line of German outposts, between the hours of 6 A.M. and 6 P.M.

11. The town of Paris is to pay a municipal war contribution of 200 millions of francs, and that before the fifteenth day of the armistice. The manner of

payment will be arranged by a mixed Franco-Germanic Commission.

12. During the armistice nothing of public value shall be removed which might serve as a pledge for the payment of the war contribution.

13. The importation into Paris of arms, ammunition, or of materials for their manufacture, is forbidden during the period of the armistice.

14. The exchange of all prisoners of war made by the French army since the beginning of the war will be at once proceeded with. To this end the French authorities will give to the German authorities in Amiens, Le Mans, Orleans, and Vesoul, as soon as possible, nominal lists of the German prisoners of war. The German prisoners of war will be set at liberty on the points nearest to the frontier. The German authorities will transfer to the French authorities at the same points, and as speedily as possible, an equal number of French prisoners of war of corresponding rank.

This exchange will also include civilian prisoners, as captains in the German mercantile marine and French civilian prisoners interned in Germany.

15. A postal service, for unclosed letters only, will be arranged between Paris and the Departments by the headquarters at Versailles.

The protocol mentioned in article 3 of the agreement contains the following :—

1. Lines of demarcation before Paris.—The line of

demarcation on the French side is the enceinte of the town; on the German side, as follows:—

Firstly, on the south front: from the Seine along the heights on the north end of the island of St Germain, along the sewage-canal of Issy, then between the enceinte of the town and Forts Issy, Vanves, Montrouge, Bicêtre, at about 500 metres from the fronts of the forts to the crossing of the road from Paris to Pont-à-l'Anglais on the one side and Alfort on the other (Rond point de la Bosse de Marne).

Secondly, on the east front: starting from the last-named point, the line crosses the confluence of the Seine and Marne, follows the north and west edge of the village of Charenton, crosses the Rond point de l'Obélisque to the Porte de Fontenay, thence northwards to a point 500 metres to the west of Fort Rosny; it then runs on 500 metres to the south of Forts Noisy and Romainville to the point where the road from Pantin touches the Ourcq canal. The garrison of the castle of Vincennes shall consist of a company of 200 men, and shall not be dissolved during the armistice.

Thirdly, on the north front: the line is prolonged from the last-described point to one 500 metres to the south-west of Fort Aubervillers, follows the southern edge of the village of Aubervillers, and then the canal of St Denis, which it crosses at a point 500 metres to the south of its elbow, and still 500 metres below this bend goes straight away to the Seine.

Fourthly, on the west front: the line of demarcation runs along the left bank of the Seine to the sewage-canal of Issy.

The German troops shall be allowed to deviate slightly from this line of demarcation, in order to place their outposts so as to obtain the necessary security for the army.

2. Crossing the line of demarcation.—Persons who have received permission to cross the line of German outposts can only do so by the following roads: the Calais, Lille, Metz, Strasburg (Porte de Fontenay), Basle, Antibes, Toulouse, and No. 189 (passing by Fort Issy); finally, by the bridges of the Seine, that of Sèvres included, the restoration of all of which is allowed.

3. Surrender of the forts and redoubts.—The surrender shall take place in the course of the 29th of January 1871, beginning at 10 A.M., and in the following manner:—

The French troops will evacuate the forts and the neutral ground, leaving behind in each fort only the commandant of the fortress, the superintendent of engineers and artillery, and lastly, the gate-keeper.

Immediately after the evacuation of each fort, an officer of the French Staff will repair to the German outposts, to give any information about the fort that may perchance be required, and to show the way to it.

After the occupation of each fort, and after all re-

quired information has been given, the commandants of the fortress, the superintendents, and the gate-keepers, will return to the garrison of their respective forts in Paris.

4. Delivering up of armament and *matériel.*—The arms, field-guns, colours, and *matériel*, will be given over by the French military authorities, and delivered at Sévran within a term of fourteen days, reckoned from the date of the signing of the convention. A detailed list of the armament and *matériel* will be supplied by the French authorities to the German before the 4th of February.

The carriages of the ordnance with which the ramparts are armed must also be removed before that date.

The execution of the convention of the 28th of January was carried out without difficulty as far as the capitulation of Paris was concerned, and by the 29th of January the German troops occupied the forts. After this date Mont Valerien was held by the 5th North German Corps; Fort Issy by the 9th; Vanves and Montrouge by the 2d Bavarians; Bicêtre and Ivry by the 6th North German; Charenton by the 1st Bavarian; the redoubts of Gravelle and De la Faisanderie by the Würtembergers; Nogent, Rosny, Noisy, Romainville, and the redoubts on this line, by the Saxons; Aubervillers by the Prussian Guard; and St Denis by the 4th North German Corps. A few days later on the Würtembergers re-

lieved the Saxons in the occupation of Fort Nogent and of the neighbouring redoubt of Fontenay.

A few acts of desperation, such as are rarely absent on such occasions, accompanied the surrender of the forts; and among other deeds of this character, two French officers, who were unwilling to survive the event, shot themselves.

The delivering up of the arms before Paris commenced on the 7th of February.

The revictualment of the capital was effected with a rapidity which could hardly have been expected, Paris once again proving her indestructible power of attraction.

Although in the beginning of this unhappy war France had not met with any real sympathy throughout Europe, yet as the struggle went on the leaf had turned. The great disasters which smote the beautiful country, the rigour of the conquerors, the desperate courage with which France rose up after the miserable collapse of the Empire, awakened a feeling of compassion throughout the whole of Europe, save in Germany. And who knows whether even there more of the same feeling was not aroused than can be recognised, as long as a host of the leaders of opinion raise their deafening shouts? Every experienced man could foresee that the resistance of France after the catastrophe of Sedan could only lead, in the then existing state of things, to the further ruin of the country; but still none could refuse to respect a people who, in

the interest of a great question—that of the right of nations to decide on their own destiny—gathered together all its force, and refused before all things to abandon its brethren without having dared the utmost in their behalf. The German soldiers themselves—we know it as a fact—did not refuse to respect the French when they undertook this hopeless and desperate struggle; the only men capable of this were purely a number of professors and journalists, who sought in their zeal to outdo their masters in Germany.

And now, in the nations which were not involved in the war, the workings of interest were joined to the workings of the heart in all men who possessed one. Statesmen in the neutral countries began to say to themselves that an absolute sovereignty of the Germans in Central Europe could not possibly be conducive to the peace of the Continent, or to the guaranteeing of the same, if the Germans were liable to be continually inflamed, as had just been the case, by their philosophers.

The commercial and industrial classes in the States bordering on the belligerents, not being accustomed to derive their largest profits from the misfortunes of others, yearned for the restoration of business, and of credit, now so deeply shaken.

Heart and intellect thus worked together, as the war went on, to turn the sympathies of European nations to the cause of France. This change was especially

discernible in England; and therefore, as soon as the reprovisioning of Paris became possible, great things were done in that country to aid the work, the city of London making a particularly munificent present of supplies to the city of Paris—a gift which was received by the Government of National Defence and the municipal authorities of the capital with lively gratitude.

But though the carrying out of the convention of the 28th of January was effected in and about Paris with a facility which was hardly expected, its execution in the Departments did not take place so quietly.

The line of demarcation was not in reality especially favourable for the French, and consequently a bitter outcry arose from many of the generals, who, however, were soon obliged to cease their protestations, as the convention was now concluded, and the Germans really demanded nothing more than its strict fulfilment.

From the contents of the convention it is manifest that the Departments of Jura, Doubs, and Côte d'Or were for the time being exempted from the armistice, and that the operations in them were to be continued. At first all impartial people at a distance believed that this was a new instance of the rigour of the Germans. But in reality it was not so. The Government of National Defence still cherished most extravagant delusions as to the workings of Bourbaki's army; and, unacquainted with everything that was really happening in France, they entertained, even on the

28th of January, most remarkable and incredible notions of the value of Belfort and of the French Army of the East. We shall presently see how it really stood with these.

It was therefore the French Government of National Defence, and not the German leaders, who demanded that the east should be excluded from the armistice.

Jules Favre at once telegraphed the news of the conclusion of the convention to Bordeaux; but in his haste he committed the unpardonable oversight of neglecting to mention in any way the exceedingly important exception of the east from the armistice. Gambetta, who ever held firm to his fixed idea of resistance to the end (*la guerre à outrance*), was furious at the conclusion of the truce, and gave vent to his rage in high-toned proclamations. And can he be reproached for this feeling when even generals, who in the last days had commanded the ill-fated and hastily-collected armies, certainly not with any especial glory, maintained that France could yet be victorious with these hosts? But spite of his anger, Gambetta telegraphed the news of the armistice in all directions, and also to the east, and there the French generals naturally believed that the cessation of hostilities applied equally to them. From this misapprehension misunderstandings naturally arose, which certainly bore their part in bringing about the disasters of the Army of the East, even if its misfortunes cannot be entirely attributed to the mistake. But we

shall have occasion later on to regard these matters more minutely.

On the 31st of January, the Government of National Defence in Paris issued the writs for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. These were to take place in the Departments on the 8th of February, and in Paris, according to the first arrangement, on the 5th, although they did not really take place there either until the 8th of the month.

The time was very scantily meted out, for the hand of the German leaders lay heavily upon France. Eight days at the most were given for the necessary preparations for the elections. The National Assembly was to meet at Bordeaux on the 12th of February, so that some kind of vote might be given before the expiration of the armistice, which would render its prolongation possible. All communications were interrupted; so that even were the result of elections in the eastern and northern Departments clearly known on the 9th of February, it was almost impossible for Deputies elected in those districts to arrive in Bordeaux by the 12th.

Bismark had promised Jules Favre that the Germans should not place any hindrances in the way of the elections in the Departments occupied by them, not even in Alsace and Lorraine, which the Germans wished to appropriate. But all the occupied Departments had German prefects, and it was impossible that these should exercise the functions of their office.

in the matter of the elections. It was therefore decided that the mayors of the chief places of the Departments should represent the prefects on this occasion.

The elections were to take place according to the law of 1849, with scrutiny of the lists; and the number of the members of the Chamber amounted by this regulation, with the existing extent of France, to 759. The prefects were not to be eligible for election in the Departments they severally administered; and the members of the dynasties which in former times had governed France, and were now legally exiled from it, were also in common-sense excluded. It was also decided, and much inconvenience would very possibly be caused by the determination, that the votes should not be given in the communes, but by cantons, in the chief places of the cantons. Now many of the cantons are of very great extent, so that a portion of the inhabitants were a tolerably long day's march distant from the voting-place. This naturally was not the case in the towns, but only in the country cantons; and this arrangement therefore gave the inhabitants of towns an advantage over the rural population. This time, however, the peasants were not to be deterred by the difficulties prepared for them, but flocked in masses to the chief places of the cantons to record their votes.

The decree, also, which determined that the troops, Mobile and National Guards, and mobilised National

Guards, should vote for the Departments from which they were drawn, was also inexpedient. These men had been for months—and what months!—absent from their Departments, and knew nothing of the existing state of affairs there. Moreover, all communication was extremely difficult, especially considering the shortness of the time; and in addition to all this, the sorting the votes in the various garrisons must necessarily occupy much time, and therefore the final determination of the result of the elections be considerably delayed.

All this, however, could have been borne; but now the Delegation in Bordeaux, acting independently of the Government of National Defence in Paris, issued an electoral decree on the 31st of January which essentially rendered every man who had stood in any relation whatsoever to the Second Empire ineligible for election. This was going very far, and, if it had been taken quite literally, would have excluded M. Gambetta himself, for he had once undoubtedly taken the oath of a deputy towards the Second Empire.

Count Bismark judged it to be expedient to protest against this decree, and appealed thereby to the 2d article of the convention for the armistice of the 28th of January, according to which the Constituent Assembly at Bordeaux was to be a freely-elected one. Now the delegation at Bordeaux—or more properly the dictatorship of M. Gambetta, who was faithfully obeyed by his old colleagues—had become just as disagreeable

to the Government of National Defence in Paris as it was to Count Bismark. Gambetta himself, since his "organisation of victory" had so lamentably failed, had fallen in public opinion with the rapidity of a balloon the valve of which is kept open and the ballast untouched. Many of his measures, which under any circumstances would have been open to discussion—as, for instance, the dissolution of the Departmental Councils-General, the breeding-places of the official candidates of the Second Empire, or as the removal of judges and other magistrates who had twisted the law in the interest of the *coup d'état*, but who, as the law stood, were not liable to be deposed —were now severely criticised and unconditionally condemned by nearly all parties.

Gambetta's besetting sin was, however, mainly his habit of boasting, and the rein he gave to his imagination, whereby he allowed himself to call into existence hosts which really never had any being, and which only the illusion of some few generals permitted them to see. Time alone can show what astounding military madness was committed under the delirious dictatorship of Gambetta, or can make men realise the recklessness with which the property of poor France was squandered under the same rule; but, when the full revelation is completed, the world will stand aghast.

The Government in Paris at once answered Count Bismark, saying that they would annul Gambetta's

electoral decree of the 31st of January; and they forthwith despatched Jules Simon to Bordeaux to carry their promise into execution. Gambetta, when he saw his acts thus disowned, tendered his resignation, and on the 6th of February retired into private life. The Ministry of the Interior, and provisionally also the Ministry of War, were undertaken by Emanuel Arago, who had followed Jules Simon; but he was shortly afterwards relieved in the latter office by General Leflô.

The result of the elections was entirely in favour of peace; and now, in opposition to the phrase "la guerre à outrance," the motto "la paix à outrance" might be said to be adopted. This was the result which could be discerned most easily and with the greatest certainty; much more difficult was it to determine whether the issue was in favour of a monarchy or of a republic. The majority of the electors had probably scarcely thought of that question when they voted. Extraordinarily few Bonapartists had been returned, and, except in Corsica, none of "first water." But as Bonapartism during the years prior to the war had swallowed up everything, it naturally resulted that men of the "old parties"—that is to say, Legitimists and Orleanists—were represented in the new Assembly as well as Republicans.

When the country to which they belong is unlucky, the thoughts of princes are invariably those of Pretenders. Thus in this case also the Count of

Chambord—the so-called Henry V.—who had quitted France when he was ten years old, and who had never done ought else than vegetate in a princely manner; this man, who could be of no greater value in the eyes of the sensible portion of the French people than an ordinary scarecrow, began nevertheless, as soon as the catastrophe of Sedan became known to him, to agitate in Switzerland on the French frontier, and to issue proclamations, as if the French people had nothing more urgent to do than to place him in the place of Napoleon III., and to allow themselves to be ruined again — although perhaps in another manner—by him.

The Prince of Joinville and the Duke of Chartres crept in as volunteers into the French Army of the West, and care was naturally taken that their patriotism should be much talked about. Gambetta ordered them to leave; and with justice, for he had here even the law upon his side. The Princes were always on the point of leaving and yet never left, and the Dukes of Joinville and D'Aumale succeeded in getting themselves returned for the Constituent Assembly. But the declarations of all these members of the house of Orleans made in the end of 1870 and in the beginning of 1871 are in truth pitiable. They all tended to show that France, if she would do justice, must re-establish the family of Orleans on the throne; but that the Princes would be content, if for the present only a president was chosen from the house of Or-

leans, and if all the centralised forces of the State were placed in his hand to use as he might think fit. Certainly the Princes of Orleans could not have had a spark of patriotism, or they would not have intervened with their private interests in France's most ill-fated hour, and thus have complicated still more the affairs of the country, which were difficult enough to arrange without these superadded troubles.

Napoleon III. also protested and proclaimed from his pleasant prison at Wilhelmshöhe.

Ought not the unbecoming proceedings of all these Pretenders to have opened the eyes of the French? Or will they follow the example of the Spaniards, who, fortunate in getting free from one dynasty, strove with all their power to find another, thereby bringing incalculable harm upon the whole of Europe —a harm which is as yet by no means finished, but which in all probability will weigh upon Europe for more than a hundred years?

Thiers gained an immense triumph in the elections, for he was returned for twenty-six Departments. Did he owe this to his renown as an adherent of constitutional monarchy, to his name of Orleanist? It would be temerarious to deny that this latter consideration may have had some influence here and there; but we may with safety assert that he was elected by more than one million and a half of Frenchmen principally because he was the most prominent representative of the peace party. He was the man for the hour. He

alone had dared to protest in the midst of the Mamelukes of the Empire against the beginning of this ill-fated war; he had sought to influence Europe in the interest of the restoration of peace; he had conducted the negotiations for an armistice at the end of October, and it was not his fault that they were then broken off. In short, he was the man for the hour.

On the 12th of February such members of the Constituent Assembly as had arrived in Bordeaux met, but there were not quite 300 present. Vicomte Benoist d'Azy, a Legitimist, undertook the presidency provisionally as senior member. The Vicomte d'Azy was born in 1796, and was employed in the service of the State under the Restoration. Under the Government of Louis Philippe he was returned in 1842 to the Chamber for the Department Nièvre, and did his utmost as a member of the Opposition. He was not elected for the Constituent Assembly of 1848, but was returned for the Corps Legislatif in 1849. An opponent to the Republic, he yet offered a praiseworthy resistance to Napoleon's *coup d'état* of 1851; and it was under his presidency that the Deputies assembled, who, in the Mayoralty of the 10th arrondissement, declared the deposition of the President, Louis Napoleon. Strangely enough, Benoist d'Azy was not molested after the success of the *coup d'état.*

In spite of the small number of members present, the National Assembly nevertheless proceeded to constitute

itself at once, and after the arrival of a further number of Deputies, it proceeded on the 16th of February to elect its permanent president and vice-president.

M. Grévy was chosen as president, and that by an enormous majority, as out of 538 votes he received 519. Grévy was born in 1813 in the Department Jura. In his youth he studied jurisprudence, and fought gallantly in the July days in 1830. Shortly after this he was admitted to the bar in Paris, and in 1848 was appointed Commissioner of the Provisional Government in his native Department, in which office, notwithstanding that he was a decided republican, he always showed great moderation, and kept tenaciously to the law. Almost immediately after his appointment he was returned to the Assembly for the Department; and in the Chamber he consistently strove to obviate the dangers which the establishment of a Presidency—which was nothing more than a monarchy in disguise—might be the means of bringing to pass. But in vain. This almost monarchical presidency was instituted, and was, moreover, given by the general vote to a prince. After the election of Louis Bonaparte, Grévy steadfastly combated the Bonapartist policy both in the Corps Legislatif as well as in the Assembly; and, voting from a democratic point of view, opposed, but always with moderation, the expedition to Rome and the coalition of Legitimists and Bonapartists. After the *coup d'état* he retired from the arena of politics and again became an advo-

cate; but, re-elected once more in the Jura for the Corps Legislatif, he resumed his political career in 1868, and at the general election in 1869 was again returned to the Chamber, where he voted against the commencement of the war of 1870. During Gambetta's dictatorship he repeatedly urged the earliest convocation possible of a National Assembly, so that it might be certainly known whether the French nation desired the continuation of hostilities or not; and in order that, if the first were the case, the war might be carried on with a good conscience and every real force, instead of with imaginary ones. In the same spirit he also declared most decidedly against every illegal act of Gambetta's. Thus it is manifest that Grévy could not have been elected as a monarchist by the more or less pronounced monarchists, and that he was chosen as the opponent of a totally irresponsible dictatorship and as a partisan of peace.

On the 17th of February, Thiers was appointed by an imposing majority Chief of the Executive Power —or, in other words, President of the practically-established Republic. On the 19th he introduced the greater part of his Ministry. This was composed of M. Dufaure, Minister of Justice; Jules Favre for Foreign Affairs; Picard for the Interior; Jules Simon for Public Instruction; Lambrecht for Commerce; Leflô for War; Pothuau for the Marine; and De Larcy for Public Works. Buffet, to whom the Ministry of Finance was offered, declined to take office, especially

considering the position he had held in Ollivier's Ministry in the beginning of 1870; and instead of him M. Pouyer-Quertier took the vacant portfolio, but not until the 24th of February.

Although the career of the celebrated statesman who was now called to the head of the French Government is well known, still we believe that it will be well under the given circumstances to recall very briefly to mind his earlier history.

Born in the year 1797, Thiers studied jurisprudence at Aix, and was called to the bar in 1820; but not feeling any natural aptitude for advocacy, he sought to open for himself a career in politics by means of journalism. From 1821 he wrote for the 'Constitutionel,' after 1823 for the 'Tablettes Historiques;' and in these first years of his appearance in literature he was distinguishable by the versatility of his talents, and especially by his capacity for receiving and reproducing lively impressions of all imaginable things and persons with whom he came into contact.

In 1823 Thiers commenced to work at his 'History of the French Revolution from 1789 to the 18th Brumaire,' a book which appeared in ten volumes between the years 1823 and 1827. While executing this task he undertook a number of practical studies on military art, administration, and finance, distinguishing himself thereby from many of even the ancient historians, who never felt that it was impossible to write history without a certain amount

of knowledge of the various relations of life in a state and people. As to the 'History of the French Revolution,' however different the opinions entertained of it may otherwise be, every one must nevertheless unite in praising its style and the clearness and vividness of its composition.

Thiers had come to Paris a poor man, and up to 1829 he had not improved his worldly fortune. At that date he conceived the idea of writing a universal history of the world, and desired to prepare himself for the task by extended journeys. To this end he had made arrangements to accompany the expedition of the circumnavigator Laplace, when, on the 5th of August 1829, Polignac's reactionary Ministry came into office. Thiers, who foresaw a great crisis, now resolved to remain in Paris, and, in company with Mignet and Armand Carrel, founded the 'National.' During the first year of existence of this journal, Thiers took the post of editor; and although the 'National' was originally destined only to defend the constitution, it became, it may almost be said involuntarily, and remained, certainly not involuntarily, an Orleanist paper. M. Thiers and the 'National' raised Louis Philippe to the throne of France; Louis Philippe could not show himself ungrateful, and Thiers was at once appointed Counsellor of State and Secretary-General in the Ministry of Finance, under the direction of Baron Louis. He also, by the special request of the King, remained as Under-Secretary of State

in the same office, under Laffitte's Ministry (2d of November 1830); but when in March 1831 this latter Ministry fell, Thiers also retired from the administration.

As early as 1830 he had been elected for the Chamber of Deputies, and in 1831 he was again returned for it. In 1830 Thiers spoke after the manner of Gambetta, and even more wildly, desiring to "reconquer" the left bank of the Rhine and the Alpine frontier, and to free Poland, Italy, and Belgium. In 1831 he became extremely moderate—a man of order, a defender of hereditary peerage, and demanded that the Government should proceed with the utmost severity against republicans and legitimists. Having taken this wise course, he was recalled to the Government as Minister of the Interior on the 11th of October. As a member of it he established tranquillity in the country, caused the Duchess of Berry to be arrested in the Vendée, and the citadel of Antwerp to be besieged. By the fall of this latter the separation of Belgium from Holland was sealed, and the former country, although not annexed, still remained for the time being fettered to France. After the fall of the citadel of Antwerp, Thiers undertook, on the 25th of December 1832, the Ministry of Public Works and Commerce, in place of that of the Interior, and in this position rendered great services to trade and industry, but at the same time demanded the worship of the Napoleonic glory

by setting up a new statue of the soldier-emperor in the greatcoat and large hat (the celebrated *petit chapeau*) on the column in the Place de Vendôme, in place of the figure of Napoleon I. in court-dress which had formerly crowned the pillar, and which had been removed during the Restoration; and also by completing the triumphal arch, which had been begun as far back as 1806, on the Place de l'Etoile.

In 1834, when circumstances were adverse for the house of Orleans, Thiers again undertook the Ministry of the Interior. During this year ministerial crises succeeded one another in rapid succession, and during these the innate difference between Thiers and Guizot—two more opposite natures can hardly be conceived—became most plainly manifest. Finally, at the end of the year, Broglie's Ministry came into office, and there Thiers found himself rightly placed. In the same year he became a member of the Academy, and in 1835, after Fieschi's plot, he defended, in a reactionary sense, the increasing of the severity of the laws for the press and jury. In 1836 he unseated Guizot, and became Minister-President, undertaking at the same time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But he did not hold these offices long. He began to entertain warlike desires, and desired to interfere in the strife between the Christinos and the Carlists. The King, Louis Philippe, did not feel at all dis-

posed to undertake this intervention, and on the 25th of August 1836 Thiers' Ministry was replaced by Molé's. Thiers now betook himself to travelling, but returning in the middle of 1838, he reappeared in the Chamber, and soon succeeded in overthrowing Molé's Ministry. Still he did not at once take the helm of State, and it was not until the 1st of March 1840 that he found himself again at the head of the Ministry. The excessive cunning of the French Government had brought about that France stood totally isolated in Europe, and in the then existing phase of the Eastern Question this fact became especially clearly and somewhat embarrassingly manifest. Thiers, furious because no one in Europe cared to trouble themselves any more about France, now entertained the idea of a popular war against Germany; and it was at this time that, owing to his urgency, it was resolved to construct the most useful fortifications of Paris. At this time, also, Nicolaus Becker's ridiculous Rhine song was written, and also Alfred de Musset's equally silly reply. But Thiers' designs were again wrecked on Louis Philippe's love of peace; and the Minister, unable to carry out his plans, abandoned the field to Guizot, and retired into private life. He now proposed writing the History of the Consulate and Empire, and prepared himself for the work by long travelling, after which the first two volumes of the book appeared in 1845, the last in 1862. The History must be regarded in every

respect as a French national work, both in its excellences and in its faults, and assisted materially to vivify the worship of glory and of Napoleonism.

After 1842, Thiers, as leader of the Left Centre, opposed Guizot's Ministry in the Chamber. His attacks became, from year to year, more violent; and the more the Ministry inclined to reactionism, and sought in its international relations for good friendship with the ruling European Governments, and the more hostility it displayed towards every revolution, so much the more did Thiers show revolutionary colours. In the night between the 23d and 24th of February 1848, Louis Philippe summoned Thiers and Odillon Barrot to form a new Ministry, but it was too late. Thiers, too, must have seen this; for scarcely had he undertaken the task, when, seeing the barricades with which the streets of Paris were being covered, he again gave in his resignation.

The Republic was proclaimed, and Thiers declared that he would join even this new form of Government, but without changing in other respects his political convictions. At the first elections for the Assembly he was passed over, but at the after-elections he was returned for four Departments, and among them for that of the Seine (Paris).

In the Constituent Assembly, and in the Corps Legislatif which succeeded it, Thiers sat on the Right. He had voted for the dictatorship of Cavaignac; he voted afterwards for the Presidency of Louis Napo-

leon. He voted for the Roman expedition, he opposed the Socialists, he voted for the limitation of the right of election (law of the 31st May); in short, he was reactionary in internal questions, and in foreign policy supported the principle of interfering in the affairs of other nations.

But spite of all this, he was arrested during the *coup d'état*, imprisoned at first in Mazas, and then exiled from France; in August 1852, however, he received, without asking for it, permission to return to Paris, where he lived for eleven years, withdrawn from politics and devoted entirely to his literary occupations.

In the year 1863 Thiers was elected for the Corps Legislatif by a great majority in Paris as a candidate of the opposition against Persigny. In the Chamber he opposed the Second Empire, mainly from an economic point of view, and in regard to its foreign policy; and as he had ever been the declared adversary of Italian unity, so he now assumed a like position with regard to the unity of Germany. Unfortunately, he could never understand that other countries have an equal right with France to regulate their own constitution, and he sought for the greatness of France in the division and weakness of her neighbours. Shortly before the outbreak of the war of 1866, he, on the 3d of May, criticised most severely the behaviour of France with regard to the policy of Prussia since the Danish war of 1864, and concluded with the darkest pro-

phecies. After the war of 1866 he was beside himself, and condemned the policy of Napoleon III., exclaiming, "Now every fault has been committed, no more can be committed!" In the year 1869 Thiers was only returned for the Corps Legislatif in the second elections in Paris, and we have seen how the Government strove to prevent his election.* He now, in 1870, protested most decidedly and up to the last moment against the commencement of the war, and afterwards worked with all his energies for the quickest possible restoration of peace. It was undoubtedly owing to these circumstances that the Assembly at Bordeaux called him to the head of affairs. But why had he denounced the commencement of the war of 1870? Simply because France was not ready to undertake a victorious campaign against Germany, neither from a military nor from a political point of view; neither by the organisation of her army, nor by her alliances abroad. Thiers, as his whole life shows, and as is most clearly manifest from his speeches in 1866, did not desire the preservation of peace, because he recognised the right of Germany, as of every other country, to regulate her constitution independently, and as she wished; and therefore this peace which was now to be concluded could never be for him aught else than a truce, which must needs be accepted, because it was imperatively necessary for France to gain time to strengthen and collect herself.

* Vol. i. p. 31.

Thiers was certainly far too prudent to proclaim this aloud to the world at the very moment when peace must be concluded with Germany on the most favourable terms possible. But the majority of the National Assembly understood him; for they knew that this man could not so suddenly change and in a moment deny his whole previous life, however much he might seem to do so. The overwhelming majority of the Assembly called him therefore to the head of affairs, not only because he was the man of peace, but also because he was the man of this especial peace, of the armistice for the recovery of France to recommence the war under more favourable circumstances and with better forces than in 1870, after a period which certainly could not be foretold to the month or even to the year.

Thiers notoriously brought some men into his Ministry solely because they had been in the Government of National Defence, and represented there the moderate party; such were Jules Favre, Jules Simon, Ernst Picard, and Leflô. Admiral Pothuau, a brave sailor, had distinguished himself in the defence of Paris, and had been sent to Bordeaux by the Parisians in company with many other like men, but also with a number of Red Republicans—men who talked most wildly and confusedly, and among whom Felix Pyat played the chief part.

But the most characteristic of M. Thiers' Government were the new names which he brought into its

constitution—Dufaure, Lambrecht, Pouyer-Quertier, and De Larcy.

M. Dufaure was born in 1798, studied law in Paris, commenced his career of advocate in Bordeaux, and was first elected for the Chamber in 1834. In the beginning of 1836 he was appointed a counsellor of State, but sent in his resignation of that office in December of the same year. He did not enter Molé's Ministry, but took the portfolio of Minister of Public Works in Soult's in 1839. In 1840 he refused to become a member either of Thiers' Ministry or of the succeeding one of Guizot, and opposed Thiers in the question of the fortifications of Paris. Between 1840 and 1848 Dufaure was repeatedly elected vice-president of the Chamber. In 1848 he could attach himself to the Republic without any secondary thoughts. He there stood on the side of the "moderate democracy," and was a "liberal" in the best sense of the word. Elected for the Constituent Assembly, he voted among other things for the Single-Chamber system and for the banishment of the Orleans family. He opposed Socialism, which at that time was certainly represented by very unripe and hardly-convinced persons. Under Cavaignac he undertook the Ministry of the Interior, and strove hard to bring about that statesman's election to the Presidency; but these endeavours, as is well enough known, were frustrated, for "a name conquered a man." But spite of these efforts Dufaure neverthe-

less undertook on the 2d of June 1849 the Ministry of the Interior under the Presidency of Louis Napoleon—the single doubtful act in Dufaure's life. He himself and his friends declare that he accommodated himself to this step in the interest of the maintenance of the Republic and of its constitution. In the July days Dufaure had to represent the reactionary decrees against the labourers' movement, but in spite of this he was dismissed by the Prince-President on the 31st of October. He then entered the legal opposition to the Government, and after the *coup d'état* retired into private life and returned to his career of advocate. Until 1871 he was never again re-elected for the Chamber, but in 1863 became a member of the Academy. As an especially honourable distinction for Dufaure, it may be mentioned that he, although many a time a Minister, is not even a Knight of the Legion of Honour; and every one who is at all acquainted with French affairs under the Second Empire will know what that signifies. In Dufaure, Thiers sought before all else for a blameless, upright man.

M. Lambrecht, born 1819, and formerly engineer of bridges and roads, was returned to the Corps Legislatif in 1863 as an opposition candidate, and sat there always by the side of Thiers. In 1869 he was not re-elected, but in 1870 Ollivier's Ministry offered him a nomination for Deputy of the Department Nord, which, however, he did not accept.

M. Pouyer-Quertier was born in 1820 in the De-

partment of the Lower Seine. A large manufacturer, he became in 1854 Mayor of Fleury-sur-Andelle, member of the Council-General of his Department, member of the Chamber of Commerce of Rouen, administrator of the Rouen branch of the Bank of France, and then president of the committee for the support of the cotton-weavers. He was returned in 1857, and again in 1863, as official candidate to the Corps Legislatif; but when the Emperor Napoleon III. became a convert to the system of free trade, and the treaties of commerce, especially that with England, were concluded, Pouyer-Quertier went over to the opposition, whence he attacked the commercial policy of the Government on all occasions, in every manner and with every weapon. A genuine Protectionist, and consequently defender of a monopoly, he nevertheless attacked other monopolies, acting in the interest of the one which he defended. He opposed the privileges of the great railway and banking companies, and advocated the liberation of the canals from the domination of monopoly, and the consequent extension of inland navigation, for purposes of internal commerce. It can be easily imagined how this Protectionist cotton lord, who was moreover a sound and shrewd man of business, and an enemy of the financial swindles which were carried on to excess in Europe, was a man after Thiers' own heart, who, himself an eager Protectionist, had plainly manifested his proclivities even during the transactions in the Chamber in 1870. By

reason of his constant opposition, Pouyer-Quertier naturally could not expect to be put forward as an official candidate for the elections for the Corps Legislatif in 1870, and he therefore came forward independently, but failed signally everywhere in spite of his undeniable services. That Thiers should seek him for Minister of Finance in the beginning of the year 1871 was a very significant fact, the importance of which it will be well at once to point out. France had under any circumstances enormous financial difficulties before her. How were these to be surmounted? How were the enormous expenses which the war had already occasioned, and which the restoration of peace would yet render necessary, to be met? The United States of America—which, although victorious, nevertheless found themselves at the termination of the great civil war in a somewhat similar position—had had recourse to high protective duties. Thiers was by no means disinclined to take the same course, and Pouyer-Quertier seemed to be the fitting man to carry it out with prudence, and the persistence engendered by conviction and interest, both personal and for his class.

M. De Larcy, born in 1805 in the Department Gard, springs from a Legitimist family, and was educated in Legitimist principles. In 1826 he became an advocate, and in 1829 commenced a judicial career; but the July Revolution and the change of dynasty quickly drove him from this. He then

returned to the bar, was elected in 1833 for the Council-General of the Department Gard, and in 1839 was returned to the Chamber of Deputies for Montpellier. There he naturally belonged to the Legitimist opposition, and became one of its most redoubtable champions. In the year 1843 he, in company with four other Deputies, visited the Count of Chambord in a very noticeable manner; and as this visit was very sharply blamed in the next address to Louis Philippe, he tendered his resignation, but was immediately re-elected. In 1846, however, he failed, but was again returned in 1848, shortly before the February Revolution. On that occasion he also came forward as a candidate for the Constituent Assembly, and in his address he declared that he would accept the Republic as an experiment. As he had formerly, even when he was in no way a Republican, constantly opposed the rule of Louis Philippe, he was now elected in two Departments. Both in the Constituent Assembly, and afterwards in the Corps Legislatif, he sat upon the Right; and the more reactionary the majority became, the better was he satisfied. Still he did not labour for Bonapartism, protested against the *coup d'état*, and in 1852 retired into private life. In the year 1863 and 1869 he again appeared as an opposition candidate for the Corps Legislatif, although he had drawn upon himself a legal prosecution and condemnation to a fine by his election agitations in the late autumn of 1868. M. De Larcy could certainly only have

entered Thiers' Government to see another experiment made with a Republic. Was M. Thiers endeavouring to insure the continuation of the Republic by uniting in his Cabinet men of the most diverse political opinions, who, as far as could be foreseen, could never come to any explanation with one another as to their special love for such a form of government?

Before the Constituent Assembly had met in Bordeaux, every one could see that the interval before the 19th of February would not be long enough to arrive at the conclusion of even a merely preliminary peace, and it therefore became necessary to commence negotiations for a prolongation of the armistice. These are closely connected with the operations which were still being carried on in the east of France, and we shall therefore consider them later on in conjunction with these.

CHAPTER LII.

THE OPERATIONS OF GENERAL WERDER UP TO THE EVACUATION OF DIJON—THE BATTLE OF NUITS.

We left General Werder towards the end of November. At that time he had the Baden division in and about Dijon, with small detachments pushed further northwards towards Chatillon sur Saône and Langres. The 4th reserve division stood about Gray, protecting with detachments the communications from Dijon by Epinal and across the Vosges into Alsace, and taking some part also in the siege of Belfort, which, however, was carried on mainly by the 1st reserve division, Treskow. Debschitz's division held Alsace, and the force there disposable, either to support Werder in the open field or to reinforce Treskow before Belfort, was continually increased by the arrival of garrison troops from Germany.

At first Werder was opposed by the Garibaldian Corps near Autun — by the so-called Army of the Vosges. This consisted of four brigades (Bosak Haucke, Delpech, Menotti Garibaldi, and Ricciotti Garibaldi), and each of these again was a strange

collection of corps bearing very high-flown titles, with which neither the quantity nor the quality of the men composing them at all accorded. But heterogeneous as their components were, there were still corps which even these brigades dared not enrol—as, for instance, Les Francs-tireurs de la Mort, La Compagnie de la Revanche, Les Vengeurs, Les Frères d'Etoile, &c. With this infantry five so-called squadrons of cavalry were associated—the whole of which would have made one fair squadron—and 3 batteries of artillery, with a total of 18 guns.

The whole Army of the Vosges may have had a force of 12,000 useful troops—although in making this statement we are far from disputing that France may have paid Bordone, the staff-apothecary, the means for subsisting double or treble that number.

In December 1870 a new Corps, under the command of General Cremer, was assembled on the right of Garibaldi, upon the front Beaune-Dôle. This fresh formation was composed principally of Mobile Guards and Mobilised National Guards from the Department of the Rhone, and is said to have numbered by the middle of the month about 20,000 men.

At the outbreak of the war in 1870, General Cremer was simply a captain of the second class on the General Staff, and that rank he had only held since 1866; consequently, he could not be more than 28 years of age. He was adjutant to General Clinchant, but had never distinguished himself in any way. He

was included in the capitulation of Metz, and when he reappeared upon the scene in the south-east of France, was accused of breaking his parole. As a rule, we do not attach much importance to such accusations, because we know from bitter experience that party-hatred, in excited times, is only too ready to wantonly hurl any charge against even the most honourable men. Very recently, for instance, the Prussians have been obliged to acquit General Ducrot of a like accusation which had been preferred against him. But with General Cremer the case was different; for towards the end of January 1871 the Prussian Ministry of War published the text of a certificate given by that General, in which he promised not to bear arms again against Germany during the course of the war.

On the 26th of November a detachment of the Garibaldian Corps attempted to surprise Dijon, by advancing from the westward upon Pasques, on the road from Dijon to Mont Auxois (the ancient Alesia). But between Pasques and Dijon this enterprise was checked by Werder's outposts, and the German leader, hurrying up himself with the three brigades which were concentrated about Dijon, fell, on the following day, upon the flank and rear of the Garibaldians, and compelled them to beat a hasty retreat, in executing which they left many prisoners in the hands of their enemy.

After the action of Pasques, quietness again pre-

vailed until the beginning of December, when the left wing of Cremer's Corps began to concentrate about Beaune, whence it shortly afterwards advanced by Nuits as far as the Vouge brook. But Werder would not under any circumstances permit his adversary to remain so close to him, as his movements would thereby be crippled, and he therefore ordered General von Glümer to proceed to attack the troops which thus annoyed him with the 1st and 2d brigades of infantry, Willisen's brigade of cavalry, and the artillery of the Baden division.

This force Glümer now divided into two main detachments—taking himself the command of the left wing, and giving the right, which consisted of four battalions and three-quarters of a squadron, to General Degenfeld.

On the 17th of December two battalions and half a squadron from this latter wing occupied Urcy, to the south-west of Dijon, and thence they were to advance at 5.30 A.M. on the 18th, marching by Quemigny and Ternain upon Villars Fontaine in the valley of the Mouzin brook. On the first-named day also another battalion took up a position on their left near Corcelles les Monts, and these troops, moving forward likewise on the 18th, were to march along the border of the Côte d'Or by Chambœuf upon Concœur, and so unite with the first-named detachment on the Mouzin brook. These united forces were then to take part, according to circumstances, in the action which the left

wing would by this time have begun in the hilly country on the eastward, and threaten especially the flank and rear of the French; while the remaining battalion of the right wing, and the remaining quarter squadron, were to leave Dijon at 8 A.M., and, marching along the highway on the eastern foot of the Côte d'Or through Gevrey and Vougeot, keep up the connection between Degenfeld and Glümer.

This latter General marched at 7.30 A.M. on the morning of the 18th of December with eight battalions, six squadrons, and five batteries from Longvic through the undulating district which spreads out on the east of the Côte d'Or, intending to attack by way of Fenay, Saulon la Rue, Epernay, and Boncourt Nuits. Advancing by this route, the Baden advanced-guard came upon French outposts near Fenay; but these, being very weak, were driven in without more ado, and it was only at noon that the fighting assumed a more serious aspect near the wood to the north of Boncourt.

Cremer, as soon as he saw himself seriously threatened on his right flank, recalled his outposts from Vougeot to Fontaine de Vosne, upon which his left now rested, his centre being about Nuits and Boncourt, his right extended by Premeaux to the Bois du Vernot on the right bank of the Mouzin brook, and his artillery posted on the heights of Chaux. The railway, which on the north of Nuits runs through a long cutting, was also strongly occupied by French infantry.

Towards one o'clock in the afternoon the farm of La Berchère and the village of Boncourt were in the hands of the Badensers, and Glümer now deployed the 1st regiment in first line near the above-named homestead, the 2d regiment in second line, keeping two battalions of the 3d regiment partly to form a reserve and partly to be ready to join in the action on the right wing; the cavalry was to advance on the left of all across the Mouzin brook upon Premeaux and the Bois du Vernot, and the main body of the artillery was posted to the south of La Berchère to fire upon the railway, and if possible drive away the troops holding it.

After the deployment had been completed, and the fire of the artillery appeared to have prepared the way sufficiently, and after Werder also had arrived on the scene of action, Glümer at 3 P.M. ordered the infantry to advance to the attack of the railway cutting and of the station of Nuits on his left. As the troops pushed forward to the assault over almost open ground, the quick independent file-firing of the French caused great losses in the ranks of the Badensers. Prince William was severely wounded, and Colonel von Renz, who took command of the brigade in his place, fell, together with his adjutant; but nevertheless by 3.30 P.M. both the railway cutting and station had been carried. The artillery also had assisted materially, for it had gradually advanced towards Nuits, and had ever more drawn upon itself the

fire of the French batteries, thereby diverting it from the German infantry. The French artillery on the heights of Chaux was too unfavourably posted to be able to do much damage in the plain below; and the thaw which had set in, and which had rendered the rich soil soft and swampy, materially lessened its effect, although on the other hand this same circumstance certainly rendered the advance of the German infantry more difficult, and increased the amount of the losses which the assaulting columns had to sustain.

After the loss of the railway station, the French fled southwards in the greatest disorder, mainly towards Beaune, and Glümer immediately established communication with Degenfeld's two columns, which had advanced by Vougeot and Concœur. The French rearguard held Nuits, and some obstinate street-fighting ensued for the possession of the town; but this struggle also was terminated by 4.30 P.M. While it was going on the French artillery continued firing for a time from the heights of Chaux, and then likewise began to retire.

The French had brought into action 14 battalions, or about 12,000 men; and on the 18th of December they lost more than 2000 men, and among them 700 prisoners. The Germans, on the other hand, lost 54 officers, and 880 men killed, wounded, and missing.

While this was going on about Nuits, Degenfeld's extreme right column had arrived near Villars la

Fontaine at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and had there encountered a body of troops detached to the left from Cremer's forces, becoming engaged at the same time with the French artillery posted on the heights before Chaux. It was after three o'clock before Degenfeld learnt anything of the fighting which was being simultaneously carried on near Nuits; but at this very time he was himself violently attacked by Cremer's left wing, which had been strengthened during the concentration upon Nuits, and was compelled at 4 P.M. to retreat in the direction of the plain of Dijon upon Marsannay and Perrigny, where he arrived at midnight—the French, as may easily be imagined, not pursuing him.

On the left flank the Baden cavalry, which had advanced across the Mouzin towards Premeaux and the Bois du Vernot, was received at these latter places with such a furious and effective infantry-fire that it held it to be expedient to retire again without delay behind the brook.

During the night preceding the 19th the Badensers remained in occupation of Nuits, the main body encamping near La Berchère and Boncourt. On the morning of the 19th, Werder—General Glümer, the commandant of the division, having been wounded on the 18th—ordered a return to Dijon, as the object of the expedition had been attained.

And indeed this object had been even more completely attained than was manifest to the Germans

at the moment; for the impression made upon the French by the defeat of Nuits was very extraordinary; many Mobilised National Guards and Mobiles of the Department of the Rhone fled to Lyons, and during the rout most lamentable scenes ensued, especially at Croix Rousse; among them may be mentioned the murder of Commandant Arnaud, chief of battalion in the National Guards, a drama which terminated in the great legal process of the month of March 1871.

While these things were going on, Werder had been obliged to secure himself from attacks from every quarter; and he had therefore pushed forward northwards also, towards Langres, a detachment consisting mainly of the 34th North German Regiment.

Langres, with a population of only some 8000 inhabitants, is one of the most remarkable towns in the world. It lies to the north of the watershed between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, upon a mountain-spur which juts out boldly between the Upper Marne and the Bonnelle. No town impresses the beholder more vividly with the idea that it has sprung from a Roman camp, and the city and its environs recall to mind at every step old Roman legends. The town of Langres itself forms a rectangle, the longer sides running from north to south, the shorter from east to west, and is surrounded with old walls which exhibit many and manifest traces of their Roman origin. This same *Andematunum*, when peopled by the Lin-

gones, showed itself only too complaisant towards the first Roman Cæsar, and during the Helvetian war surrendered, in compliance with his commands, those who had sought refuge there from the massacre of Bibrakte.

During the reign of Louis Philippe, a great citadel —a bastioned octagon—was constructed to the south of the town, and the space between the city and this work, the esplanade, called also the intrenched camp, was covered with intrenchments which fronted east and west, while the south side of the town was also provided with ramparts.

In the year 1867 it was determined to surround Langres with detached forts, and really convert it into a great intrenched camp. There were to be four of these main works—namely, Fort Bonnelle on the left bank of the Bonnelle, to the west of the village of St Geômes and to the south-west of the citadel; Fort Marnotte, to the east of St Geômes and to the south-east of the citadel; Fort Peigney, to the north-east of the town on the old Roman road to Neuilly l'Evêque and Fort Buzon, on the left bank of the Bonnelle, to the west of the citadel and to the north of Fort Bonnelle.

All these forts were to be bastioned quadrangles, constructed essentially on the system which we explained at length in the description of Metz. The only exception was Fort Peigney, which, instead of having a cavalier erected inside the main enceinte, as was else-

where the case, was to have the main enceinte itself surrounded by an envelope. By this means the enceinte was to acquire all the advantages which the cavaliers in the other detached works possessed, while at the same time it was to retain all its own peculiar merits. Many of the French Engineer officers were so inspired with this "new system" that we fail to understand them in the least.

The intrenched camp about Langres was now to be completed by intermediate works, redoubts, or batteries; one of these was to be thrown up on the spur near Brevoine, another upon Les Fourches—both of these were between Forts Buzon and Peigney—and a third by the mill of Pouvain, between Peigney and Marnotte; finally, the fortification of the village of St Geômes, between Forts Marnotte and Bonnelle, was contemplated.

Up to the time of the declaration of war in 1870 only Forts Peigney and Bonnelle had been taken in hand, and even they had not been commenced until 1869; nevertheless they were so far advanced that it was possible to complete them in a comparatively short space of time.

Meyère, chief of battalion in the Corps of Engineers, and the designer of Fort Peigney, was appointed Commandant of Langres, being at the same time promoted to the rank of general. The bulk of the garrison was formed by Mobile Guards, the majority of whom were drawn from Savoy. A serious

attack on the place was not in the interest of the Germans, but nevertheless various collisions took place between them and parties of French sent out from, and supported by, the fortress. One of these encounters we have already mentioned in narrating the march of Prince Frederic Charles from the neighbourhood of Metz to the Seine; and another took place two days before the battle of Nuits, on the 16th of December, when a detachment, pushed forward northwards by Werder to observe Langres, was attacked by a strong force which Meyère had sent out from the fortress upon Longeau, a place situated at the junction of the Gray and Dijon roads. The French were defeated after a short combat, and compelled to retire into Langres, having lost two guns and many prisoners.

CHAPTER LIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE EAST—THE EVACUATION OF DIJON BY THE GERMANS—THE BATTLE OF VILLERSEXEL ON THE LISAINE.

THE execution of the great operations in the east, of which we have already made mention, was begun in the last third of December, when the 24th French Army Corps advanced northwards, partly by the Lyons-Besançon railway, partly along the Swiss frontier. Simultaneously with this movement, Bourbaki's army, consisting of the 15th, 18th, and 20th Corps, left the neighbourhood of Nevers, marching also upon Besançon, while Garibaldi and Cremer again moved northwards to cover the operations.

According to the plan now proposed, Bourbaki was to unite the 15th, 18th, 20th, and 24th Corps under his immediate command round Besançon. With these forces, the available strength of which was calculated to be at the least 120,000, he was to relieve Belfort, and then cross over to the right bank of the Rhine; while Garibaldi and Cremer were, after the defeat of Werder, to push forward northwards

by Dijon on the west of the Vosges upon the Strasburg-Paris railway, in order to break up this line and cut off the supplies of the German armies occupied in the west.

The first intelligence of the movements of the French in these directions was received by Werder on the 25th of December, and this information related to the advance of the 24th French Corps, Bressolles, the Army of Lyons. The reports of Bourbaki's advance were still vague, but nevertheless Werder did not delay to take measures to provide for every eventuality.

Scarcely ever has a general found himself in such a difficult position as Werder now occupied. People who judge by the result may, it is true, find that all was very easy, simply because everything ended so successfully; but let us examine somewhat minutely what was really Werder's position at the end of the year 1870.

Werder had 58 battalions and 34 squadrons at his disposal, but at the time we speak of these were scattered along a front of 141 miles. They were also by no means complete in numbers, and really only amounted to an effective strength of about 47,000 men; and from these again some 15,000 must be subtracted, partly for the siege of Belfort, partly for the indispensable covering and watching of the most essential communications. There only remained, therefore, at the very most, 32,000 men available for work

in the field, and even these had to be in the first place concentrated before they could be made use of.

Werder's immediate aim was to continue the siege of Belfort, and cover the operation from attacks from any quarter.

The first part of this task was intrusted to General Treskow, to whom also troops from Debschitz's division were given, so that he might at the same time provide for the protection of a portion of the covering line.

The army of observation, which had to cover the siege of Belfort, Werder now purposed deploying on a line which extended from the Lure on the right by Chaigey, Hericourt, Montbéliard, to Delle, on the Swiss frontier, on the extreme left. This front was about 28 miles in length, so that the troops could be concentrated in a day's march upon any part of it where the French might direct their main attack.

In the first place, therefore, Werder recalled to the left bank of the Saône, to Vesoul, all the separate detachments of the right wing, which formed also the best part of his mobile troops—namely, Goltz's brigade from the neighbourhood of Langres, the Baden division from Dijon, and the main body of Schmeling's division (4th reserve division).

The Baden division stood on the 26th of December, with the 1st brigade pushed forward on the left, near Neuilly-les-Dijon, Longvic, and Marsannay la Côte. On the right of it the 3d brigade was posted at Fon-

taine les Dijon, Talant, and Plombières, with a detachment towards the west, and the 2d brigade was quartered in Dijon itself. On the morning of the 27th the division first received definite orders to march upon Vesoul. On the evening of the 29th the 1st and 2d brigades were concentrated about that town, the 3d still remaining behind at Gray and Arc to form a rear-guard, while Schmeling's division retired southward and eastward upon Noroy, and Goltz's detachment upon Vesoul itself.

Having thus collected the bulk of his available forces round Vesoul, Werder now waited for the further development of the enemy's movements; and in truth the French operations were not so rapidly executed as to cause any great haste to be necessary.

Immediately after the Badensers had evacuated Dijon, that town was occupied by Cremer's and Garibaldi's advanced-guards, and after the first days of January 1871 frequent collisions ensued between the Germans and the advanced troops of Bressolles' forces moving northward along the Swiss frontier and those of Bourbaki's army advancing between the Saône and the Doubs. General Bourbaki himself established his headquarters in Dijon on the 2d of January, and thence his troops were mainly directed upon Besançon. Since he had quitted Metz in October 1870, Bourbaki had shown signs of a melancholy which at times amounted to absence of mind,

and now Gambetta had associated with him a young Polish adventurer, who was known by the French name of De Serres. This young swindler had been naturalised by Gambetta, who, moreover, had christened him with a French name. It is not to be wondered at that, when great misfortunes overtake a nation, parasites should appear to fatten themselves upon its last blood, neither is it to be wondered at that a man so excitable as Gambetta should allow himself to be cajoled by them; but how could a French general, how could Bourbaki, bring himself to submit to the supervision of such a worthless impostor? How was it that he did not a thousand times rather give in his resignation? This abject submission can only be explained by attributing it to the derangement of intellect which had fallen upon the general, upon whose operations the whole of France was now building the greatest expectations. Sad fate, sad heritage of the Byzantine Empire!

On the 2d of January an encounter took place on the Swiss frontier at Croix and Abbevilliers, to the south of Delle, on the frontier which at Porentruy projects into France so unfortunately for Switzerland, between detachments of Treskow's and Debschitz's forces on one side, and Bressolles' advanced troops on the other.

These troops which here came into action on the French side had also been organised by a Polish adventurer, who speculated upon obtaining large sums of money from France, spending as little as possible

for useful purposes, and then retiring home again through Switzerland with all speed. The Corps which this man had organised was called "Les Vengeurs." What they revenged, or on whom they were revenged, when, 200 men strong, they retired comfortably upon Swiss territory, no one knows, or ever will know. The greater number of these men, who were interned in the barracks in Thun, were not Frenchmen, and gave much more trouble to the authorities than all the 85,000 French soldiers who a month afterwards crossed over into Switzerland.

On the 5th and 6th of January, also, detachments of Werder's forces, which were pushed forward to the south of Vesoul, came into collision with parties from the left wing of Bourbaki's army, which was ascending the Doubs and the Oignon towards Montbéliard and Héricourt, having flanking parties extended on the right bank of the Oignon towards the Saône.

Through these encounters Werder obtained information of Bourbaki's march to relieve Belfort. The German general had long before sent detailed reports to the headquarters at Versailles of all that had become known to him concerning the proposed operations of the French Army of the East; but at Versailles much time had been spent in prolonged deliberations, and it was only when later confirmatory despatches arrived from Prince Frederic Charles that measures were taken to give Werder effectual assistance.

For the present, therefore, Werder was left entirely to his own resources; and after he had obtained sufficient information of the actual state of things, he determined before all to take up a strong position on the Lisaine to cover the siege of Belfort. By the 8th of January all the detachments of those Corps which had been pushed furthest to the westward had arrived about Vesoul, and on the 9th the German leader commenced his march towards the Lisaine with the main body of his forces. But simultaneously with this he wished also to fall upon Bourbaki, and delay his march as much as possible; for by doing this he would not only gain the time he required to establish himself properly on the Lisaine, but he would also give the promised reinforcements from the north and west an opportunity to come up and take an effective share in the operations.

Werder therefore directed the main body of Schmeling's division to move by Noroy upon Villersexel, and Goltz's brigade by Valleroy upon Marat, both for the purpose of falling upon Bourbaki's left wing.

Thus advancing, the advanced-guard of the 4th reserve division (Schmeling), consisting of two battalions of the 25th regiment of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, and two batteries, under Major-General von Treskow II., came at 9 A.M. on the 9th of January into view of Villersexel on the Oignon, and after a short engagement succeeded in seizing both the town and castle. But now Bourbaki at once rein-

forced the troops that had been engaged at Villersexel. The Prussians, it is true, also received reinforcements little by little — at first the remaining battalion of the 25th regiment of infantry, then various landwehr battalions from the 4th reserve division. Moreover, most of the battalions of Goltz's brigade were engaged on the Prussian right at Marat and Moinay, seeking to connect with the last-named division; but still, at 2 A.M. on the 10th of January, Werder withdrew his troops from Villersexel, for he had completely attained his object. The force which he had employed was entirely disproportionate to that which the French leader had thrown into action. The latter had been delayed on his march in an unexampled manner by this, for a regular army, really insignificant encounter; and Werder had thereby gained time to establish himself thoroughly in the position on the Lisaine, to intrench it, and even to bring up heavy siege-artillery from the besieging force before Belfort.

The Lisaine runs nearly parallel to the Savoureuse, and on the west of it flows into the Haleine at Montbéliard, and then the united rivers join the Doubs below this latter town.

Werder had taken up his position on the left or western bank of the river. On his right the Baden division stood between Frahier and Chagey; in the centre the 4th reserve division was posted along the front Héricourt-Bussurel-Montbéliard, having reached

its position on the 11th by way of Conthenans; on the left Debschitz's division was between Montbéliard and Delle, while Werder himself had established his headquarters at Brévilliers, to the north-east of Héricourt, on the railway from Montbéliard to Belfort.

It was the 13th before Bourbaki's headquarters reached Onans, to the south-east of Villersexel, on the highway from Besançon to Belfort; and thence on the same day he caused the outposts in front of Werder's centre to be attacked at the villages of St Marie and Arcey. After a short engagement the Germans withdrew from these by Aibre and Tavey upon the main position at Héricourt. Attacks followed on the same day upon the Lisaine to the south of Héricourt, at Bussurel, Bethoncourt, and Montbéliard; and the result of these assaults was, that the German detachment under Colonel Zimmermann, which defended these latter portions of the line, had to evacuate the town of Montbéliard—remaining, however, in possession of the old citadel.

Bourbaki, however, did not begin his main attack until the 15th. He then concentrated his forces from the south and west, especially against Héricourt; but here again the German artillery proved itself to be far superior to that of the French. However, in the night preceding the 16th, and on the foggy morning of this latter day, Bourbaki succeeded in pushing forward and establishing his infantry nearer to the

German positions. During the day the superior infantry fire of their adversaries wrought great damage among the Germans; but still, after three repeated attacks, the French could not succeed in gaining possession of the town of Héricourt; and a fourth assault, which was undertaken during the night, also failed. But while the French leader thus occupied the attention of the German centre, he at the same time directed his left wing to turn the right flank of the enemy by a movement upon the village of Frahier, which was not even held by Werder. During the afternoon the advanced-guard of the French left occupied this locality; but as soon as the German commander was informed of the manœuvre, he directed Keller's brigade upon Frahier; and in the night between the 16th and 17th these troops fell upon the village, drove the French out, made many of them prisoners, and established themselves on the following morning as securely as they could in the exceedingly strong position.

On the 17th of January Bourbaki made a last effort; and while his centre and right attacked along the whole front of the line Chagey and Luze-Héricourt-Bethoncourt-Montbéliard, his left, reinforced by troops from a specially-formed and exceptionally well composed reserve, turned against Frahier. But the Germans held firm at every point, and the French failed even to pierce temporarily the front of their adversaries.

On the 18th Bourbaki heard that an encounter had also taken place at Abbevilliers, on the Swiss frontier, between the advanced-guard of the 24th Corps and Debschitz's detachment, and that this also had ended unfortunately for the French. During this time the melancholy of the French leader had continually increased; and the failure of the three days' attack on the Lisaine worked the more depressingly upon him, as he could not disguise from himself the fact that he had been opposed by an utterly disproportionate numerical minority, and as he could not but see plainly and with his own eyes how much his army was wanting, not only in drill and discipline, but also in clothing and the equipment necessary for a winter campaign—in short, in all the moral and material conditions for the acquirement of victory.

And in addition to this, news now came in of the advance of strong German forces to support Werder. The despatches received from Gambetta, who began at this time to wonder why his general, aided as he was, too, by M. de Serres, had yet neither invaded Germany nor even relieved Belfort, did not enhance the pleasure of Bourbaki's situation. On the 18th of January he resolved to retreat, and on the same day took measures to gain the left bank of the Doubs, and to retire along it in the first place upon Besançon.

Werder had every reason to be perfectly contented with his successes during the past week, for they had

not even cost him any large sacrifice of men. His losses in the three days' fighting on the Lisaine he estimated at only 1200 men; and as soon as he was certainly assured, on the 19th of January, that Bourbaki had really commenced his retreat, he did not hesitate to follow him, although in a cautious manner, without waiting for the remaining portions of the new German Army of the South to come up.

CHAPTER LIV.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY OF THE SOUTH—RETREAT OF THE GREATER PART OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE EAST UPON NEUTRAL SWISS TERRITORY.

As soon as the German leaders in Versailles were surely informed of the march of Bourbaki eastward, and when they could no longer entertain doubts as to the important strength of his forces, they determined on their side to form a strong "Army of the South," under the command of General von Manteuffel, who up to this time had commanded the First Army. This Southern Army was to consist of Werder's troops, and, in addition to them, of the 7th Army Corps from the valley of the Meuse, and of the 2d Corps, which was to be detached from the investing force before Paris —the two latter Corps numbering together 56 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 168 guns, or about 50,000 men, infantry and cavalry. The 2d Corps received marching orders as early as the 3d of January.

To cover the formation and march of this Army of the South, a detachment, consisting of six battalions, two squadrons, and two batteries, under Colonel von

Dannenberg, was pushed forward to Montbard, on the Burgundy canal, and became engaged there as early as the 8th of January with troops from the Army of the Vosges.

By the 12th of January the 2d Corps stood on the right wing behind Dannenberg at Noyers on the Serrain, and near Nuits-sous-Ravières and Ravières on the Armançon; while the 7th Corps was posted on the left near Chatillon sur Seine and Montigny sur Aube.

On the 13th of January Manteuffel arrived at Chatillon sur Seine, and undertook there the commandership-in-chief of the Army of the South. He now resolved to march in the first place by the most direct line upon Vesoul, leaving Dijon on his right and Langres on his left, in order to carry assistance as speedily as possible to Werder; but whether the direction of the operations would be changed or not during their execution would depend upon the character of the reports he might receive.

On the 15th and 16th of January Manteuffel's advanced-guard crossed the highway from Dijon to Langres at Selongey, Prauthoy, and Longeau, and on the 18th the main columns also reached this line. On this same day, when Manteuffel's forces were still sixty-five miles from the position on the Lisaine, Werder had, as we know, withstood the most obstinate attacks of his enemy.

At this stage of his advance Manteuffel also had to

fight a few slight skirmishes on his left with scouting-parties sent out from Langres. On the right the 2d Corps had again drawn in Colonel Dannenberg's detachment, but in exchange had left behind the 8th brigade, Kettler—5 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries—on its right flank, between Sombernon and St Seine to the west of Dijon, to observe that town and the Army of the Vosges in position near it.

On the 19th of January Manteuffel's advanced troops stood on the Saône near Grey and Scey—their extreme left extending beyond St Loup les Luxeuil and Luxeuil, and seeking to connect with Werder; while the mass of the Army of the South had reached Dampierres and Fontaine Française.

During the night preceding the 19th, Manteuffel had received information of the battles on the Lisaine, and of the probable retreat of Bourbaki; and although the latter fact was not absolutely assured, he nevertheless at once ordered the 2d and 7th Corps to wheel to their right, with the intention of afterwards advancing in a south-westerly direction, and cutting off Bourbaki's communications with Besançon and Lyon. To effect this, the left wing of the 7th Army Corps—the 14th division—was directed by Fresnes St Marnès upon Besançon; the main body of the same Corps by Marney on the Oignon upon Dampierre on the Doubs below Besançon; while the 2d Corps was to march by Pesme upon the important railway junction at Dôle.

By the 21st of January troops from this latter Corps occupied the town of Dôle, and during the following days others were pushed forward in the direction of Salins, Villers-Farlay, and Mouchard; the 7th Corps took possession of St Vit to the south-west of Besançon, and thence on the 24th and 25th of January crossed the Doubs, advancing upon Quingey. Meanwhile the 4th reserve division (Schmeling) from the 14th Corps (Werder) had also crossed the same river at Beaume les Dames, and on the 25th stood at St Juan d'Adam; while Debschitz's division advanced on its left from Blamont by St Hypolite against the road from Besançon to Pontarlier. The remainder of Werder's disposable troops, the Badensers and Goltz's brigade, stood also on the 25th at Rioz, between the Oignon and the Saône, having outposts pushed forward as far as the Oignon; while Willisen's brigade of Baden cavalry had reached Pesme on the lower Oignon.

Colonel Dannenberg's brigade—now, however, commanded by General von der Knesebeck—was extended along the Saône and towards Auxonne, covering the rear of Manteuffel's operating army; while Manteuffel himself established his headquarters at Beure on the Doubs close to Besançon.

Let us now turn to the French situation. On the 21st and 22d of January Bourbaki had effected the concentration of his army in the vicinity of Besançon; the 24th Corps, Bressolles, on the left bank of the

Doubs opposite the passages of the river at Pont-deroide and Beaume les Dames; the 18th Corps, Billot, the 20th Corps (now Clinchant) and the general reserve, Pallu de la Barrière, in the centre, about Besançon, on the right and left bank of the Doubs; and the 15th Corps (Martineau) on the left wing along the Loue as far as Fontain Pugey and Chenecy, to directly cover the line of retreat to Pontarlier.

After the 22d of January Bourbaki made no further movement. His continued melancholy degenerated into a complete disease of the mind, and instead of answering Gambetta's insane despatches with *Lex mihi Mars*, dismissing the Polish *spiritus familiaris* De Serres, and then either making yet another offensive effort, for which his position in and by itself was not unfavourable, or else commencing his retreat upon Lyons without delay—instead of doing any of these things, he took to heart Gambetta's despatches, which would, if they could, have transported both the French general and his army in balloons to Berlin. Bourbaki still remained an interesting man, *à la Claure*, but no longer a man to whom a great nation could intrust the fate of more than a hundred thousand of her sons, and indeed her own destiny.

After the 22d of January, therefore, Bourbaki did not give any further order; and on the 24th, feeling deeply his own misfortunes and those of his unhappy country, he sought to commit suicide. But the attempt failed, although he shot himself through the temples,

and thereby, at all events, rendered himself incapable of retaining the command. Before this, however, he had taken the precaution, which betrays the honourable man, of naming a successor to his post—General Clinchant, hitherto commandant of the 20th Corps.

Clinchant undertook the command at dawn on the 25th. His first and very laudable action was to despatch M. de Serres to Bordeaux with messages for Gambetta. In the second place, he ordered an immediate retreat to Pontarlier, leaving behind, however, the 3d division of his former Corps (De Polignac) to reinforce the garrison in the fortress of Besançon. Henceforth, therefore, the 20th Corps only counted two divisions.

By the 28th of January this order had been carried out, and the French Army of the East was concentrated round Pontarlier, close to the Swiss frontier. On the right the 18th Corps stood at Dommartin, Doubs, and Arçon; in the centre the 15th Corps at Sombacourt, Pontarlier, and Oye; and on the left the 20th Corps upon the road to Champagnole at Bannans, Bulle, Dompierre, and Frasne. The 24th Corps had arrived in the greatest disorder at Pontarlier, having been seized with a panic near Pontderoide and St Hypolite, and was now posted on the road to Mouthe to the south of Pontarlier, in order that it might recover itself to some extent. Cremer's detached Corps, which had hurried up from the north-west on the first news of Manteuffel's advance, and

had been very unfortunate in its feebly-attempted defence of a few points of retreat, was again attached as a division to the 24th Corps, and posted on the road to St Laurent; General Bressolles, the commander of this same Corps, being superseded on the 28th by General Commagny.

On the 29th of January Clinchant remained in essentially the same positions, and only Cremer with his cavalry pushed forward in great haste by Foncine le Bas upon St Laurent.

But this 29th of January was a very important day for Clinchant's army; for on the 27th, Manteuffel, who had delayed longer in the positions so easily and favourably taken up on the Doubs opposite Besançon than seemed necessary with troops such as he commanded, could no longer entertain any doubt as to the retreat of the French upon Pontarlier towards the Swiss frontier, and he therefore gave his columns the following directions :—

The 2d Corps to move from Mouchard by Salins upon Pontarlier, sending detachments by way of Arbois upon Champagnole and upon Lons le Saulnier; the whole Corps was, however, shortly afterwards directed upon Champagnole, and by the 28th its advanced-guard had pushed forward beyond that place:

The 7th Corps was relieved in its positions towards Besançon by two brigades of the Baden division, which, together with Goltz's Prussian brigade, had

arrived near Marnay on the 27th, and was then to turn the pass of Salins, which is defended by Fort St André, by the north, advancing against Pontarlier by Villeneuve d'Amont and Levier:

The 4th reserve division, Schmeling, marched southwards from Beaume les Dames upon St Gorgon:

Debschitz, with seven battalions of his division, moved along the Swiss frontier upon Morteau; and Manteuffel himself established his headquarters in Arbois, posting Goltz's brigade as a general reserve at Villers-Farlay.

On the afternoon of the 29th, the advanced-guard of the 14th division (7th Corps) came upon a French rear-guard at Sombacourt and Chaffois, and drove it in with great loss upon Pontarlier. On the same day, also, the advanced-guard of the 2d North German Army Corps came into collision with a French detachment posted near Les Planches, between Foncine and St Laurent, to cover the road, which Clinchant could still employ for a retreat southwards along the Swiss frontier —although, owing to the severity of the season, the said road was in thoroughly bad condition. Here again the French were routed by the Germans; but the disastrous results of the defeat were lessened by the fact that on this same 29th of January, Manteuffel ordered the 2d Corps to diverge from its south-easterly direction and march upon Frasne, which place, accordingly, its advanced-guard occupied on the following day.

It may be asked why Clinchant made no movement

on the 29th, and why he made no effort to escape, if it were even yet possible, towards the south. But this apathy really sprang from the miserable and neglected condition of his army, which was hardly clothed at all, and which no man in his senses could possibly expect to fight during the inclement wintry weather which prevailed.

And now, while the fighting on the 29th was still going on, the news of the conclusion of the armistice of the 28th of January spread among the troops, being announced, it is said, by the mayors of the neighbouring communes.

We know that this convention did not include the German Army of the South and the French Army of the East, but the French camp was ignorant of this fact. The news from Gambetta certainly would not enlighten it on that point; and the soldiers, who had already manifested a great unwillingness to fight, now asked outspokenly what a further shedding of blood would avail.

Clinchant consequently commenced on the 30th of January to treat, on the one hand with Manteuffel, and on the other with the Swiss commander-in-chief, General Herzog. From the first-named he received answer that the armistice did not affect either Manteuffel himself or Clinchant, and that, therefore, if the latter was no longer able to defend himself, he might lay down his arms. The negotiations with the Swiss general became, therefore, now of paramount import-

ance. Excepting for a few detachments which stood further to the south, and of which we shall speak later on, there were three passes leading into Switzerland from the rear of the mass of the French Army of the East in its positions round Pontarlier,—one from Verrières into the narrow valley of Travers, through which the railway from Pontarlier to Neufchatel runs; another by Les Fourgs and St Croix to Yverdon; and a third through the Jougne valley to Orbe: but the road through the central pass is extremely bad in winter, especially upon the French side. At the point where these three routes branch off from one another, between Pontarlier and Verrières, lie two imposing mountain castles—Fort du Larmont and Chateau de Joux, the latter of which had the honour of sheltering Mirabeau as a prisoner of state.

Pressed on his side by Manteuffel, Clinchant again pressed General Herzog to conclude a convention, and on the early morning of the 1st of February an agreement was arrived at, by virtue of which the French Army of the East was to pass over on to Swiss territory, laying down its arms as it crossed the frontier—all arrangements concerning this army during its sojourn in Switzerland being referred for the consideration of the Federal Council.

This convention was barely concluded when the French troops commenced their retreat along the three above-named roads towards the frontier, and across it into Switzerland—the artillery and trains leading

along the road by Verrières into the Travers valley, while the covering of the whole movement was intrusted by Clinchant to General Billot with a part of the 18th Corps and the general reserve.

At mid-day on the 1st of February Manteuffel's forces stood concentrated close to Pontarlier, and during the afternoon the town was successfully attacked by Du Trossel's brigade of the 2d North German Army Corps, the Germans making thousands of prisoners and much booty. After this success Du Trossel continued the pursuit towards the pass and towards Forts Larmont and Joux, where, however, he was more seriously delayed.

On the following day Manteuffel, who had established his headquarters during the afternoon at Pontarlier, directed the 2d and 7th Corps and Goltz's brigade southwards against the front Lons le Saulnier (right wing), Mouthe (left wing).

While the remainder of the army was thus hastening into Switzerland, the commandant of Clinchant's reserve, Pallu de la Barrière, succeeded in escaping with the ruins of a few battalions along the slopes of the Jura southwards without touching Swiss soil. Cremer, whose division stood between Mouthe and St Laurent at the commencement of the catastrophe, fled with his cavalry into the Pays de Gex, and thence further to the south. On the way he caused his guns to be spiked and left behind; while his infantry, hard pressed by the Prussians, retired by the paths of

Mont Risoux, and partly by Morez and Les Rousses, into the canton Waadt.

Altogether 85,000 men, with 11,000 horses and 202 guns, entered Switzerland—a host which was proportionately as large for that small country as if 1,200,000 French had been suddenly brought into Germany. But in spite of the undeniable difficulties to be overcome, the quartering of the troops was not only speedily, but also well arranged, the Federal Council distributing the interned Frenchmen among the cantons in proportion to their respective populations, and the horses according to the facilities of obtaining forage, while the guns and waggons were collected in a large park at Colombier.

But although State assistance was rendered everywhere, still as the whole matter had to be quickly arranged, and as the French army was in a most deplorable state, much had to be done by private aid; and here the kindness and readiness of the Swiss people became conspicuously manifest. A part of the South German press congratulated Switzerland ironically "upon the agreeable visit it was receiving;" but in general the Swiss laughed at this and thought—"Yes; if we, like you, had to wait for orders and detailed instructions from all manner of authorities, it would indeed be a bad business; but as we know how to help ourselves, we shall be able to manage this affair also, and the poor soldiers shall find themselves well off in our country, and be as well contented with us as the

Austrians were in 1859." The Swiss press, it is true, could not keep silence, nor refrain from answering the jibes which were borne across from the right bank of the Rhine; and in this spirit one of the papers, which otherwise was noted for its partiality for the Germans, remarked—Perhaps Switzerland will soon find an opportunity to heap coals of fire upon the heads of the editors of those South German papers, when they may be constrained to recognise that the modern German freedom and civilisation of which they dream are in reality of a very different aspect to that which they bore in their ideal visions.

When in the latter end of March the French soldiers left Switzerland, both sides were well contented with one another. The Swiss had readily sprung to the assistance of the unfortunate, and the French had everywhere shown that they recognised this, and were, what was not even required of them, grateful.

A few disasters had certainly occurred; but in comparison with the hard fate of the belligerent States, they were scarcely worth mentioning, and they were hardly anywhere to be attributed to the faults of the French soldiers. Among them were several railway accidents, the explosion of the laboratory in Morges where French ammunition was stored, the destruction by fire of a church where French soldiers had been lodged, and then the small *émeute* in Zurich on the 9th of March and following days. The last of these

occurrences, however, has been so greatly exaggerated that we must necessarily regard it somewhat more in detail.

The Germans in Zurich had held it to be imperatively necessary to celebrate a German festival of victory; or, as it was afterwards called, of peace. The mass of the inhabitants of the town concerned themselves as little about the matter as about any other national festival solemnised on their soil by any people—as, for example, by Americans, Poles, &c.; but still there was in truth a section of the population who were disagreeably affected by this demonstration. To explain this, it must be remembered that among the Germans who were about to join in this manifestation there were many who had enriched themselves in Zurich by speculations (as the modern phrase runs); others who for years had occupied salaried offices in the town; others, again, who had acquired the right of citizenship in the Canton; and some, indeed, to whom this freedom had been presented, not always because of services rendered to the community, but because they had lived in it for years, and had made themselves beloved. Of these people many had spoken hard words of their native country, and of its institutions, with kings, &c., and had everywhere come forward as pure Swiss republicans.

But now these men all at once proudly declared themselves members of the "German colony in Zurich," and knew of nothing higher than the new

Emperor of Germany and the "Empire"—a change of sentiment which every impartial man will acknowledge might well shock any reasonable mind.

When, then, these Germans, without waiting for the departure of the interned French from Switzerland, and although they knew that their celebration might cause disturbances, began on the 9th March to solemnise this, to say the least, superfluous festival, which had been, moreover, preceded by various provoking demonstrations, they were interrupted in their doings in a very disagreeable manner; and in this interruption a few French officers and soldiers unfortunately took part. In consequence of these events, several arrests were made, and in the following night other *émeutes* were originated for the object of liberating those arrested. These arrests were, it is true, confined to the actual rioters; but these were to some extent less guilty than those Germans who, long before the solemnisation of the festival, had declared that now Switzerland must expect to be speedily annexed to the German Empire, and who, when the first of the interned French entered Zurich with the cry of "Vive la Suisse!" had deemed it necessary to answer "Vive la Prussie!" thereby causing various disturbances to arise.

The whole affair, however, has been inordinately exaggerated. The German exciters of disorder obtained possession of the whole press for their unseemly accusations and challenges, which certainly would not have been uttered in any other country without

the nation speedily ridding itself of such arrogant guests.

But the Swiss press, and especially the Zurich papers, also used exaggerated language.

The people of Zurich have a justifiable pride in their liberal institutions, and consequently the majority were inconsolable because it had been shown to be possible that any assembly should be disturbed in their capital. Another sting which the affair left behind was the fact, that in consequence of the *émeutes* the Athens on the Limmat was subjected to a Federal occupation. This, it is true, did not last long, and even before it was undertaken had become superfluous; but from these two causes the exaggeration on the Swiss side sprang, and doubtless political party-interests contributed in a secondary manner to its growth. These very exaggerations were in their way praiseworthy; but still we regret their existence, for we know certainly that their spirit was not in the least understood in Germany.

The Germans, on their side, were not able to find words bitter enough to frame accusations against the French officers, who unfortunately had mingled in the tumult, for their violation of the laws of hospitality; but in reality very few officers were involved in the fray, and those few were condemned, it may be said almost unanimously, by their brother officers interned in Zurich. And, in truth, do not those Germans whom we have just described violate

the same laws of hospitality to a much greater extent? For they know the language, customs, and disposition of the people of Zurich—a knowledge which could not be expected from the French officers. But from their side, from the side of these Germans, we find literally no apologies, only haughty, arrogant demeanour. And it is precisely because of this, and because the Swiss in general, and the people of Zurich in particular, have borne these things with equanimity and forbearance, that we have thought it well to relate these things as they really occurred.

Meanwhile Manteuffel, during his march upon Vesoul, had, as we know, only left behind Kettler's brigade of the 2d Army Corps before Dijon. How strong Garibaldi's Corps at the same place was, will probably never be accurately known. Garibaldi himself asserted later on that he had only 8000 men, and that of these he could only depend upon 2000. On the other side, it is said that the Garibaldian Corps, even after the withdrawal of Cremer, may be estimated at from 25,000 to 40,000 men. But these two statements are easily reconcilable. At the end of the year 1860 the troops of the Italian Army of the South were estimated by the authorities of the Exchequer at 70,000 men, and among them were 2000 generals and colonels. But the highest number ever seen on the field of battle was never more than 15,000 men, even in times of the greatest danger, and among them hardly more than fifteen generals and

colonels. If now, as must necessarily be assumed to be the case under the management of the staff apothecary, General Bordone, similar, and if possible yet more scandalous, transactions took place behind the scenes, the statements both of Garibaldi and of the other side may be believed.

On the 21st of January Kettler attacked Dijon, on which occasion the Polish General Bosak-Haucke fell. On the 23d Kettler renewed the assault, and on this day the Germans lost the only colours which were taken from them during the whole war. These belonged to the 2d battalion of the 61st (8th Pommeranian) regiment. The colour-bearer was shot towards the evening of the day close to Dijon. As he fell the colours were seized by several officers and soldiers of the battalion in succession, but all were killed or severely wounded. After dusk, when the battalion was mustered in the dark, and very incompletely, the colours were not at once missed. In the interval they had been found by a Mobile Guard, and were given up by him to Ricciotti Garibaldi, who rewarded the honest finder with 200 francs and the post of lieutenant in the administrative branch of the army.

It can be seen that the colours were lost by the Prussians in a most honourable, and, it might almost be said, chance way; but still the incident made a great sensation. Consequently on the 27th of January Manteuffel concentrated Degenfeld's Baden brigade of infantry and Willisen's of cavalry under

General Hann von Weyhern, at Pesme, on the Oignon, while Knesebeck's brigade, which was posted on the line Gray-Dôle, and Kettler's brigade, were to unite with them before Dijon itself.

Garibaldi, when he heard that the armistice of the 28th of January did not extend to the south-east of France, evacuated Dijon hastily, at the approach of Hann von Weyhern, making use also of the railway. In the first place, he retired upon the important railway junction at Chagny, and then more to the south, still descending the Saône. Soon after this he resigned his command; and although he was afterwards elected in various places for the Constituent Assembly, he only appeared at its opening to declare that he would not accept office, and then, not being well satisfied with the course of events, he returned to Caprera, having first made over the command of the Army of the Vosges * to his son Menotti; but these forces were, in so far as they had not already disappeared, at once dissolved by the National Assembly.

Although Werder alone and without the assistance of Manteuffel would not have been able to compel Clinchant's army to retreat into Switzerland, still he had undoubtedly rendered brilliant services by his renewed offensive blow against Villersexel, by his

* According to the French official documents, the Army of the Vosges was commanded from the first by General Cambriels, and afterwards by General Michel. Garibaldi's command, on the other hand, is distinguished as that of the Vosges district (Zône des Vosges).

determination to make a stand on the Lisaine to cover the siege of Belfort, and by his obstinate persistence in holding the position he there took up. He had had the rare good fortune to reap a well-merited success, and he was rewarded not only by the grateful acknowledgment of the Emperor, but also by that of many of the civic authorities of South Germany—a fact which demonstrates that in January a French invasion was by no means held to be impossible there.

We must here further relate that, during the battle in the south-east on the 22d of January, a band of Francs-tireurs scientifically blew up the railway-bridge of Fontenay, between Nancy and Toul, thereby interrupting for ten days the direct railway communication between Strasburg and Paris, as well as between Metz and Paris.

22/6-3

MAPS FOR THE OCCURRENCES IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF BELFORT IN JANUARY 1871.



THE BATTLE ON THE LISAINE—POSITIONS AT NOON ON THE 16TH OF JANUARY 1871.

GERMANS.—A. Keller's Brigade } of the Duke
B. Main Body } Division.
C. Schmeling's Division.
D. Garrison of the Citadel of Montbéliard.
E. Debschütz's Detachment.
F. Treskow's Division (Investment of Belfort).

FRENCH.—Bourbaki's Main Army
Right Wing.
Left Wing.
Centre.
Reserve.

Scale 1/80000

THE NEW FORTS ABOUT BELFORT.

CHAPTER LV.

THE FALL OF BELFORT.

THE investment and siege of Belfort had been intrusted by Werder, as we have before related, to Treskow's reserve division, reinforced by South German engineers and artillery.

After the 3d of November 1870, Treskow had to sustain various small actions with detachments of the garrison of Belfort, to the north and north-east of the fortress, in the first place at Petit Magny and Rougemont. On the day mentioned he himself established his headquarters to the north of the town at La Chapelle-sous-Chaux, and endeavoured primarily to carry out an effective investment of the fortress. This, however, was so difficult to accomplish, owing to the great irregularity of the surrounding country, and to the weakness of the blockading force, that even to the very last it was never thoroughly successful.

On the 9th of November the Germans occupied the castle of Montbéliard, to the south of Belfort, and pushed forward their outposts on the south-east as far as Bourogne on the Delle road. On the 16th

and 23d of November the besieged made sorties to the eastward towards Bessoncourt; on the 24th towards Valdoye on the north, towards Chevremont on the east, and along the road to Montbéliard. All these sorties were undertaken with a force of several battalions, and naturally cost the garrison some sacrifices; but they gave the besieged a good knowledge of Treskow's positions, accustomed the young Mobiles to fire, and delayed the establishment of an effective investment.*

Treskow intrenched all the positions he took up, and on the 23d of November removed his headquarters to Fontaine, on the east of Belfort, and close to the Altkircher road. After this he gradually contracted his troops upon a closer line of investment, which may be described as running through the points Cravanche, Valdoye, Offemont, Vetrigne, Bessoncourt, Chevremont, Meroux, Bavilliers, and Essert.

But it was the end of November before any considerable amount of siege-ordnance, with the ammunition pertaining to it, arrived before Belfort; for the nature of the ground made transport extremely difficult, especially during the then prevailing wintry weather. Immediately on its reception, however, trenches and batteries were commenced on the south-west of the town upon the heights between the roads to Héricourt

* Denfert followed out, especially in his sorties, the perfectly correct idea of drawing the besiegers into the range of fire of well-covered infantry. He succeeded in doing this several times, and on every occasion the result was advantageous to him.

and Lure, and between the villages of Bavilliers and Essert. In the night between the 2d and 3d December these batteries were armed with twenty-eight guns, from which fire was opened at eight o'clock on the morning of the 3d. The garrison of Belfort meanwhile had not been quiet spectators of the labours of the Germans, but, on the contrary, had striven, though without success, to hinder their progress by an artillery-fire.

The bombardment carried on by the Germans after this damaged principally the Fort des Barres and the intrenchment at Bellevue, and to some extent the citadel. Many projectiles also fell into the suburb De France, where the hotel "A l'Ancien Post" was almost entirely destroyed, and into the western quarters of the town.

While the Germans continued an uninterrupted fire from the western batteries, they also carried forward their trenches on the same side, and moreover threw up a few batteries on the east and north against Forts Miotte and Justice, and against the intrenched camp. Against these siege-works of the Germans Denfert also caused a sortie to be made on the 11th of December.

By the beginning of January 1871 the Germans had arrived at the conclusion that the attack from the west could not be successful, and General von Mertens, who was called up from Strasburg to conduct the siege operations, proposed seizing the

Perches in the first place, and thence taking on the one side the Fort des Barres in rear, and on the other advancing against the town and citadel.

As an introductory step to the execution of this new plan, Treskow removed his headquarters to Bourogne, to the south-east of the town, on the road to Delle; and in the night between the 7th and 8th of January the Germans obtained possession of the village of Danjoutin after a somewhat stubborn battle. But now came the dark days, when Werder and the siege of Belfort were threatened by Bourbaki's advance. Serious operations against the town were rendered impossible, and Treskow had to confine himself essentially to maintaining the positions he had already taken up.

When, however, Bourbaki's attack on the Lisaine had been victoriously repulsed, the execution of the new plan was forthwith recommenced. As early as the 20th of January, Treskow stormed the village of Perouse, which was to protect the right extremity of his trenches against the Perches, as Danjontin did the left; and in the night between the 21st and 22d the first parallels against these works were commenced, the Prussian batteries constructed in and behind the trenches opening fire immediately against the two intrenchments on the Perches, while zig-zags were simultaneously pushed forward towards them.

On the 26th, Treskow believed that he had drawn near enough to these intrenchments, and had played

upon them sufficiently with his artillery to be able to venture an assault, and accordingly on the following day he stormed them. But the attack failed, and his troops were driven back with slaughter. Treskow therefore once more resumed his trench-works against the Perches, and by the 6th of February had arrived within about one hundred paces of them.

During all this time the situation of the besieged was by no means enviable. Many of the inhabitants had left Belfort betimes before the bombardment, but the great majority had remained, and had now for months been only able to find in the cellars refuge from the shells which hailed upon the town. The artillery of the French, too, could only very imperfectly answer that of the Germans. Moreover, the commandant wished to preserve the elongated projectiles of the rifled 12-pounders and 24-pounders for defence against the attack on the town itself, and besides them he only had solid shot and spherical shells. Provisions, however, were not wanting, and there was a sufficient supply of ammunition for the small-arms. The damage done to the works, too, was by no means of the kind that necessarily makes a successful resistance to be despaired of. Only the intrenchment which was thrown up on the Perche after the declaration of war on the 19th of July was in such a state as to make its maintenance against a serious renewed attack by Treskow very improbable. But after the fall of this work the general position of Denfert was such that

he could not possibly declare beforehand how much longer he might be able to offer resistance, however resolved he might be to hold out to the utmost extremity.

Now also reports of the conclusion of a general armistice found their way into Belfort; and if such a convention had been already concluded, or was about to be arranged, a further maintenance of the fortress would lose much of its value, and would hardly be worth the increased sacrifices which it would necessarily entail. On the 5th of February, therefore, Denfert, having regard to all these circumstances, sent Captain Chatel of the general Staff through the Prussian lines to Basle. There Chatel was to inform himself of the general aspect of affairs, and then place himself in communication with the Delegate Government in Bordeaux; only, in case that Government judged the capitulation of Belfort to be expedient, Denfert prayed that he might be allowed to negotiate himself the terms of the convention—and in making this request he called attention to various points worthy of consideration.

A few days after the Government of National Defence had received Chatel's communications, Treskow on the 8th of February obtained possession, as Denfert had foreseen he would, of the intrenchment on the Perche.

Immediately after the opening of the National Assembly, the Government in Bordeaux was compelled

to bethink itself of obtaining a prolongation of the armistice. Jules Favre consequently hurried forthwith to Versailles, and there arranged not only for a further continuation of the truce, but also for its extension to the Departments in the south-east, and the fate of Belfort was sealed at the same time.

The armistice was in the first place prolonged until noon on the 24th of February.

The continuation of the line of demarcation eastward from Quarre les Tombes was to follow at first the southern boundary of the Department Côte d'Or, with this exception, that it was to run everywhere at least one kilometre * to the north of the railway from Nevers by Autun and Chagny to Chalon sur Saône. Accordingly it struck the boundary of the Department Côte d'Or to the east of Chagny, and then followed the boundary between the Departments Côte d'Or and Jura on the one side, and Saône et Loire on the other. It then left the western boundary of the Department Jura to the south of the road from Lonhaus to Lons le Saulnier, turned to the east, crossed the railway from Lons le Saulnier to Bourg en Bresse nearly seven miles to the south of the former town, struck the road from Lons le Saulnier to Clairvaux at the bridge over the Ain, and then followed the northern boundary of the Arrondissement St Claude (Department Jura) to the Swiss frontier, which it touched at the Upper Jouxthal.

* 1094 yards.

The still uncaptured fortresses of Besançon and Auxonne, which were nevertheless within the German district, received neutral zones in favour of the French, with a radius of about 6¼ miles round Besançon, and of nearly 2 miles round Auxonne, while agreements were also to be made for the revictualment of these fortresses.

Belfort, with all the *matériel* of war pertaining to the fortress, was to be given over to the Germans; but the garrison, with arms, waggons, the *matériel* of war belonging to the troops, and the military archives, were to be allowed to march with all the honours of war to the south of France.

The convention was concluded on the 15th of February, but Denfert had been informed beforehand that it was imminent, and had therefore arranged an armistice with Treskow. The settlement of details was left to the commanders-in-chief of the besiegers and besieged, and the capitulation itself was signed on the 16th. The garrison, still 12,000 men strong, marched out, moving in the first place towards Grenoble, and the fortress was occupied by the Germans on the 18th of February.

Thus in the east also the actual war was brought to an end.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE EVENTS AT SEA.

During the whole of the great struggle, the relation of which we have undertaken, there cannot be said to have been a naval war; but still certain events took place at sea, and of these we must say a few words, not only for the sake of making the history complete, but also to show yet again that, as for all else, so for the conduct of war also, there are certain truths which really a child can comprehend without their being proven to him, either by his own experience or by that of others, but which were neglected in an almost incomprehensible manner by the people whom blind Fortune had placed at the head of the State and of the State administration.

The German fleet was far too small to venture to undertake a war on the open sea with one so large and so well found as the French. After what the course of events has shown, it may be said that it might perhaps even have been able to do this; but the leaders of the German army and navy would not have been justified in assuming beforehand such a gross neglect

of the most indispensable essentials for the successful conduct of naval operations as became manifest in regard to the fleet of the Second Empire.

When, therefore, the outbreak of hostilities became certain, the German vessels of war were directed to withdraw into the harbour in the Jahde Bay; while those which were on distant stations, as well as all merchant-ships, received information of what had taken place through the consuls. There had long been much talk of a French landing on the German coast, in case of such an eventuality occurring as had now come to pass, and therefore arrangements were now made in Germany for the defence of the North Sea and Baltic shores. The chief command of these districts was given to General Vogel von Falkenstein, and considerable mobile forces were left behind there at the commencement of the war, when the idea prevailed that it would be necessary to defeat the French fleet on land between the Rhine and the Moselle. A volunteer "Seewehr" was also established, to undertake the watching of the coasts; while the harbours and other practicable landing-places were secured with batteries and torpedoes, which latter, however, it is true, only damaged the defenders themselves, never the French fleet.

On the French side, Admiral Bouet-Villaumez was appointed commander-in-chief of a so-called Baltic squadron on the 22d of July 1870—that is, three days after the war had been declared, or nearly fourteen

after it had been determined on; and the Admiral was informed that the fleet under his command would consist of fourteen ironclads, many quick despatch-vessels, and armoured batteries of a light draught. A second fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral La Roncière le Noury, was to follow shortly, made up of gunboats, floating-batteries, and large transport-steamers, with 30,000 troops on board under Bourbaki.

When, on the 23d of July, Bouet-Villaumez arrived in Cherbourg and hoisted his flag on board the ironclad Surveillante (14 guns), he soon became convinced that the reality must fall immeasurably short of the dreamy plans which had been hatched in the boudoirs of the Court war party in Paris. For not only was the *matériel* wanting, but also the *personnel*; for the men inscribed in the maritime conscription, and who, according to the law, could be at once called out, were away in the Newfoundland fisheries and along the coast of Scotland, thanks to the utter want of forethought and to the reckless manner in which the war had been commenced.

Bouet-Villaumez therefore soon saw that, unless he wished to postpone his departure *ad calendas græcas*, he must resolve to put to sea with only seven ironclads and one despatch-boat, independently of the promises of further large reinforcements.

Accordingly he set sail on the 24th of July. His instructions said that he was first to steer for the Sound, and thence detach the armoured corvette

Thetis (8 guns) to Copenhagen, where Captain de Champeaux had secured the services of the Danish pilots, provided for the provisioning of the fleet, and also commenced a little political agitation. Bouet-Villaumez was then to return with his main force from the Sound to before Wilhelmshafen (bay of Jahde), in order to blockade the same, and there he was to be joined by the promised reinforcements. He was then to leave Rear-Admiral Dieudonné with one division of the fleet before the Jahde, and to sail himself with the other into the Baltic, to watch the German ports and the movements of the Prussian fleet.

When he left Cherbourg, Bouet-Villaumez still entertained hopes of falling in with the Prussian fleet on the high seas. Should this eventuality arrive, the large North German ironclad König Wilhelm would cause him some anxiety; for among the ships with which he set sail on the 24th of July, there was not one at all comparable with the Prussian frigate, either in weight of armament or in thickness of armour. The only vessel in the French navy which might be held to be equal to the König Wilhelm was the Rochambeau, which had been built in America under the name of the Dunderberg, and sold to France for 2,500,000 dollars. But since its purchase the Rochambeau had been continually altered, so that by the middle of 1870 this nondescript vessel must have cost at least 15,000,000 francs. It had now as-

sumed the form of a ship with a very low freeboard, carrying on her deck an armour-plated fort mounting sixteen guns (4 of 37 centimetres, and 12 of 27 centimetres calibre); but unfortunately, just at the moment that her services were required, the Rochambeau was not ready to put to sea.

Bouet-Villaumez purposed, therefore, in case of falling in with the König Wilhelm, to attack her and her seconds with his rams, in the first class of which stood the Surveillante. It will be remembered what an unfortunate part the ram Affondatore played at Lissa under Admiral Persano; and Bouet-Villaumez now wished to make a more successful trial of the system; but the opportunity never presented itself.

The French Admiral sailed to the Sound, and returned to the Jahde; but for many days he did not know whether the German fleet had sought refuge there or in the harbour of Kiel. Moreover, the fleet was unprovided with charts of the Baltic or North Sea; and by the 26th of July it was reported to him that the coals were running short in most of his ships. He now therefore sailed with all speed from the North Sea into the Baltic, in order to recoal in the bay of Kiöge, in the island of Zealand, to the south of Copenhagen.

Champeaux, who met the French fleet in the latitude of Skagen on the 28th of July, gave most glowing accounts of the enthusiasm of the Danes for France.

According to him, the French Admiral had only to run into the Sound, and Denmark would at once rise up against Germany. But Bouet-Villaumez, who knew that he had not any troops at all to land, and that, moreover, he had only ships of great draught of water, with which it would be impossible for him to manœuvre in the intricate waters on the Danish coast, or even to pursue a German merchant-ship of small draught, telegraphed to Paris for instructions. He had, however, scarcely forwarded his despatch when he received, but not in answer to his message, directions to choose a post of observation from which he could observe the German shores, and where he could easily supply the wants of his fleet; at the same time he was to respect the neutrality of Denmark, but always keep Wilhelmshafen blockaded.

On the 1st of August Bouet-Villaumez received a visit from the Marquis de Cadore, who had been despatched after the declaration of war to the Northern Courts to persuade them to form an alliance with France. The more we regard the details of its transactions—and we only relate, as the opportunity occurs, a few of the many instances known to us—so much the more prominently does the utter recklessness of this senile Byzantine Second Empire shine forth. But what reasonable man, who has studied, or lived to see history, can hold the French people responsible for this, as unfortunately it is now so much sought to do in Germany? Let the Germans

themselves remember what manner of events they have allowed to take place during tens of years in their own country without their being made altogether responsible for them.

Cadore also wished to take Bouet-Villaumez to Copenhagen, but the latter could not consent, for the reasons known to us. Meanwhile he learnt that the North German monitor Arminius (4 guns), and the unarmoured corvette Elizabeth (26 guns), were running northwards through the Great Belt to repair to Wilhelmshafen. Accordingly the French Admiral despatched the ironclad frigate the Guyenne (14 guns), the two armoured corvettes, the Jeanne d'Arc and Thetis (each of 8 guns), and the despatch-boat Cassard, in pursuit of them. But the heavy French ironclads could not come up with the German vessels, and the Arminius found shelter on the coast of Jutland, while the Elizabeth returned to Kiel. The Cassard, it is true, could have followed the Arminius into the shallow waters where she had sought refuge, but the French despatch-boat was too lightly armed to venture to engage with the German monitor.

On the 2d of August Bouet-Villaumez received definite orders to proceed into the Baltic. To do this he had to take the passage up the Cattegat and into the Great Belt; and even this he found barely navigable, for his heaviest ironclad, the Ocean, which drew 28 feet, had at times only a foot and a half of water under her keel.

On the 7th of August Bouet was in the bay of Marstral, and thence he visited Neustadt, Wismar, Rostock, Swinemünde, and Colberg. Simultaneously with these cruisings, also, he, still hoping that Denmark might abandon her neutrality, occupied himself in seeking for a point on the Germanic Schleswig coast whence land operations could be commenced; and finally he determined that Aarosünd, to the east of Hadersleben, would be the most suitable locality for this purpose.

On this subject, also, he received various despatches from the Minister of Marine; and one of these, dated the 7th of August, and written under the influence of the impression of the battles of Wörth and Saarbrücken, announced to him that Admiral Fourichon would proceed into the North Sea, and that Bouet was to confine himself to strictly blockading the harbours, and not to bombard defenceless towns. The French Admiral now sailed for Kiel; but he soon saw that nothing could be effected there with the means which he had at his disposal, and he therefore continued his course eastward towards Rügen. On his way thither he received .two despatches—the one dated the 6th of August, and which had been delayed in transmission, commanding him to return to France at once; the other, of a later date, directing him to remain in the Baltic.

It can easily be imagined that the Admiral was extremely dissatisfied with these contradictory orders;

and returning to the bay of Kiöge, he there appointed a committee, which was to determine what could be undertaken in the Baltic without troops or iron-clads of a light draught. The committee assembled forthwith, and in a very short time gave in a report, stating, that since it was forbidden to fire on defenceless towns, the only hope of effecting anything was to be found in the bombardment of Colberg and the Forts of Weichselmünde and Neufahrwasser before Dantzig.

Accordingly, nothing remained but to steer for Colberg; but as Bouet-Villaumez was making preparations for the attack, he received news that the Prussian fleet had left the Jahde and was making for the Baltic. This intelligence was absolutely false; for, on the contrary, Admiral Fourichon had arrived at Heligoland with a fleet of eight ironclads, was watching Wilhelmshafen, and had declared all the North Sea harbours to the east of Baltrum, and therefore the estuaries of the Weser and Elbe, as well as the Jahde, to be in a state of blockade.

Bouet, however, had, on receiving the false reports, hastily retraced his steps towards the Great Belt; but soon afterwards becoming more rightly informed, he again turned back into the Baltic, and then divided his fleet into two squadrons. One of these, under Rear-Admiral Dieudonné, was to observe and blockade the western shores of the Baltic from Kiel to Arcona; while the other, under his own command, performed

the same duty in the eastern waters from Arcona to Memel, notifications of the blockade being at once promulgated.

About this time the French despatch-boat Jerôme Napoleon fell in with the Prussian despatch-boat Adler, and gave notice to the fleet. Bouet at once sent the Thetis and the Hermite in pursuit, but the Adler succeeded in escaping into a bay on the east of the island of Hiddens-oe. From this, on the 17th of August, the yacht Grille and three gunboats issued forth against the pursuing French ships and engaged with them in an artillery action, in which the heavier vessels were unable to effect anything against the lighter draught German boats, which, moreover, were armed with excellent artillery.

Bouet-Villaumez therefore left the Jeanne d'Arc behind to watch the island of Hiddens-oe, and after the 23d of August devoted his attention to blockading the harbours and roadsteads of Kiel, Neustadt, Rügen, and the estuary of the Oder, keeping, however, two ironclad frigates disposable for cruising in the Baltic. With these he had entered the roadstead of Dantzic, when, on the night before the 21st of August, he was attacked by a wooden corvette, the Nymphe. The alarm was raised, but owing to her superior steaming powers and her small draught of water, the small Nymphe was able to escape into the estuary of the Vistula. It is easy to conceive the rage and discouragement which now took possession of the French

crews, when it was thus made manifest to them that their fleet, which could have achieved anything on the open sea, could do absolutely nothing on the shores of the Baltic.

While Bouet-Villaumez was thus doing his best in the Baltic, Vice-Admiral Fourichon, who had arrived near Heligoland with eight ironclads and four despatch-boats, divided his division of the fleet into three squadrons. The first, under Vice-Admiral Deroux, was to observe the estuary of the Elbe; the second, under Jauréguiberry, the estuary of the Weser; and with the third Fourichon himself intended to watch Wilhelmshafen. In these waters literally nothing occurred; and in the middle of September Fourichon returned to Cherbourg, and was then, as we know from the preceding, appointed Minister of Marine by the Government of National Defence.

Before he quitted the North Sea, Admiral Fourichon had given notice of his intention to Bouet, in order that the latter might see to his own safety in the Baltic. Bouet in the mean time had been obliged to send back the Ocean, which had too great a draught of water, and the large ironclad the Flandre, which had damaged her machinery, but had received in exchange the celebrated Rochambeau, and the armoured corvette Armide (8 guns). On the 8th of September, he, together with his division of the fleet, was near the Danish island of Langeland when he received the news of the catastrophe of Sedan. Thereupon he

collected his whole division at the Great Belt to wait for further information and for further orders. These latter he received on the 9th of September, when he was directed to maintain and continue the blockade of the Baltic harbours.

But bad weather had set in, and it only cleared again on the 13th of September. Bouet then sent Vice-Admiral Dieudonné to resume the blockade of Kiel and Neustadt, while he himself proposed steering with the greater part of his division to Colberg, to endeavour to do something there. When in the latitude of Arcona, however, where he anchored during the night of the 13th of September, a violent storm arose, and the Thetis and Rochambeau, especially the last ocean-monster, were in great danger.

Bouet now steered back again to the bay of Kiöge, and there he first received the news from Fourichon of which we have before made mention. The French Admiral now feared or hoped the German fleet would repair from Wilhelmshafen to the Baltic, and he therefore took measures to watch and to bar the passage through the Great Belt; but immediately after this he received orders to bring back his whole division to Cherbourg.

Fourichon, as soon as he had undertaken the Ministry of Marine, had resolved to give up altogether the blockade in the Baltic, but purposed having two squadrons for the North Sea, one or other of which should be always cruising in the Sea itself, while the

other returned to Dunkirk, or even to Cherbourg, to obtain fresh supplies. Bouet, who on his return had presented himself before the Jahde on the 25th, in order to offer battle, naturally in vain, to the German fleet hidden there, entered the roadstead of Cherbourg on the 29th of September. While this division of the fleet was thus employed, the other squadron, under Vice-Admiral de Gueydon, sailed from Dunkirk into the North Sea, and on the 10th of October Bouet was again to relieve it. In the interim, however, he became very sick, and had to be superseded in his command by Rear-Admiral Penhoët.

The approach of winter now rendered it ever more and more difficult for the French fleet to remain in German waters, especially as all the light-ships, buoys, and other marks, had been removed; and the ships were consequently always obliged to remain during the night on the open sea. Under the circumstances, there was no longer any prospect of a naval action or of any real activity on the sea, but still the fleet succeeded in easily capturing a number of merchant-ships. The relief of the one squadron or division by the other assisted in this, for it led the Germans to believe, especially about the beginning of November, that the naval war had altogether ceased; and acting on this assumption, General Vogel von Falkenstein even directed, on the 4th of November, that the signal-lights should be rekindled, and the buoys and marks again laid down; but two days afterwards this order had to

be again rescinded, as the relieving squadron reappeared at that time near Heligoland. And again, whenever a new relief took place, and it consequently appeared as though the French fleet had altogether quitted German waters, enterprising merchant captains of this latter nation put out from the harbours or sought to enter them from without, an endeavour which did not by any means always succeed.

On the French side it has been asserted that every day of the blockade cost German commerce five millions of francs; this would amount in a month to one hundred and fifty millions, and altogether, during the whole period of the war—taking the continuation of the effective blockade at only four months—to six hundred millions. We conjecture that the actual loss did not reach the third of this sum; but even if we deceive ourselves, it certainly was unwise on the part of the French to make such assertions so late as the end of November. It must have been known that they could be made use of against France when peace should be concluded; and much unhealthy covetousness was awakened in Germany among thousands of commercial thieves who were lying in wait to make "a good thing" out of the general loss, and their more or less demonstrable personal losses.

On distant stations men-of-war belonging to the belligerents naturally fell in with one another; but, as a rule, when they met in neutral harbours they did

not seek to come to action, as the German ships on these stations were for the most part very small and insignificant. But there was, at all events, one exception to this rule.

On the 12th of November 1870, the Prussian gunboat Meteor and the French despatch-vessel Bouvet left the harbour of Havannah, in which they had both anchored, to engage in a duel outside the neutral waters. The superior artillery of the German vessel soon compelled the French ship to again seek shelter in the harbour; but the artillery battle raged on even to within the neutral zone, and the Spanish harbour authorities were obliged to call the attention of the excited combatants to the fact that they must there cease their battle.

In the beginning the Germans had altogether refrained from even endeavouring to answer the French prize-taking in a like manner—and that for very good reasons. When, however, the character of the French naval war became ever feebler, the Germans announced that they also would no longer follow out their humane principles on the seas; and, in fact, they shortly afterwards sent out men-of-war to prey upon the French merchant-ships.

On the 12th of December 1870, the flush-decked corvette Augusta, named after the reigning Queen (unarmoured, with 14 ports), put out into the North Sea—under the command of the same officer, Captain Weickhmann, who, in the night between the 20th

and 21st of August, had prepared the pleasant surprise for Admiral Bouet-Villaumez with the corvette Nymphe. From the 26th of December to the 2d of January 1871, the Augusta cruised about in the Channel and before Brest, without being able to capture anything. On the 3d of January, however, she steered into the mouth of the Gironde, and lay in wait there during the following night between the Pointe de la Courbe and the tower of Cardouan. On the 4th of January she made three prizes—one of which, the mail-boat Maximilian, Weickhmann set on fire and sank by firing shell into her, he himself immediately shaping a course for the Spanish harbour of Vigo, to find concealment there.

This was the last act of the so-called naval war carried on during the great struggle.

CHAPTER LVII.

THE PRELIMINARY PEACE.

On the 19th of February the National Assembly in Bordeaux elected a Diplomatic Commission of fifteen members. These were to accompany MM. Thiers and Jules Favre to Versailles, whither these latter were to repair to negotiate a preliminary peace with Count Bismark, and to remain with the French negotiators to assist them during the whole course of the transaction, and in any difficulties which might arise, and then communicate to the National Assembly, if MM. Jules Favre and Thiers should desire it, any result gained or accepted.

On the 21st of February the French negotiators met Bismark in Versailles. The latter diplomatist had also called together representatives of the South German States, who would sign the acceptance of the preliminaries of peace on behalf of their respective Governments. These representatives were,—for Bavaria, the Minister of State, Count Bray; for Würtemberg, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Wächter, with whom was associated also the Minister

of Justice, Von Mittnacht; and for Baden, the Minister of State, Herr Jolly.

On the 22d of February the armistice was further prolonged for forty-eight hours, until midnight of the 26th; and on the 26th itself, the preliminaries of peace were signed. Their contents were as follows:—

Article 1. France cedes in favour of the German Empire all her rights in, and titles to, the territories which lie to the east of the following boundary:

The line of division begins on the north-west boundary of the Canton Cathenon towards the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, follows the western boundary of the Cantons Cathenon and Thionville towards the south, traverses the Canton Briey, along the western boundary of the communes Montois-la-Montagne and Roncourt, and the eastern boundary of the communes St Marie-aux-Chênes, St Ait, Habonville; reaches thus the boundary of the Canton Gorze, traverses this last along the boundaries of the communes of Vionville, Bouxières, and Onville; follows the south-western and southern boundary of the Arrondissement Metz, the western boundary of the Arrondissement Château-Salins, as far as the commune Pettoncourt; this it encloses on the west and south, and then follows the summit of the heights between the Seille and Moncel as far as the boundary of the Arrondissement Sarrebourg to the south of La Garde. Thence the line of division coincides with the boundary of the Arrondissement Sarrebourg as far as the commune

Tanconville, the boundary of which it reaches in the north; it then follows the ridge between the sources of the (white) Saar and the Vezouze to the boundary of the Canton Schirmeck—the western boundary of this last Canton includes the communes of Saalles, Bourg-Bruche—Colroy la Roche, Plaine, Ranrupt, Saulxurus, and St Blaise-la-Roche of the Canton Saalles, and then coincides with the boundaries of the Departments Upper and Lower Rhine as far as the Canton Belfort. The line then leaves the southern boundary of this last Canton not far from Vourvenans, and traverses the Canton Delle along the southern boundaries of the communes Bourogne and Froide Fontaine, and along the eastern boundary of the communes Jonchery and Delle to the Swiss frontier.

The German Empire will possess this territory perpetually in the full rights of sovereignty and property. An international commission, composed of equal numbers of representatives of the two high contracting parties, will be charged with the duty of laying down on the ground the trace of the new frontier in accordance with the foregoing determination, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

This commission will also arrange the division of such pieces of ground and properties as were formerly the common property of districts or communes, now divided by the new frontier. In case of disagreement as to the trace of the frontier, or as to the measures

for carrying it out, the members of the commission will report thereon to their respective Governments.

The frontier, as above described, is painted in green upon two like copies of the map of the Government-General of Alsace, published in Berlin in September 1870 by the geographical statistical department of the Great General Staff. A copy of this map will be appended to each of the two copies of the present treaty.

The above-described frontier line has, however, undergone modifications with the consent of both the contracting parties. In the former Department of the Moselle, the villages of St Marie-aux-Chênes, near St Privat la Montagne, and Vionville, to the west of Rezonville, have been ceded to Germany; and in exchange the town and fortifications of Belfort, together with a district which will be hereafter more minutely described, remain in the possession of France.

Article 2. France pays to his Majesty the Emperor of Germany the sum of five milliards of francs.

At least one milliard will be paid in the course of the year 1871, and the whole of the remainder by instalments extending over three years from the date of the ratification of the present treaty.

Article 3. The German troops will begin to evacuate the French territory as soon as the present treaty shall be ratified by the National Assembly at Bordeaux. They will evacuate the interior of Paris, and the forts on the left bank of the Seine, immediately

after the said ratification; and as soon as possible after an understanding shall have been arrived at by the military authorities of both countries, they will quit the Departments of Calvados, Orne, Sarthe, Eure et Loir, Loiret, Loir et Cher, Indre et Loire, Yonne, and, further, the Departments of Seine Inférieure, Eure, Seine et Oise, Seine et Marne, Aube, and Côte d'Or, up to the left bank of the Seine.

At the same time the French troops will withdraw behind the Loire, which they will not be permitted to recross until the definite treaty of peace shall be signed. The garrison of Paris, however, is exempted from this condition; but the said garrison shall not exceed 40,000 men, and the garrisons indispensably necessary for the security of the fortresses.

The withdrawal of the German troops from the Departments between the right bank of the Seine and the eastern frontier will take place gradually after the ratification of the definite treaty of peace and the payment of the first half-milliard of the indemnity determined by Article 3, commencing with the Departments nearest Paris, and continuing proportionately to the payment of the other four milliards. After payment of the first half-milliard, the Departments of Somme, Oise, and the parts of the Departments Seine Inférieure, Seine et Oise, Seine et Marne, and Seine, which lie on the right bank of the Seine, as well as the forts of Paris on the right bank of the same river, will be evacuated.

After payment of two milliards, the German occupation will be limited to the Departments Marne, Ardennes, Haute Marne, Meuse, Des Vosges, Meurthe, and the fortress of Belfort, with its district. These territories, in which only 50,000 German troops will then remain, will serve as a bond for the payment of the remaining three milliards. His Majesty the Emperor will be disposed to accept, in place of the territorial guarantee given by the partial occupation of French territory, a financial guarantee, if this latter shall be offered by the French Government under conditions which shall appear to his Majesty the Emperor and King satisfactory for the interests of Germany.

Interest at the rate of five per cent per annum will be paid on the three milliards, the payment of which is postponed, from the ratification of the present treaty.

Article 4. The German troops will not levy any requisitions in the Departments occupied by them, either of money or of produce; but they will be maintained at the cost of France, according to a scale agreed to by the German military intendance.

Article 5. The interests of the inhabitants of the territory ceded by France will be guarded as carefully as possible in all matters respecting their commerce and civil rights, so soon as the definite treaty of peace shall be settled. To this end an interval will be granted during which they will enjoy special

facilities for the sale of their produce. The German Government will not place any hindrance in the way of the migration of the inhabitants of the ceded territories, and will not take any measures to the prejudice of their persons or property.

Article 6. Prisoners of war not already set free by exchange will be liberated immediately after the ratification of these preliminaries. To hasten the transport of the French prisoners, the French Government will place a portion of the rolling stock of their railways in the interior of Germany at the disposal of the German authorities, according to special agreements, and at the prices which are paid in France by the French Government for military transport.

Article 7. Negotiations for a definite treaty of peace, upon the basis of the present preliminaries, will be opened at Brussels immediately after the ratification of these last by the National Assembly and by his Majesty the Emperor of Germany.

Article 8. After the conclusion and ratification of the definite treaty of peace, the administration of the Departments occupied by the German troops will be intrusted to the French authorities. But these last must submit to the orders which the chiefs of the German Corps of occupation may deem necessary in the interest of the safety, subsistence, and distribution of their troops.

In the occupied provinces the customs will be collected by French officials, and on account of the

French Government, after the ratification of the present treaty.

Article 9. It is expressly remarked that the present treaty does not confer upon the German military authorities any rights whatsoever in the portions of territories not actually occupied.

Article 10. The present treaty will be immediately laid before his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and the French National Assembly sitting at Bordeaux, for ratification.

Simultaneously with the preliminaries of peace, a convention was signed at Versailles referring partly to the prolongation of the armistice, and partly explaining the preliminaries in one point (Article 3).

This convention declares in Articles 1 and 4 that the armistice is prolonged until the 12th of March, but reserves to either side the right of terminating it, after the 3d of March, by a notice of three days.

Article 2 declares the armistice not to be prolonged as regards Article 4 of the convention of the 28th of January. This last article is replaced by the following determination, to which the undersigned have agreed:—

The part of the town of Paris within the enceinte, and lying between the Seine, the Rue Faubourg St Honoré, and the Avenue des Ternes, will be occupied by German troops, not to exceed 30,000 in number. The manner of occupation, and the dispositions for the accommodation of the German troops in this por-

tion of the town, will be arranged by an agreement between a staff officer from either army. Entrance to the said portion of the town will be forbidden for the duration of the occupation to French troops and armed National Guards.

Article 3. The German troops will not levy any more requisitions of money in the occupied territories. Contributions of this kind, the amount of which is not paid, are as a matter of right null and void, and those which by reason of ignorance of this treaty are paid will be returned. On the other hand, the German authorities will continue to collect the State taxes in the occupied territories.

A few remarks and explanations concerning these preliminaries of peace will not be superfluous here.

The main points in them are the annexation of Alsace and German Lorraine, and the war contribution of five milliards of francs. We have already expressed our humble opinion concerning the first of these two conditions and its expediency, and we do not see any grounds for altering aught we have said. But we may be permitted to touch upon a few illusions which prevail in Germany. All the public expressions of feeling made in Germany have, with very few exceptions, tended to promulgate a belief that with the restoration of peace in 1871 a long era of universal peace and freedom has been founded; and it has been further added, although less generally, that the strife with France having been once

thoroughly fought out, it will be possible to materially lessen the military burdens of Germany.

Freedom is certainly a beautiful word! But let the course of events be as favourable as can possibly be imagined, long years must still elapse before Alsace and German Lorraine can take other than the place of a subject country in Germany—they must remain subdued provinces. Now history has in all ages shown—and indeed the experience taught by it is hardly required—that the possession of such provinces has never been good for the freedom of the country ruling them. If freedom existed before the country acquired its conquests, it nevertheless declined after the acquirement; and if the freedom was to be first won after the acquirement, it was either never gained at all, or else it was gained after the country had passed through scenes of the bloodiest confusion. We do not believe that those Germans who wished to make helots of the Alsatians and inhabitants of Lorraine have any especial moral right to demand concessions in favour of freedom from the new German Emperor, whose elevation to the dignity had nevertheless to take place with the acclamation of the Sovereign German Princes and Burgomasters of the Free Towns. Truly "freedom exists only in the empire of dreams."

Let us now consider how it stands with the promise of perpetual peace.

As late as November 1870, the leaders of French politics declared that a peace based upon cession of

territory would be scandalous and impossible. On the 26th of February 1871 these self-same people accepted such a peace. Can it then be believed that in the short space of time intervening between these two dates their most fundamental ideas had become so changed? Certainly not. They accepted at the end of February the peace which they had rejected in the beginning of November, because they had finally become convinced that a successful military resistance, such a one as might promise to turn the tide of fortune, was no longer possible. The *reservatio mentalis* which in February was universal throughout France was this—we must wait for a better time, and do our utmost to bring it about; and then at the fitting moment we must reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. Truly there is a fair prospect of an enduring peace!

For long years it will certainly be difficult for France, alone and with her own resources, to engage again with Germany; but still the Germans overestimate, as we shall presently show, the duration of the peace which they have imposed upon France. And must France necessarily always stand alone? We believe most thoroughly in the peaceful intentions of the German Governments and of the German Diet; but nevertheless this latter pronounced most distinctly, as lately as the end of March, against the "reconquest" of Milan, Naples, and Palermo, and against the alliance with the western Pope.

And even if no "intervention" be undertaken, there are still a multitude of points which may lead to complications in various quarters. Thus, in the debate on the address in the German Diet towards the end of March, much was said of the "restored unity of Germany," and outside of Germany this has in many places not been well received. The question naturally suggested itself, whether the Grand Duchy of Austria, German Tyrol, Steiermark, considerable portions of Bohemia and Moravia, and many other districts, in the names of which German sounds are distinguishable, whether these do not belong more to Germany than Alsace and Lorraine, and consequently people are on their guard.

It has also come to pass in many places abroad that the leading Germans, who comported themselves so excessively modestly before 1870, and before 1866, have since 1870 shown themselves excessively arrogant and provoking, and this has not greatly commended them in the eyes of foreigners.

Moreover, however little the present leaders of the destiny of Germany may be disposed to undertake unjustifiable attacks, and however prudent their calculations may be, still men change; and various signs foretell that when the change does take place, the same caution and moderation will no longer influence the conduct of affairs.

The possibility of a coalition against Germany must therefore not be left out of the reckoning, and

in such a combination France may find an earlier opportunity than is now apparent of playing a not unimportant part.

It may indeed be answered to this, that Germany is now, as a military Power, a match for all the world. This may be, and we are far from disputing the assertion; only this fact by no means proves that Germany has now a long period of peace before her.

The diminution of the burden of military service in Germany, in consequence of a lasting peace, must be banished to the land of dreams. And if it is altogether, and under all circumstances, logically impossible that the budget corresponding to the present military system should be reduced, or even kept at the same point, the necessity of governing a refractory province, and of keeping a double and treble European guard, are certainly not circumstances to change the general rule. It may be that the war contribution to be paid by France may temporarily prevent a perceptible increase in the North German budget; but so much the more surely will this augmentation take place, and that after no long period; for it may be foreseen that the spending of this contribution will awaken much military greediness, which will flourish and remain in force instead of disappearing as the contribution itself is spent.

The indemnity itself of five milliards of francs has been very variously judged. By some it has been designated as exorbitant, by others as much

too small. It is also said that Bismark originally demanded six milliards, and that it was only through the persuasion of England, and in consideration of the burden which would presumably be laid upon France for many years by having to provide for the subsistence of German troops upon her territory, that he consented to accept the lesser sum. Let us therefore now examine the different grounds upon which we may base a judgment.

It is probable that the collective coined gold and silver at present in currency in France does not much exceed ten milliards of francs in value. It would seem, therefore, at first sight, that a war contribution which amounts to half of this sum must be called very large. But ready money has naturally a great tendency to circulate, as most men, with a few favoured exceptions, experience daily to their loss and dissatisfaction. It by no means follows, therefore, that the money which passes from France to Germany in the form of a war contribution will not speedily return to the former country—that will mainly depend upon the arrangements the French may make for international commerce; and although, certainly, great hopes cannot be entertained for her in that respect at the present moment, the matter will perhaps very shortly assume another aspect.

Before the war the national wealth of France was estimated, and apparently very rightly, at 140, and even 150, milliards of francs.

As long ago as 1851, the value of the ground, arable and meadow, woods, mines, roads, and buildings of all kinds, was calculated at 84 milliards. Since that date the smaller freeholds especially have increased in worth, and the net of roads has been greatly extended: in 1870, railways and telegraphs alone represented a capital of more than 7 milliards; and therefore the value of the ground in 1870 was estimated, rather below than above the truth, at 100 milliards.

The industrial capital—ready money, paper money, deeds, bills of exchange, &c.—must be valued at the very least at 30 milliards, and probably it was much greater.

Lastly, the stores of provisions of every kind, the iron, coal, machines and other implements, were estimated to be worth 20 milliards.

The war contribution of 5 milliards, therefore, would only be a thirtieth part of the national capital of 150 milliards; and, regarded from this point of view, it would seem that the loss might be borne comparatively easily, assuming only that peace restored to France internal tranquillity and labour.

In the year 1866, Prussia obtained from all her adversaries a total war contribution of 173 millions of francs. But in 1870 Germany placed about twice as many men in the field as Prussia did in 1866, and the war lasted for about six times as long in the first-named as in the last-named year. Following out this proportion, Germany ought to have demanded

from France in 1871, in round numbers, about two milliards; and, from this point of view, the demand for five seems hard and exorbitant.

But we must now inquire what had to be done with these five milliards.

In the first place, this money was to cover the actual costs of the war; and for this, according to the foregoing calculation, about two milliards would be necessary. Further, it was to provide for the pensioning in a liberal manner of the numerous maimed and crippled, and of the widows and orphans of the fallen. Let us set aside for this — and here we are very liberal—600 million francs. Then the German State treasure was to be replenished, let us say, with 200 millions. But, further, the theory was started by Germany: France will soon attack us again, and when hostilities recommence, we must be able to enter upon the war under circumstances favourable for us. For this there will be necessary another change in the system of the German armament, at least of the weapons of the infantry; an alteration of the system of fortification; an enlargement of the fleet (and this last has become, owing to the ironclads, a very costly article, for a single one of these monsters can easily cost twelve millions of francs). How much will be required for these and similar works it is difficult to say; the estimates must always be a matter of imagination, and may vary from 100 millions to 1000 millions—that is, to one milliard.

Thus with these small calculations we arrive at nearly four milliards, more or less, and therefore one milliard, more or less, remains as capital for the settlement of demands. And among the persons preferring these will be Germans expelled from France in consequence of the war, German shipowners who have either really sustained losses by the naval war, or who seek, as we have before pointed out, to make the general misfortune profitable to themselves. And, in truth, among those preferring claims for monetary compensation there came even people bringing calculations of the war contributions paid to France in the years from 1806 to 1813—matters which, according to ordinary ideas, must be held to have been settled by the treaties of peace in 1814 and 1815.

Moreover, dotations were required. Report says that this time large endowments will not be given to a few of the higher generals, as was done in 1866, but that, on the other hand, gratuities, under the name of refitting money, will be granted to all officers, of amounts corresponding to the different ranks; but that even for the highest grades the sum will be very moderate. In these matters, however, much still remains to be decided. It would also be but right to provide promotion for the subordinate ranks, and all these things will materially lessen the remaining millions.

Judging the war contribution of five milliards from these various points of view, we find then—

Firstly, that it is absolutely large and heavy;

Secondly, that it cannot, in and by itself, ruin France;

Thirdly, that it remains to be seen what profit the German nation will derive from it.

In France, as soon as the conditions of the preliminary peace were made known, two great questions occupied prominently the public mind. The first of these was, Shall the war contribution be paid as soon, or shall its settlement be delayed as long, as possible? and secondly, How and from whom shall the necessary amount be raised?

The most hot-headed of the Radicals, who even now would not see the falsity of their principle of resistance to the utmost extreme, declared strongly in favour of postponing the payment, urging that no one could predict what lucky chances might render it possible for France to recommence afresh the war within a very short time. The more sensible people, on the other hand, desired the payment to be made as quickly as possible, and among these there was no lack either of Radicals or even of Reds. They said, so long as Germans stand upon the soil of France, there can be no chance of the free resumption of commerce in the Departments occupied by them. The occupation itself must necessarily cost much money, and the longer it is continued the larger will be the amount; it will also inevitably lead to collisions, which it will be better to avoid: and thus restriction of French in-

dustry, and augmentation of the burden to be borne by the people of France, will be the surest consequences of delaying the payment of the contribution, or, in other words, of prolonging the occupation of considerable portions of France by German troops.

The majority of the French were therefore agreed that the five milliards of francs must be paid to the Germans as soon as possible, in order that these latter might be got rid of with all speed. And this dislike for their visitors will certainly not offend any man in Germany or elsewhere, for foreign troops are nowhere welcome guests.

How, then, were the five milliards to be quickly raised? The expedient which immediately suggested itself was a loan; for in France of late years, when loans have been contracted, they have always been subscribed for with incredible readiness. Whether the same eagerness could be hoped for now must depend essentially upon whether France would for the present devote herself to peace, and, by rallying round the Republican Government, awaken confidence in its stability. Unfortunately the prospects of this were but meagre, for very soon socialistic conspiracies began to be carried on in Paris and other large towns, in opposition to the intrigues of the monarchists in the National Assembly.

Next to a loan a national subscription and donation to the State was proposed. The idea was originated by M. Cremieux, who himself offered 100,000 francs;

and if all the possessors of large fortunes in France had been willing to make proportionate sacrifices, the sum of five milliards would have been raised without any great difficulty. But experience teaches—and the reasons why are well enough known—that such national subscriptions never give more than very poor results.

More Radical propositions also were made, such as the collection of all the uncoined gold and silver in France, in their present form comparatively unprofitably employed in articles of luxury, where they could be just as well replaced by the baser metals—had this been carried out, the clergy also would have been great sufferers—and then the sale of the State property. Among this were included the magnificent castles and parks which had hitherto existed only for the use of the reigning dynasties, and which would now become entirely superfluous if France was to be so fortunate, according to the Republican idea, as never to possess again either emperor or king. Perhaps, also, the alienation of these domains would have the effect of rendering the various pretenders less urgent in declaring themselves ready to mount the throne of France. According to calculations put forward, the sale of these estates would realise fabulous sums; but we have no means of judging the correctness of these assertions.

The most thorough Radicals now demanded, too, that those who had occasioned the ill-fated war should be

required, in the first place, to produce the five milliards. But we doubt much if anything worth naming could have been effected on this system. The guilty ones—the Second Bonapartic Empire and its followers—with their device, "Après nous le déluge," had long felt their danger; and we know that the thieving magpie does not long hold the stolen ring in its beak, but hides it as soon as possible in some secure place—*Fabula docet.*

In the convention for the armistice of the 28th of January nothing had been said of an entry of the Germans into Paris; but now, in the preliminaries of peace of the 26th of February, this entry came to be mentioned, and the French negotiators asserted that they consented to its taking place in order to retain Belfort for France.

On the 28th of February 1871, Thiers laid the motion for the acceptation of the preliminaries of peace before the National Assembly. He urged their speedy settlement, especially with regard to the determination of the preliminaries concerning the entry of the Germans into Paris, for it was possible that this degradation might be altogether avoided if the matter were very quickly arranged. Thiers himself was so greatly moved that he could not personally communicate the conditions demanded, and Barthélemy St Hilaire had to undertake the task. During the debate which ensued, two Corsicans ventured to raise their voices in favour of the Second Empire, and in conse-

quence the National Assembly forthwith passed a resolution by which the deposition of Napoleon III. and his whole dynasty was repeatedly and solemnly proclaimed. But this resolution, in that it did not declare decisively in favour of the Republic, did not satisfy the adherents of this latter; and they probably thought, What does it avail to cast one emperor out of doors when, at the same time, two or three other pretenders are kept in readiness to enter?

On the 1st of March the National Assembly in Bordeaux accepted the preliminaries of peace—of an imposed peace—by a majority of 546 votes against 107. Upon the division being declared, the Deputies who represented the districts ceded to Germany quitted the Chamber, and resigned their seats. It is of course self-intelligible that these Deputies had voted against the peace, for their vote was naturally a protest against the separation of Alsace and German Lorraine from France, which they were in a certain way obliged to make, even though they fully recognised its inutility in the present instance.

But these Deputies did not stand alone in voting against the preliminaries of peace; and the many others who agreed with them belonged mainly, but not exclusively, to the Radical party. As regards these latter, it may be said that their opposition was a very easy one. They knew full well that the great majority would be in favour of concluding peace; and it would have been more patriotic, and even

wiser, had they also voted for it, for then the peace would have more than ever borne the stamp of an inevitable misfortune to which France was obliged to submit—with a reservation.

Meanwhile, in accordance with the convention of the 26th of February for the prolongation of the armistice, 30,000 Germans from the 11th, 2d Bavarian, and 6th Army Corps, had entered Paris on the morning of the 1st of March, passing along the Avenue de la Grande Armée, under the Arc de Triomphe, and down the Champs Elysées into the parts of Paris named in the said convention. This portion was surrounded by troops of the National Guard of Paris, who prevented any armed men from passing out of the town into the district held by the Germans. In this latter, General von Kamecke, who had been called up before Paris in December, and had there undertaken the conduct of the siege operations against the capital, now held command; but neither the Emperor nor the Crown-Prince entered the capital.

Altogether this entry into Paris could scarcely have been very satisfactory to the German soldiers. A man who has only visited the parts of the capital then given over to the Germans can hardly say that he has been in Paris. Moreover, the few shops and similar establishments in those quarters were shut, almost without exception. No one has asserted that the entry of the conquerors was greeted with joy; but the accounts of the number of curious spectators who

visited the quarters the latter passed through are very contradictory. Most of the reports say that there was but a small sprinkling of visitors; only a few accounts, and those very party ones, speak of a vast multitude. But these latter may be only guilty of an unintentional exaggeration; for an assemblage which, to a Londoner, for instance, would appear a melancholy solitude, might seem to a man who had never been in London to be a somewhat great crowd.

By a special agreement, unarmed German soldiers under the conduct of officers were to be allowed to visit the Hotel des Invalides and the Louvre; but owing to the conduct of the Parisians, and in order to prevent deplorable collisions, the former of these privileges was altogether given up. The Louvre, however, was visited by detachments of troops; but these only had the satisfaction of inspecting the walls from without; for during the bombardment all the windows of the building had been barricaded with sand-bags to protect the collection of treasures within from injury, and these screens not having been again removed, all the rooms were in total darkness, and none of the beauties which they contain were visible.

It had been at first intended to successively relieve the troops which had entered Paris after every few days, so that, if possible, all the men of the besieging army might return home with the impression that they had entered Paris as victors. But as early as

the 2d of March authentic information was received at Versailles that the preliminaries of peace had been ratified by the French National Assembly; and consequently, in conformity with the treaty, the German detachments in Paris forthwith received orders to quit the capital. The evacuation was carried out on the morning of the 3d of March, and nothing more was said of the entry of further series of German victors.

On the 10th of March the National Assembly in Bordeaux resolved to migrate thence—not to Paris, but to Versailles; and for the majority of the Deputies even this latter place was much too near to the capital; but although they much wished to choose a more distant spot, they allowed themselves to be persuaded by Thiers.

As recently as January, a Government-General had been established in Versailles for all those western Departments of France which did not belong to the Government-General of Nancy or to the one founded in Rheims, and this newly-formed command had been intrusted to General Fabrice, Minister of War for the kingdom of Saxony. The Emperor of Germany now on the 5th of March dissolved these Governments-General, transferred the supreme authority in the Departments to the German military authorities, and made them over in other respects to France. On the 12th of March Versailles was completely evacuated by the German troops, and on the 20th of March

the French National Assembly could open its first sitting there.

But two days before this, on the 18th March, a most lamentable revolution had broken out in Paris, which at the very least would necessarily delay the completion of the work of peace. The affair arose thus: When there was a prospect of a German entry, troops of the National Guard, especially those belonging to the northern quarters of the town, to Montmartre Belleville, and La Villette, had taken possession of a great number of guns which were in Paris, and had dragged them up to Montmartre. There they were regularly guarded, and Montmartre itself was intrenched towards the town.

The Government at Versailles at first treated the matter very lightly. On the early morning of the 18th of March, however, when General Vinoy wished to retake possession of the guns, he encountered an organised resistance; troops of the line even going over to the insurgents. Deplorable scenes ensued, in which General Lecomte and the former commander of the National Guard, General Thomas, were deliberately shot by the rebels. Vinoy hereupon withdrew his troops to the left bank of the Seine, and then out of the town altogether, in order to get them better under command, and to guard the Government and National Assembly in Versailles. In his retreat he also left the southern forts in the hands of the insurgents. These latter at once occupied

the Hotel de Ville, and there established their Government under the name of the Central Committee of the National Guard. On the 26th of March municipal elections took place in all the Arrondissements, and a new Paris Government arose under the name of "The Commune." Not only all the bourgeois, but also the majority of the quietly-disposed artisans and labourers, had abstained from voting, and consequently all the names at the head of the poll belonged to men of the extreme socialistic party.

What the Central Committee, and afterwards the Commune, desired and strove for was not absolutely easy of accomplishment. In the first place, the Commune declared itself to be the representative of the municipal freedom of Paris, but as such it would also become the representative of a matter which extended beyond the boundaries of the town of Paris. As long ago as the time when the National Assembly first met at Bordeaux, a dissension had arisen between the Deputies representing the large towns and those returned by the country districts, and the Government of M. Thiers and the National Assembly did but little to lay the strife. From the very outset the majority of the Assembly showed a great aversion to allow the large towns to freely elect their municipal authorities, although the smaller towns, among which all with a population of less than 20,000 inhabitants were afterwards included, and the rural districts, were still to retain this right. Hereupon a very justifiable discon-

tent arose in the capital and in all the larger towns, and complaints were made about their oppression by the country. Thus in this matter the rebellion in Paris represented not only the capital, but also all the large towns; and an unconditional hostility sprang up between the Commune of Paris and the Government and Assembly in Versailles.

Moreover, the large towns desired the maintenance of the Republic, and it certainly cannot be denied that monarchical intrigues played a great part in the National Assembly. M. Thiers himself never spoke clearly and decidedly as to the continuance of the Republic, but only diplomatically; nay, he even made most imprudent declarations—as, for instance, "Most of the electors of France seem to have given to their representatives a monarchical mandate." Such a statement was manifestly wrong, as was destined to be proved by the municipal elections in the beginning of May. The majority of voters had returned their members in February in order that they might conclude peace, not that they might again bless France with a monarchy; so that this Assembly which M. Thiers very unwisely designated "Sovereign," certainly was not commissioned to act as Constituent, or to regard itself as such a one.

Every one, both in France and abroad, who wished the country well, deplored the rebellion in Paris; because every one must perceive that the first necessity for France was internal tranquillity and freedom

from German occupation. To secure this latter condition, credit was necessary. Now at the conclusion of the preliminary peace the credit of France stood as high as it possibly could be expected to do under the given circumstances; but the insurrection in France, in that it continued and thereby disclosed weakness in M. Thiers' Government, necessarily damaged this credit very materially.

But in spite of this regret, few people in Europe would have unconditionally sympathised with the Government and Assembly in Versailles, and have unconditionally condemned the Commune, if this latter had only demanded municipal freedom, within the limits allowed by the State, and the maintenance of the Republic. Nay, even the peaceable citizens of Paris, who suffered the most from the state of affairs, did not remain so passive towards the insurrection from timidity alone—a quality which is peculiar to this class everywhere—but because they could discern that a certain amount of justice lay hidden in the demands of the Commune, and because of the mistrust awakened by the doctrines of the politicians in Versailles.

The names of most of the men, however, who composed the Government of the Paris Commune, caused it to be at once recognised that the matter would not be settled without the trial of socialistic experiments; and the circumstances under which the Commune sprang into being left no doubt that

its reign would degenerate into one of greater or less terror.

The Commune was by its very constitution necessarily obliged to seek to gain over to its side at the very least the non-possessing classes. But the state of siege which now again threatened Paris made all lucrative trade and labour impossible. It therefore became necessary for the Commune to free the poorer part of the population from the burden of paying rent for their habitations, to give them a long respite from all payment, and to alleviate as much as possible the state of those whom the sad force of circumstances had compelled to enter into relations with the Mont de Piété, or to transact business in any other way with money-lenders. All these things the Commune was compelled to do by necessity. And now also it must prepare for the war which it had declared against the Versailles Assembly, and which the Versailles Assembly had declared against it. It must pay its troops, and it must continue to give to the National Guards the pay they had received during the German blockade; nay, even more, it must increase the pay of the useful portion of these troops. It must also provide for the widows and orphans of those National Guards who fell in the cause of the Commune, and the aspect of affairs also compelled it to take steps to provision Paris to the utmost extent possible.

All these things required much money, and as

much ready money as possible. But this could only be obtained by requisitions on all kinds of institutions, and on private individuals who were suspected either of possessing wealth, or of being able to dispose of that of others; and these requisitions could not be exacted without plunging the Commune more deeply every day into terrorism and communism. Many actions were thereby rendered necessary which, viewed separately, as they were by the mass of men, were deserving only of condemnation or of ridicule. Such were, the suspicion of persons who undertook any responsibility or command, the constant deposition and imprisonment of these persons, and the consequent perpetual change in the conduct of affairs, the mutual accusations of the members of the Communal Government, excesses of all kinds both for and against the Commune, and the uprising against the intriguing Church, which, under the Second Empire, had acquired a vast amount of land, to the great detriment of the education of the people.

And to this uprising of the Commune against the clergy the coquetry of M. Thiers' Government with the Papal authorities greatly contributed.

On the 8th of December 1869 a so-called Œcumenical Council had been assembled at Rome by order of Pius IX. The majority of this Council was composed of Eastern bishops—of men who had

been thought scarcely fitted by acquirements and ability to represent the ecclesiastical order in the civilised countries of Europe; and this majority in July 1870 declared, in compliance with the Papal wish, that the infallibility of the Pope was henceforth a dogma which every Catholic must believe under pain of excommunication. In September the protectors of the Pope, Napoleon III. and Eugenie, fell. The Court of Florence also could not doubt the fact, and consequently it hesitated no longer in seizing the morsel it had long hungered for—Rome. After a mock encounter, which recalls to mind the brigand combats of the middle ages, so vividly described by Villani, Rome was occupied by the Italian army, and the States of the Church declared to be annexed to Italy. The way in which all this was done was certainly neither noble nor grand; but the result, that Rome was once more given to Italy, was very pleasing to all sensible men.

Now France at this time had certainly something else to do than to busy herself with the interests of the Pope; but it nevertheless became everywhere very perceptible that M. Thiers had by no means laid aside his old ideas as to the advantages derivable for France from a dismemberment of Italy; and although it was at the moment impossible for him to intervene with arms on behalf of the temporal power of the Pope, he yet showed that he had every

desire to do so. Italy had to be on her guard, and certainly could not be rendered favourably disposed towards the Government of Versailles by the expressions of this wish made by the latter.

And now also the Government of Versailles, becoming convinced that the Commune of Paris would develop into a more formidable power than had been at first supposed, had to make ready to do battle with it. But in this preparation it was in many ways greatly impeded, and among other things by the conditions of the preliminary peace. It was laid down, namely, in these, that the French Republic was not to maintain any army between Paris and the Loire, and that the garrison of the capital was not to exceed 40,000 men. But to make war against the Commune the Government of Versailles required to have an army between Paris and the Loire; and such an one, too, must be much stronger than 40,000 men. Permission to organise the requisite force was therefore demanded from the Germans, and under the circumstances was granted without delay. Moreover, the Germans could essentially facilitate the formation of the required army by speedily returning to France the soldiers who were prisoners of war in Germany, and they evinced the greatest willingness to do this also. And if delays occurred in this return transport, the blame must not be laid upon the Germans, but rather upon the Versailles Government, which raised

up perfectly unexpected difficulties when the peace negotiations were opened in Brussels, and also remained very much in arrears with the money required for the subsistence of the German troops of occupation.

Towards the end of March the fighting about Paris was recommenced, but a military description of it does not come within the province of this book, and we shall only relate so much of it as appears to us necessary for the understanding of the political events up to the conclusion of the definite treaty of peace.

The first struggle took place for the possession of the peninsula of Nanterre, for the bend of the Seine near Courbevoie and Asnières, and about Neuilly. At all these places the Government troops only gained ground slowly from those of the Commune. The bitterness between French and French was much greater than the exasperation between French and German had been in the preceding great war, and the Government troops wrought more damage with their projectiles in the town of Paris and among its monuments, especially on the Arc de Triomphe on the Avenue de la Grande Armée, than ever the Germans had done.

In April, Thiers intrusted Marshal M'Mahon, who had placed his services at the disposal of the Versailles Government, with the chief command over the troops

employed against Paris, and an attack was forthwith commenced against the southern forts, especially against Issy and Vanves, and against the main enceinte at Point du Jour.

But at all these points the Government troops made but very slow progress.

CHAPTER LVIII.

THE DEFINITE PEACE.

THE conditions of the preliminary peace were so clear, and entered so fully into details, that it might reasonably have been expected that the definite treaty of peace would follow immediately; for in reality the latter could only be an elucidating copy of the former, and it was also greatly to the interest of both parties to establish the real peace as quickly as possible. The two Governments also seem to have entertained the same idea, for they only sent subordinate diplomatists to Brussels, where the peace negotiations were to be conducted—Germany being represented in the first place by Count Arnim, and France by Baron Baude.

The first preparatory conference between the negotiators took place at Brussels on the 27th of March. Contrary, however, to the well-founded expectation, the negotiations dragged on without any result being arrived at. On the French side protestations were made against the amount of the war-contribution and against the required mode of its payment, and at-

tempts were even made to obtain an alteration of the frontier in respect of the territories ceded to Germany. Thus it came to pass that by the end of April no decided progress had been made, and the German Government began to consider whether it would not be expedient under the circumstances to recommence hostilities, or at least to take a first step in that direction by seizing the town of Paris, either by force or by an agreement with the Commune, and then requiring the Versailles Government to withdraw its troops behind the Loire, so that the negotiations for the definite peace might be continued from those positions.

But before taking this grave step, the Imperial Government determined to despatch Bismark, who had received the title of Prince from the Emperor of Germany, to Frankfort-on-the-Main, to confer there with Jules Favre, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Pouyer-Quertier, the Minister of French Finance, to see whether an understanding could not be arrived at about the principal points upon which differences had arisen, and also to obtain more sure guarantees for the definite conclusion of peace than were afforded by the preliminaries.

Bismark himself had never believed that the actual conclusion of the definite treaty of peace could take place in a few days, and had from the first assumed that its compilation would require a much longer period; still he had at the same time supposed that

it would be possible to leave this work to subaltern negotiators.

He now found the French Ministers more accessible to his arguments than he had expected. They fully comprehended the danger which now again threatened France if the Germans, doubting the good faith and power of the Versailles Government, found themselves obliged to forcibly obtain new guarantees. They also understood how, on the other hand, that French Government which should conclude the definite peace with the German Empire would, by that act in itself, gain stability; because the French would see that the Germans could not and would not treat so easily with any other as with that very Government about the execution of the treaty, and about details which might arise in carrying it out.

Thus it came to pass that by the 10th of May the Federal Chancellor Prince Bismark was enabled to sign with MM. Jules Favre and Pouyer-Quertier a definite treaty of peace, the ratifications of which were to be exchanged before the 20th of May. The conditions were now, as was to be foreseen, harder for France than those of the preliminary peace, and harder than they would have been had the insurrection in Paris and the failure of the Brussels' negotiations not taken place. We proceed now to give their substance as concisely as possible, adding at once the necessary explanations.

Article 1. As regards the cession of territory, the

German Government offered to considerably enlarge the Alsatian district round Belfort, which, together with this fortress, was to remain French, if France, on the other hand, would consent to make a still further cession to the west of Thionville, along the Luxemburg frontier. By this new arrangement France was to retain around Belfort the entire cantons of Belfort, Delle, and Giromagny, and the western portion of the Canton of Fontaine; and in an appendix Bismark conceded a yet further extension, by which the villages of Rougemont, Leval, Petite Fontaine, Romagny, Félon, La Chapelle sous Rougemont, Angeot, Vauthiermont, La Grange, La Rivière, Reppe, Fontaine, Frais, Foussemagne, Cuvelières, Montreux le Chateau, Bretagne, Chavannes les Grandes, Chavanette, and Suarce, and, moreover, the whole road from Giromagny to Remiremont on the Moselle, were to remain French; this last-named road, from the point where it quits the canton of Giromagny, forming the future frontier between Germany and France.

On the other hand, Germany demanded that in the north her frontier should be moved further westward than had been previously arranged. Thenceforward this frontier was to start from a point between Hussigny and Redange on the Luxemburg frontier, and run through between Erronville and Aumetz (but leaving Thil and Villerupt French), between Beuvilliers and Boulange, between Trieux and Lommerange,

between Avril and Moyeuvre, where it was again to coincide with the frontier before determined by the preliminaries of peace.

The point at issue here being purely an exchange of territory, the French negotiators did not believe that they were empowered to accept the offer, and Bismark therefore referred the decision to the consideration of the French National Assembly, as it was for Germany only a matter of secondary importance. The Versailles Chamber accepted the exchange, and thereby the extension of the territory remained French around Belfort.

Articles 2, 3, and 4 treat of the rights of the inhabitants of the territories ceded to Germany to decide upon their future nationality, of the delivering up of such archives, exchequers, &c., as were solely connected with the ceded territories.

Article 5 establishes the enjoyment by both nations of equal rights upon the Moselle, the Marne-Rhine, Rhone-Rhine, and Saar canals, and also upon the navigable waters connected with the same.

Article 6 treats of the redistribution of the ecclesiastical districts in conformity with the new political ties created by the peace.

Article 7 treats of the war-contribution and the gradual evacuation of French territory by the German troops of occupation (articles 2 and 3 of the preliminaries of peace); and it is in respect of this condition that the increased severity of the German

demands is principally shown. In their new form they ran thus:—

Thirty days after the French Government shall have established its authority in Paris it will pay to Germany the first half-milliard; the second and third half-milliards will be paid in the course of the year 1871; the fourth before the 1st of May 1872; and the remaining three milliards before the 2d of March 1874. Interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum will be paid on these last three milliards on every 3d of March after the 2d of March 1871. Interest on sums paid in advance will be remitted from the date of such payment.

Payments can only be made in the chief commercial towns of Germany, and must be in metal (gold or silver), bank-notes of the Banks of England, Prussia, Holland, Belgium, in demands payable to order, or in first-class bills of exchange.

After payment of the first half-milliard, and after the ratification of the definite treaty of peace, the Germans will now only evacuate the Departments of Somme, Seine inférieure, and Eure on the right bank of the Seine.

The Departments Oise, Seine et Oise, Seine et Marne, and Seine, as well as the forts of Paris on the right bank of the Seine, will now only be evacuated so soon as the German Government has reason to believe that order is sufficiently restored in France to guarantee the payment of the indem-

nity; but in any case these said districts will be evacuated after the payment of the first three half-milliards.

As regards the payment of the last three milliards the preliminaries of peace remain unaltered.

Deductions from the indemnity of five milliards, which the French Government may in any way be authorised to make by the definite treaty of peace, may on no account be subtracted from the half-milliard to be first paid.

Article 8. As regards the subsistence of German troops remaining in France, the former determinations shall hold good, in so far as France herself fulfils the conditions. But if the French Government fails to fulfil its obligations in this matter, the natural rights of the German troops to make requisitions for their subsistence must be enforced. As soon as the effective strength of the German troops in France can be reduced to below 500,000 men, a proportionate diminution of the sum to be paid by the French Government for the support of these troops will follow.

Article 9 determines that the special advantages granted to France for the exportation of industrial products from Alsace and German Lorraine shall continue until the end of August 1871.

Article 10 promises that Germany will hasten as much as possible the sending back of the French prisoners of war, and determines the position of the

French army in and about Paris as far south as the Loire.

Article 11 confirms the arrangement that the previously-existing treaties of commerce with the German States are annulled by the war, and that they shall not be renewed. Germany recognises this; but under the condition that in commerce with France she shall be treated equally with, and not more unfavourably than, England, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria, and Russia.

We have already called attention to this point—the reintroduction of protective duties, whereby the best act of the Second Empire was first and thoroughly revoked by the Government of M. Thiers.

Article 12 takes care of the rights of all Germans expelled from France after the 28th of August 1870—an article which is equally useful for Germany as for France; as otherwise no one knows what would be the amount of the claims for compensation which would be made by the expelled upon the German Governments.

Article 13 contains determinations as to the position of German merchant-ships and cargoes captured by the French navy.

Article 14 establishes that the canalisation of the Moselle from Frouard to Thionville, commenced in 1870, shall be continued by Germany and France, by each country on its respective territory.

Article 15. The high-contracting Powers mutually

bind themselves to extend to the subjects of the other nation the same measures which they may deem expedient to take in favour of those of their own subjects who are rendered incapable by the events of the war of maintaining their rights, and of taking care of them betimes.

Article 16 specifies that the graves of French and German dead on both territories shall be respected and preserved.

Article 17, that the discussion of special questions connected with the preliminary or definite treaties of peace shall be reserved for further negotiations at Frankfort-on-the-Main.

Article 18, that the ratifications of the treaty shall be exchanged within ten days from the 10th of May, or earlier if possible.

Additional articles, which were also signed on the 10th of May, provide for the purchase of the portions of French eastern railways lying in Alsace and German Lorraine, Germany paying for them 325 millions of francs, which will be deducted from the indemnity of five milliards. At the same time, contingent arrangements were made for bringing the Luxemburg railways, the management of which had been undertaken by the French Eastern Railway, into the German system; and the German Government also offered two millions of francs for the short length of the Basle-Mülhausen-Paris railway traversing Swiss territory, provided that the French Government

obtained the consent for this cession within one month.

Further, the additional articles contained more minute details respecting the trace of the frontier around Belfort; but these we have already noticed in narrating the 1st article of the main treaty.

On the 18th of May the French National Assembly at Versailles accepted the definite treaty of peace by a large majority, at the same time consenting to the exchange of territory proposed by Bismark; and on the 20th the ratifications were exchanged at Frankfort-on-the-Main.

On the following day the Government troops succeeded in penetrating into Paris from the south and west, and after several days of street-fighting they gained possession of the capital. Symptoms of the approaching dissolution of the Commune had been for a long time apparent. Among these we reckon the appearance of several Polish names at the head of the insurgents, an infallible sign that the end of any enterprise is approaching, and the degeneration of the administration of the Commune into a pure administration of destruction. The house of M. Thiers on the Place St Georges was levelled with the ground, and the pillar in the Place Vendome was overthrown. Numbers of the champions of the Commune became apostates, and those who remained loyal consisted mainly of men who knew they could not expect mercy from the other side. Too weak in numbers to be

able to defend any longer the ramparts of Paris, these champions now revenged their defeat by acts of the most frantic Vandalism; and the Tuileries, the Louvre, the Palais Royal, the Hotel de Ville, and numerous other ornaments of the French capital, were set in flames or blown up with powder.

With the definite treaty of peace of the 10th of May, and with its ratification, the War for the Rhine Frontier was formally concluded.

But when will it be really ended?

Every one feels that that great calamity which was evoked by the frantic declaration of war on the 19th of July 1870, will exercise an evil influence over Europe for tens of years; and when we hear hopes expressed of a speedy, complete, and thorough reconciliation of the two Great Powers concerned, we feel, when we regard at the same time the shattered state of French credit and the insecurity of the present French Government, as though we heard children whistling on passing a churchyard at night.

We close our narrative with the earnest wish that our fears may be vain, and that happier fates than we can foresee may preside over the fortunes of the two great nations more immediately concerned, and so over the whole world.

APPENDIX.

A.—REMARKS ON SOME OF THE MORE REMARKABLE EVENTS OF THE WAR OF 1870 AND 1871.

In the War for the Rhine Frontier the Germans had to deal successively with two different French armies—with the long-organised Imperial forces, which disappeared completely with the capitulation of Metz; and with the improvised hosts of the Republic, the first independent action of which commenced in November 1870.

The superiority of the German organisation to the French Imperial had for a long time been no riddle to men who occupied themselves at all with the study of such things.

The German organisation brought better elements into the army by the adoption of the principle of universal service; while the French Empire still further greatly increased the disadvantages under which the French army suffered in this respect, by instituting the Army Dotation Chest, the evil effects of which, although the institution itself was abolished by the decree of the 1st of February 1868, could not be at once remedied. The bad results were first noticeable in 1860, but after that they ever rapidly increased.

The German organisation rendered it very certain that a numerical superiority of organised forces would be forth-

coming; and among these we must reckon the landwehr, although its troops do not serve with the colours in time of peace. But in a great military organisation it is by no means of paramount importance that large numbers of men should be kept continually under arms, but only that military *cadres* should be established, that trained men should be forthcoming to fill up the same, that every one of these trained men should know his exact place in these *cadres*, that arms and equipment should be ready for all, and that the men who are to fill up these skeletons should know one another. This last advantage, again, is only to be gained by introducing a system of military localisation, such as has long existed in Prussia, and which since 1866 has been also carried out in the South German States—a system which causes corresponding regiments of the line and landwehr to be recruited from the same districts, and which takes care that the regiments of the line, except where in a very few cases special circumstances may render exceptions necessary, shall be quartered in time of peace in the several districts from which they respectively draw their recruits, and from which they are supplemented in time of war. By such means only can an easy, quiet mobilisation be rendered possible—a mobilisation without any confusion through haste, carried on on an apparently complicated but really simple plan, the main secrets of which are, first, decentralisation of the administration, every Army Corps mobilising itself; and secondly, a certainty that every individual man who has to take any part whatsoever in the mobilisation has a perfect knowledge of what his exact work is, and that all gaps among these men will be filled up from year to year in a manner which is to a certain extent mechanical.

Marshal Niel, when he undertook the conduct of the Ministry of War, recognised thoroughly the necessity of introducing the principle of universal service into France, if this latter country was to rise to the military level of

Germany—at that time of North Germany. But this principle cannot be forced upon the masses in a moment. Even in Prussia it was only very gradually introduced in spite of the stirring times in which it was first announced in that then poor and oppressed country, which, however, even in its darkest moments, believed that it would again rise up.

But in 1867 and 1868, France by no means felt the hard yoke of such an oppressed state; on the contrary, the successes of the Second Empire had greatly contributed to impress the country with an idea of the invincibility of the Imperial army; and a sensible man had therefore a hard task in those days to instil reason into the masses on the one hand, and to prove to the authorities on the other, that new principles must be accepted in the organisation of the army.

Marshal Niel endeavoured to introduce the principle of universal service into France by means of the Mobile National Guard. But this institution, in the form in which it passed out of the Corps Legislatif, with the period of annual exercise curtailed, and without any provision for drawing in such men as have served a certain, although it might be a short time in the army, could not effectually strengthen the forces of the Empire. In later days Marshal Niel has been greatly blamed for not having shown more character in this question, and for not having more energetically defended his project for the Mobile Guard. But seeing that he did not find any support in the Corps Legislatif, and that even the Mamelukes of the Empire were opposed to him, we do not know how more "character" would have availed him. At the most, he could have resigned his ministerial portfolio; but he remained and endeavoured to do his best upon the bad foundation granted him, until his successor suspended the whole organisation for the time being.

And if at the outbreak of the war the Mobile Guard could not be reckoned upon, it was also equally impossible to reinforce quickly such troops as were forthcoming—partly be-

cause of the complicated regulations of the law of 1868 concerning the Reserve Forces, and partly because of the want of a system of localisation in military districts; so that, as a matter of fact, most of the battalions which stood on the frontier numbered only 500, officers included, and battalions which had 600 men were classed as strong.

In Germany, on the other hand, there was not, with the existing institutions, the slightest difficulty in at once placing on their normal war footing all such bodies of troops as were called out; and as each Army Corps was a small army in itself, provided independently with all the material of an army, it followed that not a single article was wanting in the war equipment of the troops; while on the French side, owing to the centralisation of important portions of equipment, and to the dualism of command and military intendance, the case was very different.

The importance of a system of localisation has not yet been fully recognised in France, although great endeavours are being made there to obtain a new organisation of the army. Among others a project of General Faidherbe's lies before us. In it the principle of universal service is accepted: every healthy man is to serve two years with the colours in the army of the line; he is then to pass for two years into the first reserve, and then for six into the second. The first reserve is to be called out two months annually for training, the second fourteen days. But side by side with this, General Faidherbe recommends that the soldiers from different districts shall be mixed in the various bodies of troops of the line army, and also that the men of the first reserve shall be called out for exercise at some place outside the district in which they live. And in these ideas he is by no means alone. On every side one hears it said—"We cannot form regiments purely of Gascoignes or Parisians."* —Why not?

* Since the above was written, the number of pamphlets which have appeared

And as there was on the German side a great superiority in the solidity of the mobilisation for war, so was there also an equally better-arranged transport of the troops to the frontier; and in this matter, again, everything went on correctly and methodically, according to plans prepared long before.

In France, also, the subject had been worked at beforehand, but it may be said theoretically. The preparatory labours there were not immediately put into practice, and were barely adapted for real work; so that as the war had been commenced in haste and without reason, so also the assembling of troops and their transport to the frontier had to be carried on without method or order.

Of the "new strategical combinations" about which fulsome panegyrists of German strategy dote, we have not been able to remark anything. The good old rules were followed: Concentration of a numerical superiority to strike the decisive blow and win victory on the battle-field; simplicity of plan—direct march upon Paris—having at the same time regard to the secondary and divergent operations which the movements of the enemy rendered necessary; caution in advancing until a decisive victory had been gained upon the field of battle; and subjugation of large tracts of country, where little resistance only could be expected, by troops whose co-operation on the battle-field would have been of secondary importance, or whose employment there would only have brought about a small result.

On the French side, on the other hand, these old rules were neglected in an almost incomprehensible manner, although it was exactly there that the numerical inferiority in available troops rendered their observance and execution doubly and

in France on Army Organisation has considerably increased. Most of them urge the same measures—universal service, but no localisation. To those who are especially interested in the subject we would recommend before all others Lahaussois' book, 'L'Armée Nouvelle.'

trebly necessary; and this very remissness gave the Germans again a considerable advantage.

In the year 1866 great complaints were made that a proper combination of the three arms had not been carried out, either on the Prussian or on the Austrian side. In respect to the artillery the outcry was carried still further, and it was said, in very exaggerated language, that this arm had not rendered any service whatsoever. Upon this basis the Arkolay literature sprang up. Arkolay, as it will be remembered, asserted that rifled guns rendered a combination of the three arms impossible, and recommended a return to smooth-bore ordnance. Naturally his counsel was not followed by any one; but his assertions called forth in Austria several academical essays, which, however, were far from satisfying any one.

That the Prussian artillery in 1866 failed to fulfil all that had been expected from it must be attributed to various reasons, which may be briefly summarised as follows:—

1. The *matériel* of the Prussian artillery was not so perfect as it was in 1870. Many smooth-bore guns were still mixed with the rifled; and even if this mixture had no other bad result, it had at least that of obliging various kinds of ordnance to be worked together, the very nature of which rendered such co-operation impossible.

2. The infantry had implicit confidence in the needle-gun when opposed to the Austrian muzzle-loader. The first successes increased this confidence, and gave them at the same time the consciousness of a general superiority to the Austrians.

3. In consequence of this feeling, and according to old tradition, the artillery on the Prussian side was not well distributed. The advanced-guard of a division could, at the most, bring one battery, or very rarely indeed two batteries, into action at the beginning of a battle; the remainder of the divisional artillery marched with the tail of the division; and the reserve artillery of an Army Corps, the smaller half of all

its batteries, in rear of the Corps itself. The small initiatory action of the artillery, together with the successes gained by the Prussian infantry in ordinary ground, explain very clearly how it came about that the former was somewhat in the background in 1866.

But in 1870, on the other hand, the German artillery played a brilliant and important part.

It is true that in this latter year the Prussian artillery was not numerically stronger than it was in 1866. After making the necessary deductions for the cavalry divisions, it may be taken that there remained 14 batteries, or 84 guns, for every 26,000 men; or at the rate of 3½ guns per thousand men. But these batteries were formed solely of rifled guns, and the great mass of them now marched, not with the tail, but with the head of the divisions. The reserve artillery —which, however, was no longer called reserve artillery, but Corps artillery—also marched in front; so that, as a rule, it was generally possible, if only a division of a Corps came into action at first, to unite with it from the very outset ten batteries.

The Austrian artillery had also, in 1866, not fulfilled the part that was intrusted to it—and which had been fairly expected from it, because its *matériel* was on the average better than that of the Prussian. The reason for this shortcoming is to be found in the extreme dissemination of the guns through the system of brigade batteries, which prevented any real superiority being brought to bear against the Prussians at the commencement of an action. And when large artillery reserves were brought upon the battle-field—as, for instance, at Königgratz—they were totally unconnected with the infantry, and were in the end silenced by the Prussian infantry in detail.

Although in the lower circles in Prussia little was said about the Chassepot, and its value relatively to the needle-gun was spoken about with great caution, still in the upper

circles the technical superiority of the French weapon was fully recognised, and a not too difficult modification had been discovered for the Prussian firearm which would make it somewhat more equal to the Chassepot—at least as regarded rapidity of fire. But it would have taken some considerable time to effect the proposed alteration in the mass of needle-guns, and therefore a fitting opportunity had to be waited for. If hostilities had not broken out in July 1870, this change would probably have been carried out in the winter of 1870-1871; and it is said that a knowledge of this intention was one of the causes which induced the French Government to hasten on the war. But the higher Prussian military authorities, who must necessarily since 1867 have been constantly thinking about a war with France—however little this same might be desired politically—were not minded to wait quietly in the hope that a time might come for the conversion of the needle-guns to be carried out; and thus they were naturally led to the expedient of devising and establishing a new and effective combination of the working of the two arms—namely, of the infantry and artillery. The result was, that the artillery was now destined to undertake and carry out in a most thorough manner the initiatory stage—the preparation for the battle; and the infantry was mainly directed to pluck the fruit ripened by the artillery.

And this programme was most completely carried out through the means before described. The mobility which had begun to be acquired even in 1866 by the introduction of rifled guns, but which had not then been perfected, also facilitated its execution, and the sharp criticism which had followed the Prussian field-artillery in 1866, not altogether fairly, incited it to great achievements in 1870. And it must be especially noticed that in this latter year the rifled German batteries never came into action at such long ranges as they did in 1866. They seldom took up their first position at a greater distance than 2000 paces from the enemy,

and availed themselves as speedily as possible of every opportunity of approaching nearer to him.

The French artillery was in 1870 by no means numerically weak. With the distribution of forces which was actually in existence at the end of July, there were 30 guns for each division of infantry in an Army Corps—that is, with the prevailing very weak battalions, for every 8000 men; and there were therefore $3\frac{3}{4}$ guns per 1000 men, or more than with the Prussians. But of these 30 guns only 18 (3 batteries) were immediately attached to the divisions, the other 12 belonging to the Corps reserve. The batteries composing this last were mostly 12-pounders, with only a small proportion of rifled 8-pounders and of the horse-artillery 4-pounders, and were usually treated as guns of position, and dragged in rear of the column, so that it was rarely possible to bring any number worth naming into action at the commencement of a battle or encounter. Thus the French committed here the very mistake which the Prussians had made in 1866, but which they had since remedied.

Secondly, there were six mitrailleuses among the thirty guns which were apportioned to every 8000 infantry and cavalry. If these are subtracted, there only remain three guns per 1000 men, including those of the Corps reserve. Now it is very doubtful if a mitrailleuse can be held to be worth as much as an artillery field-piece. As regards weight, and the manner of service and manœuvring in general, the mitrailleuse (*canon à balles*) is exactly similar to the field-piece. But the effect of the former is by no means equal to that of the latter; it cannot destroy material obstacles such as barricades and walls, neither has it so great a range. Its effect, therefore, can only be compared to that of a very concentrated infantry fire, although the latter would perhaps be more accurate. And here again the question arises, whether the concentration of this infantry-like fire given by it is not too great? One Prussian officer was struck

by 22 mitrailleuse-balls; and even though this case may stand perfectly alone, it is still certainly known that German soldiers were frequently wounded by several mitrailleuse-bullets, while one would have been just as effective, as it was only required to make each man incapable of fighting for a time. A slight dispersion can, it is true, be given to the balls by a lateral motion, which is imparted to the machine while it is being fired; but it can easily be seen that this expedient would generally be prejudicial to accuracy: in the first place, because it would rarely happen that both the wheels stood on an absolutely horizontal surface; and secondly, because the ground upon which the fire was directed would probably often be irregular. It is not impossible to devise better means to bring about this dispersion. In any place that of a shell is preferable; and as solid projectiles are no longer fired from field-guns, this better expedient is at hand everywhere. In detached cases, however, the advantages of the mitrailleuse are very apparent—as, for instance, in defile fighting; but in general it may be asserted that these cases will occur more often in fortress warfare, and especially in the defence of works, than in field service.*

* A friend of ours lately dead, Major von Plönnies, has calculated, working upon a basis of 12,000 men, that of the Germans killed and wounded 90 per cent are due to the effects of the Chassepot, 5 per cent to the mitrailleuse, only 3 per cent to the French rifled guns, and 2 per cent to causes which cannot be correctly ascertained. It would be of the greatest interest to have a like calculation of the effects of the German arms; but owing to the lack of anything like complete lists of French wounded, such a table could scarcely be procured. Intelligent artillery officers ascribe the inferiority of the French artillery not only to the already-mentioned causes, but also to the prevailing division of command. When the war broke out every one wished to join in the campaign. The Minister of War gratified this desire; and in order to give employment to the higher officers of the artillery, he gave two commandants, a first and a second, not only to the artillery of every Army Corps, but also to that of every division, so that it was often difficult to discover who was master and who was servant.

In accuracy at like ranges the German breech-loaders were far superior to the French rifled field-guns—especially to the French rifled 4-pounders, which came principally into action as the reserve guns; the 12 and 8 pounders being only brought to the front on extraordinary occasions.

The French had in addition a special army artillery reserve of 16 batteries, 96 guns, composed of one regiment of field and one of horse artillery. This force never came into action as a whole, and it was only by chance that portions of it were sometimes engaged; it never had a day as the Austrian army artillery reserve had, at least once, at Königgratz.

In these latest days cavalry can seldom be usefully employed upon the field of battle. The effect of firearms has become too telling, as was strikingly demonstrated in 1870 on the days of Wörth and Rezonville. It has been said that the cavalry was there brought into action imprudently—against troops whose strength and formation were unknown, upon unfavourable ground; in short, under disadvantageous and unfitting circumstances, and that this need not always be the case. Until we are further informed, however, we must nevertheless hold that such must always be the case; and we simply wait for explanations as to where more favourable ground and more fitting circumstances are to be found.

It may not be inexpedient to call attention to, or to recall to mind, three circumstances which experience has shown tend greatly to nullify the action of cavalry on modern battle-fields. These are the long range and the explosive properties of the shells of the artillery, which enables this latter to hurl confusion from a safe distance into attacking cavalry; secondly, the rapidity with which breech-loaders can be fired, which lends to even half-routed infantry a great power of resistance to pursuing horsemen; and thirdly, the diminution of the possibility of a surprise.

For what has ever been the first condition for the effective

action of cavalry? Always surprise. In North Germany it remains to this day a proverbial figure of speech, "Like Zieten from the bush." But in order to surprise, the moment must be seized. But again, in order to seize the moment, it must not only be rapidly recognised, but the idea must be promptly followed by action; in other words, it must be possible to charge home with as little delay as possible.

But now the great range of modern firearms, and their effect at that range, render it necessary, unless indeed an exceptionally favourable formation of ground exists, to keep the cavalry at a greater distance than formerly from the theatre of action, where they may possibly be usefully employed; and hereby not only the recognition of the right moment, but also its prompt utilisation, are rendered much more difficult; because, as a longer distance has to be ridden over, the attack of cavalry will seldom be a real surprise, or be carried out before preparations have been made to receive it.

Another employment of cavalry is for outpost and advanced-guard duties, either in smaller detachments attached to divisions and corps, or in larger cavalry corps or divisions, which occupy large tracts of country in advance of the operating army, or on its flank and in its rear—cut off the opponent's communications, guard those of their friends, bring in intelligence of the enemy, and prevent him from obtaining information.

In 1866 the Austrians had five squadrons, or 750 horses, attached to every Army Corps of about 28,000 infantry; and we may say that this number was sufficient to perform the duties of what we would call "divisional cavalry."

For this same work the Prussians had four squadrons for every division of infantry; therefore for an Army Corps of 25,000 men eight squadrons, or, on the normal war footing, 1200 horses.

Moreover, in the same year the Austrians had special divisions of cavalry, three so-called reserve cavalry divisions

and two light cavalry divisions. Each reserve cavalry division consisted of two brigades and two batteries; the brigade was composed of two cuirassier regiments of four squadrons each and one Uhlan regiment of five squadrons, and therefore the division counted 26 squadrons and 16 guns, or 3900 horses, with 4 guns per thousand horses.

These divisions were to be employed after the ancient manner of using reserve cavalry on the battle-field; but this intention naturally could not be carried out; and the Austrians have very naively complained that their reserve cavalry divisions, destined to act as in the days of chivalry, were maliciously decoyed under the fire of the needle-guns of the Prussian infantry (which fire they had no means of answering) by detached squadrons and regiments of Prussian dragoons, who advanced against them, and then suddenly retreated, enticing their pursuers to destruction.

The first of the two light cavalry divisions had 30 squadrons and 3 batteries, 4500 horses and 24 guns; the second 20 squadrons and 2 batteries, 3000 horses and 16 guns. These divisions were to undertake the reconnoitring duties on the flanks and front, and were to operate as the American cavalry had done in the great civil war. It was epecially hoped that the first light cavalry division, Edelsheim, would do great things in this way: but these expectations were doomed to be disappointed, because nothing came of the great offensive movement which was to be carried on into Prussia; and as soon as this offensive advance became changed into a defensive concentration, the whole original plan of action for the Austrian light horse had to be completely changed.

In the formation of the reserve cavalry of the Prussian army of 1866 no fixed principle can be recognised. The First Army, Prince Frederic Charles, which consisted of three Army Corps, had one cavalry corps under Prince Albrecht, and this consisted of four brigades, or ten regiments (40

squadrons), and four batteries—altogether, 6000 horses and 24 guns. The Second Army, Crown-Prince of Prussia, had four Army Corps; three of these Corps had each a special cavalry reserve of one, two, or three regiments, and the army itself had as a main reserve one division of cavalry (Hartmann) of six regiments and two batteries—3000 horses and 12 guns. In the Third or Elbe Army, Herwarth von Bittenfeld, one of the three divisions of which it was composed had no divisional cavalry at all, but the whole army had a cavalry reserve of 16 squadrons and 2 batteries—that is, of 2400 horses and 12 guns.

The Prussian reserve cavalry marched in rear; and in reality only the reserve division of the Second Army could boast of any reconnoitring exploits. In truth, the whole of the reconnoitring duty was very badly performed.

In 1870 every division of German infantry had its regiment of divisional cavalry, precisely as in 1866; but, on the other hand, the reserve cavalry was organised in a totally different manner. It was now formed into independent divisions, each consisting of two or three brigades, four to nine regiments, with one or two batteries. There were six of these divisions in the whole North German Army, exclusively of the division of cavalry of the Guard, which was always kept somewhat closely connected with the Guard Corps, and of the Saxon horsemen, who stood in the same relation to the Saxon Corps. In addition to these six there was a division of Bavarian cavalry, and also one Würtemberg, one Hessian, and one Baden brigade.

The divisional cavalry consisted chiefly of dragoons, with a few hussar, and a yet smaller number of Uhlan regiments. On the other hand, the independent divisions were formed principally of Uhlans and cuirassiers, with a few regiments of hussars and dragoons; and of all these the Uhlans manifestly played the first part. We have repeatedly in our narrative had to relate how the appearance

of a very few of these German lancers in a large French town was sufficient to inspire the inhabitants with a really Cossack terror.

The German cavalry divisions in 1870 were organised and destined to act exactly on the principles which governed the formation of the Austrian light cavalry divisions in 1866. In the idea there was absolutely no difference, but how different was their employment and the use made of them. This again resulted from the difference of the whole conduct of the war; for in 1870 the Germans really assumed the offensive, which the Austrians in 1866 never arrived at, although they had every desire to.

In 1870 the German cavalry divisions never took any direct part on the battle-field. They were constantly employed on the flanks of the armies, and guarded them against surprise.

It has been asked whether the German cavalry would not have been able to attain all that it accomplished in 1870 with a much smaller numerical strength. We believe that this would have been the case. For wherever the cavalry was sensibly employed in 1870, at a greater or less distance from the fields of battle, and wherever it was really and thoroughly effective, it never encountered any serious resistance; and it was a matter of indifference whether a squadron or a regiment was present in such cases.

General Faidherbe, in the project already mentioned by us, demands for the new organisation of the French army only one cavalry soldier for every twenty infantry. And in reference to this subject he remarks, that the French Army of the North, during the second period of the war, had only two squadrons of dragoons, at the most 250 horses, for 40,000 infantry—that is, one horseman to every 160 infantry. A few more cavalry would, he admits, have been desirable; but, on the other hand, he states that the Germans opposing this same army had in the beginning five, and after

the battle of St Quentin nine, regiments, or at the least 5000 horses, and these never performed any especial service either on the battle-fields or elsewhere.

This may be true, but in making these remarks General Faidherbe certainly somewhat under-estimates the value of the security which the presence of the German cavalry on Manteuffel's, and afterwards on Göben's flank, gave to the movements of these generals—a security which certainly contributed much to their success. . But still, the difference between one horseman to every 20 infantry and one to every 160 is a very considerable one.

The Germans had about one cavalry soldier in the field to every eight infantry; and this proportion may well be condemned as too great without admitting one to every 160 to be sufficient.

It has been said that the great numerical strength of their cavalry enabled the Germans to keep constantly in motion, because they could often relieve the actual working cavalry, and not always keep the same employed. In this there is certainly much truth; but still it does not entirely justify the extraordinarily large number of horsemen which the Germans led on to the theatre of war; for if the doings of the small detachments of cavalry be followed, it will be found that they, whenever they could be really usefully employed, effected great things. Probably, under the present conditions of warfare, one horseman to every twenty foot soldiers will be found to be an ample proportion.

On the western theatre of war General Chanzy was by no means of opinion that cavalry was nearly useless. He repeatedly remarked in his instructions and orders, especially in December, that the German cavalry did great mischief to the French by constantly alarming them. But it must be well remarked that here again only quite small detachments of Germans were spoken of. Chanzy complained that the French horsemen did not perform any like exploits; although he,

who had a force of cavalry numerically much stronger than Faidherbe's, does not attribute the poor achievements of the French in any way to their small numbers, but reproaches them for not having the same spirit of enterprise as the Germans had.*

These complaints of General Chanzy recall vividly to our mind an article which appeared in the 'Figaro' in 1868, and which contained pretended reports by Prussian officers on the French army. In these it said, among other things, in speaking of the French cavalry, "It is just good enough to charge and sabre the enemy." Much laughter was thereby excited, and yet there was no small amount of truth in the statement. Marshal Niel recognised more thoroughly than any Minister of War had for a long time the shortcomings of the Imperial army in every respect, and he commenced earnestly and seriously to endeavour to remedy them. This roused an almost incredible animosity against him in the leading military circles, and among those directly dependent upon them; and as early as 1868, Niel resembled, to the impartial observer, a fallen Belisarius among the Byzantine favourites. Among other things, the Marshal recognised what was wanting in the French cavalry; and it may not be without use for a later investigation of history to call to mind here a pamphlet which appeared under his immediate inspiration, 'Observations sur le service de la Cavalerie en Campagne 1868,' and to remark that only a fifth part (pages 18-90) of this publication is devoted to discussing the employment of cavalry on the battle-field, while the remainder, four-fifths of the whole, treats of application of the arm for other purposes.

* Since the above was written, General Chanzy's work on his campaign in the west—'La Deuxième Armée de la Loire'—has appeared. It is of the highest interest for those who wish to study the subject more deeply than we have been able to do in these pages, and at the same time it will repay the labour of comparing it with General Faidherbe's book on the campaign in the north—'Campagne de l'Armée du Nord'—both as regards its manner of viewing and of describing events.

In 1870 many intelligent French officers complained how little was done by their cavalry in the way of covering the army, reconnoitring the ground, and bringing in information about the enemy—not because its numbers were insufficient, for it was in many places numerously represented, but because it was wrongly and ignorantly employed.

In the Imperial French Army, which was concentrated in August 1870 on the north-eastern and eastern frontiers, every Corps had a division of cavalry of from 4 to 7 regiments, 18 to 30 squadrons, with one or two batteries of horse-artillery. Moreover, a large cavalry reserve of 12 regiments—48 squadrons—was formed. But hardly anything was ever heard of the activity of this numerous cavalry of the battle-field; and on the battle-fields themselves it only proved, with excessive gallantry certainly, that nowadays nothing can be effected by fighting after the manner in vogue in the Seven Years' War, or even in the combats of the First Empire.

The superiority of the Chassepot over the needle-gun was, as had been foreseen, fully proved during the campaign of 1870. But since the Germans, nevertheless, everywhere gained brilliant victories, it has now become impossible to attribute all the successes of the Prussians in 1866 to their superior firearm, and henceforth it will be necessary either to seek for other grounds or to accept those others already found. On the other hand, a full recognition of their services is due to those men who, foreseeing what things might come to pass, prepared the German artillery, in the face of many difficulties, for their glorious achievements in 1870.

The Turcos, whose swarthy countenances and savage cries are said to have had such a mighty working in 1859 upon the troops of the very mixed nationalities of the Austrian Empire, did nothing in 1870. It seems that the German soldiers—not only the North Germans, but also especially

the Bavarians—lacked the imagination necessary to enable them to regard the celebrated peculiarities of the Africans as human, and that they were rather disposed to look upon them as wild animals which they had simply a right to confine or to kill. The modern Zouaves, who wear the same uniform as the Turcos, are altogether French.

During the six months' campaign, from the beginning of August 1870 to the end of January 1871, the Germans took, or forced to surrender, twenty-six French fortresses. If the matter be not more minutely looked into, such a number certainly appears enormous; and our assertion that the Germans only achieved very small successes in fortress warfare, except when they had their powerful artillery ready on the the spot, may easily be made to appear ridiculous by people who would be content to exclaim, "Six-and-twenty fortresses in half a year! Four to five fortresses a-month!"

We do not think it necessary to examine again the quality of these fortresses, as we have already briefly described the main characteristics of each, and from these it is apparent that most of these conquered places were nests which, since the beginning of this century at least, could have had no influence on the conduct of a war; mere shell-traps, which could not even withstand a bombardment from German field-pieces—places which were weakly garrisoned, and yet must necessarily be held, simply because they existed, but from which the French could not assume an offensive, partly owing to the want of troops to concentrate in them, partly because of the absence of detached forts around them. It was scarcely of any importance to the Germans to seriously attack these fortresses, for when they took them they found nothing worth mentioning within. At the most, such a nest sometimes partially barred an important communication, and then certainly it became to some extent necessary to undertake a serious attack. But it may be asserted that, altogether, 20,000 Germans would have sufficed to observe twenty of

the "holes" which were included among the captured "fortresses. Now 20,000 men would certainly have been a very important force in days when national wars were carried on with armies of 50,000 men; but in modern times, when 500,000 men and more are led on to the field, they are so no longer. The Germans were obliged to leave etappen* troops on their lines of communications, and these could very well undertake simultaneously the observation of such small nests as we have described. These etappen troops, too, were composed of landwehr—of soldiers whom it was not desired to employ in the first line; and therefore the actual field-army did not sustain any loss.

Let us once more pass in review the small shell-traps, designated fortresses, which fell into the hands of the Germans, in order that we may see clearly of how little importance they were.

Enumerating them, then, we first come to Bitche (vol. i. p. 296), before which a *modus vivendi* was soon established between the besieged and besiegers, which led to a friendly capitulation when the preliminaries of peace were concluded; then to Lichtenberg; Lützelstein; Phalsbourg, which held out for a long time; Marsal, which did absolutely nothing, so that the money which had been expended on the newly-constructed Fort Dieuze was completely thrown away, as intelligent men had long predicted it would be, as was also that which had been spent in damming up the Seille.

Following these come Toul, Schlettstadt, Neu Breisach (vol. ii. p. 358), Sedan, which fell with the Imperial army defeated there, Laon, Thionville, Soissons (vol. ii. p. 381), Verdun, Montmédy, Mézières, Rocroy, Vitry le Français, Ham, Peronne, La Fère, Amiens, and Longwy, where very recently a system of countermines had been constructed at a great cost, but without even the very slightest reflection, such as would be required from a subaltern officer.

* Etappen tróops are troops employed to guard the lines of supply.

If it were of importance to yet further increase the list of "fortresses" taken by the Germans, we might speak of the capture of Weissenburg, Hagenau, the castle of Montbéliard, &c. &c. But it must be manifest to every sensible man, that the folly of the French war administration in still keeping these places in the category of fortresses is much more remarkable than the glory gained by subduing them.

Among all the works bearing this name of fortress, only Paris, Metz—and first in the second rank—Strasburg and Belfort, really deserved it.

Belfort, in itself a small place, in which but little was to be found, weakly garrisoned, both as to the quantity and quality of its defenders, could only acquire any real strategical importance through such an exceptional state of things as would render the utilisation of its detached works possible. And even this would under any circumstances be difficult, as Belfort does not lie on a river of any importance. In 1870 a serious attack on the fortress was only forced on the Germans by the fact that the German Government had determined to unite Alsace and German Lorraine with Germany—to reunite, as was the historic professorial expression; and Belfort therefore, as the most important fortress in Upper Alsace, must be taken. The small place offered resistance for three months and a half, and might have been able to hold out for yet another month but for the peculiar state of affairs brought about by the armistice.

Strasburg is wanting in all the qualities which are indispensable in a modern fortress, and is not even a good type of an old fortification, being by its form terribly exposed to the effects of artillery fire. Nevertheless it held out for seven weeks, and kept a by no means inconsiderable portion of the enemy's forces tied down before it.

A numerous French army was quartered in and around Metz; but Metz had to succumb to hunger and to Marshal Bazaine's policy. It had detained a strong German army

before it for about eleven weeks; but this army never seriously attacked the fortress, contenting itself with blockading it, certain that it must at last fall through hunger. After September 1870 the annexation of Metz to Germany was decreed, and the experience gained at Strasburg caused a bombardment to be avoided; and, moreover, this would also have been much more difficult at the former than at the latter place, owing to the existing detached forts. Prince Frederic Charles was well satisfied that Bazaine's army should complete the still unfinished works for Germany. But what blindness was everywhere manifested in the conduct of French affairs! Truly the war was plunged into without the slightest preparation having been made. Marshal Niel had undertaken the completion of Metz with perfectly well-determined objects, and he certainly would not have consented to hostilities being commenced before the system of works there was essentially completed. But how shamefully unfinished everything really was there! We were in Metz as late as June 1870, and we are convinced that the Germans could, even after the great battles in August, have stormed the gorge of Fort Plappeville with every prospect of success. Undoubtedly great losses would have been sustained; but if Plappeville had been taken about the 23d of August by the means we have indicated, Metz itself must have fallen soon afterwards; the war would then have taken a very different course, and dangers which now threaten the whole of Europe, and which will be better understood every day, would have been diverted.

Paris held out for four months and a half, and then only succumbed to hunger. The incapability and dishonesty of the statesmen into whose hands the fate of France fell in September 1870 and in March 1871 subjected the capital anew, after the preliminary peace, to a state of siege; and undoubtedly the German leaders can henceforth assert that they behaved much more humanely towards Paris than the

Chambordians, Orleanists, and all the Republicans of various shades who govern France from Versailles. And if Germany makes the whole of Paris, all the Parisian population, and if it were possible the whole of France, answerable for the Commune which established itself on the 18th of March 1871 in Montmartre, and thence descended upon the Boulevards and to the Seine, this would be easily explicable. But still the judgment is absolutely false; and let what may be said on the matter, the Parisians nevertheless did great things on behalf of the defence of their capital, much greater than their best friend, who at the same time knew France well, would have been justified in expecting.

The great French fortresses, as a rule, rendered important services in this war, and if these did not lead to favourable military results, the reason lies in the wretched military organisation of France—an organisation which, under the Empire, had become ever worse and worse. There existed but one single army, sufficient for action against the French themselves, but not against a foreign country, and which could not be reinforced betimes in any organised way, but only by improvisation, and even for this improvisation no regular preparations had been made. If France had possessed either the Prussian system of service or something similar to the militia system of Switzerland, the two to four months that her great fortresses held out would have given her sufficient time to raise a relieving army of more than a million combatants, and these would certainly have done greater things than the many millions of "mobilised," of whom, at the most, 300,000 troops, badly trained, badly officered, and ill found in everything, could be placed in the field. At the present time the little State of Switzerland is much laughed at and ridiculed, principally by a number of those Germans who, having made a great show of their desire for liberty, and having gained office and rights of citizenship in the country, now, after the victories of the German soldiers,

entirely forget their own past career, and bow down most humbly before the majesty of the new Emperor-King—*Habeant sibi.* And if there be Swiss who so debase themselves as to join in chorus with this class, if there really be such men, *habeant sibi.* Switzerland is a small country, and knows right well that were she, unsupported by allies, to be fallen upon in an unfavourable moment by one of the European Powers, she must succumb. But she would defend herself and take her chance. As to her militia system, we would here call attention to a fact which is perhaps but little regarded—which is, that the weak point in this organisation is the cavalry; nevertheless, if Switzerland were as large as France, her militia system would enable her to place more horsemen in the field than the Second Empire could bring forward in 1870.

Official and officious German journalists—therefore indubitably honest men—have repeatedly advised the French, now that they have seen what calamities fortifications may entail upon a town, to raze to the ground as speedily as possible the defensive works of the capital. But although the latest political leaders of France entertain most curious ideas, and do not give signs of possessing great insight, we nevertheless do not believe that they will blindly follow the advice of these official and officious writers; but will rather, on the contrary, improve to the utmost the fortifications of Paris, abandon the useless fortresses of France, and then establish between the system of fortification and the military system that harmony which alone can render the former useful, and which will allow fortified towns which have gallantly defended themselves for months to be effectually relieved—nay, which will cause that, as far as can be calculated, such fortresses must be relieved in the time during which they can defend themselves.

Innumerable comparisons have been instituted between the French and German General Staffs, especially since the

appearance of the 'Apocrypha of Stoffel.'* As far as our experience goes, we believe that there are just as highly —although in part partially—educated men on the French Staff as on the German. A great advantage for the German General Staff, however, is, that its members are taken from the actual army, and are not in any way connected with the administration. But we see even in our immediate neighbourhood how difficult it is for even intelligent men to recognise this advantage—for they cannot help imagining that everything would be well arranged if only they could place each man at his proper post; and hereby it often comes to pass that every one is not in his proper place, but just the reverse. This peculiar misappropriation of places naturally cannot recommend such a system to the impartial observer.

In France the officers of the General Staff were not taken from the army. They were first educated at the Polytechnic, or at the School of St Cyr, and then passed into the School of Application for the General Staff; thence they were sent for one year to an infantry regiment, one year to a cavalry regiment, and, latterly, for half a year to the artillery; but it must be remarked that during this service they did no actual regimental duty. After they had passed through these so-called schools they at once entered the General Staff as captains, and, unfortunately, usually as *aides-de-camp* to general officers.

Now a man may be socially very amiable and socially very accomplished, and therefore extremely well fitted to be an *aide-de-camp* to a general, to manage his *menus plaisirs*, and yet not be in the least qualified for a Staff officer in the pro-

* When we wrote this the opinion prevailed in Switzerland and Germany that the well-known reports of Colonel Stoffel were composed *après coup;* but since then we have become convinced that they were written in the years preceding the war, exactly as they were afterwards published. They were, however, kept in the Imperial chambers, and their contents barely communicated to the Minister of War.

per sense of the word. But it was only too natural that the young officers of the Staff who had fulfilled perfectly the duties of a personal *aide-de-camp* to a general should be taken with him by the latter when he was promoted to a higher position; and thus it frequently came to pass that the younger officers of the Staff were called upon to fill positions, the duties of which they were incapable of performing.

A real central seat of the General Staff, such as exists in Prussia in the Great General Staff, did not exist in France, for the General Staff Committee could not be regarded in that light. Something of a substitute might, it is true, be found in the French War Depot (Depôt de la Guerre), but the work was not done there in the same orderly manner that it was on the Great General Staff in Berlin. Moreover, under the Second Empire everything had degenerated. The office hours of the officers employed in the various administrations in Paris were too curtailed—only from noon until four o'clock in the afternoon. Very zealous officers might certainly hereby gain time for private study and private work; but for the generality of young officers life in Paris was too seducing, and they believed that they could occupy their free time more usefully—that is, more agreeably—than in laborious scientific studies and labours.

Owing to the want of a proper division of labour on the one hand, and of the necessary concentration of labour on the other, it may be said that, excepting in a few special branches, the work was very theoretically done in the Depôt de la Guerre. Much "valuable material" was collected there; but this was not so arranged, so classified, or so condensed, that it was ready for immediate use, or that it became, so to speak, the intellectual property of the whole army, as was the case in Prussia.

In these things, and not in the want of education of the officers of the Corps, we see a real inferiority in the French General Staff when compared with the Prussian.

B.—ORDRES DE BATAILLE.

I.—Distribution of the French Army at the Commencement of the War

(*Beginning of August* 1870.)

Commander-in-Chief: The Emperor Napoleon III.
Major-General: Marshal Lebœuf.
First Aide-Major-General: General Lebrun.
Second Aide-Major-General: General Jarras.
Commandant of Artillery: General Soleille.
Commandant of Engineers: General Coiffinières de Nordeck.

Imperial Guard: General Bourbaki.
Chief of the Staff: General D'Auvergne.

1st Division: Deligny.
- 1*st Brigade:* Brincourt — Battalion of Rifles, 1st and 2d Regiments of Voltigeurs.
- 2*d* " Garnier — 3d and 4th Regiments of Voltigeurs.

2d Division: Picard.
- 1*st Brigade:* Jeanningros—Zouaves and 1st Regiment of Grenadiers.
- 2*d* " De la Croix—2d and 3d Regiments of Grenadiers.

Cavalry Division: Desvaux.
- 1*st Brigade:* Du Frétay—Guides and Chasseur Regiment.
- 2*d* " De France—Lancer and Dragoon Regiment.
- 3*d* " Du Preuil—Cuirassier and Carabineer Regiments of the Guard.

Total—24 Battalions, 26 Squadrons, 12 Batteries.

1st Army Corps: Marshal M'Mahon.
Chief of the Staff: General Colson.

1st Division: Ducrot.
1st Brigade: Moreno—13th Battalion of Rifles, 18th and 96th Regiments of the Line.
2d " Du Houlbec—45th and 74th Regiments of the Line.

2d Division: Abel Douay.
1st Brigade: De Montmarie—16th Battalion of Rifles, 50th and 78th Regiments of the Line.
2d " Pellé—1st Regiment of Zouaves and 1st Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs.

3d Division: Raoult.
1st Brigade: L. Hérillier—8th Battalion of Rifles, 36th and 48th Regiments of the Line.
2d " Lefèvre—2d Regiment of Zouaves, 2d Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs.

4th Division: De Lartigue.
1st Brigade: De Kerléadec—1st Battalion of Rifles, 56th and 87th Regiments of the Line.
2d " Lacretelle—3d Regiment of Zouaves, 3d Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs.

Cavalry Division: Duhesme.
1st Brigade: De Septeuil—3d Hussar and 11th Chasseur Regiments.
2d " De Nansouty—2d and 6th Lancer and 10th Dragoon Regiments.
3d " Michel—8th and 9th Cuirassier Regiments.
Total—55 Battalions, 30 Squadrons, 20 Batteries.

2d Army Corps: General Frossard.
Chief of the Staff: General Saget.

1st Division: Vergé.
1st Brigade: Valazé—3d Battalion of Rifles, 32d and 55th Regiments of the Line.
2d " Jolivet—76th and 77th Regiments of the Line.

2D DIVISION : Bataille.

1*st Brigade :* Pougé—12th Battalion of Rifles, 8th and 23d Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Bastoul—66th and 67th Regiments of the Line.

3D DIVISION : De Laveaucoupet.

1*st Brigade :* Doëns—10th Battalion of Rifles, 2d and 63d Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Micheler—24th and 40th Regiments of the Line.

CAVALRY DIVISION : Lichtlin.

1*st Brigade :* De Valabrègue—4th and 5th Chasseur Regiments.

2*d* " Bachelier—7th and 12th Dragoon Regiments.

3*d Army Corps :* Marshal BAZAINE.
Chief of the Staff : General MANÈQUE.

1ST DIVISION : Montauban.

1*st Brigade :* Aymard—18th Battalion of Rifles, 51st and 62d Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Clinchant—81st and 95th Regiments of the Line.

2D DIVISION : De Castagny.

1*st Brigade :* Cambriels—15th Battalion of Rifles, 19th and 41st Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Duplessis—69th and 90th Regiments of the Line.

3D DIVISION : Metman.

1*st Brigade :* De Potier—7th Battalion of Rifles, 7th and 20th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Arnaudeau—59th and 71st Regiments of the Line.

4TH DIVISION : Decaën.

1*st Brigade :* De Brauer—11th Battalion of Rifles, 44th and 60th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Ferrières—80th and 85th Regiments of the Line.

CAVALRY DIVISION: De Clérambault.

1st Brigade: De Bruchard — 2d, 3d, and 10th Chasseur Regiments.

2d " De Maubranches—2d and 4th Dragoon Regiments.

3d " De Juniac—5th and 8th Dragoon Regiments.

Total—52 Battalions, 31 Squadrons, 20 Batteries.

4th Army Corps: General DE LADMIRAULT.
Chief of the Staff: General OSMONT.

1ST DIVISION: De Cissey.

1st Brigade: Brayer—20th Battalion of Rifles, 1st and 6th Regiments of the Line.

2d " De Golberg—57th and 73d Regiments of the Line.

2D DIVISION: Grenier.

1st Brigade: De Bellecourt—5th Battalion of Rifles, 13th and 43d Regiments of the Line.

2d " Pradier—64th and 98th Regiments of the Line.

3D DIVISION: De Lorencez.

1st Brigade: Pajol—2d Battalion of Rifles, 15th and 33d Regiments of the Line.

2d " Berger—54th and 65th Regiments of the Line.

CAVALRY DIVISION: Legrand.

1st Brigade: De Montaigu—2d and 7th Hussar Regiments.

2d " De Gondrecourt—3d and 11th Dragoon Regiments.

Total—39 Battalions, 18 Squadrons, 15 Batteries.

5th Army Corps: General DE FAILLY.
Chief of the Staff: General BESSON.

1ST DIVISION: Goze.

1st Brigade: Saurin — 4th Battalion of Rifles, 11th and 46th Regiments of the Line.

2d " Nicolas — 61st and 86th Regiments of the Line.

2D DIVISION: De Labadie.

1*st Brigade:* Lapasset—14th Battalion of Rifles, 49th and 84th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " De Maussion—88th and 97th Regiments of the Line.

3D DIVISION: De Lespart.

1*st Brigade:* Abbatucci—19th Battalion of Rifles, 17th and 27th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " De Fontanges—30th and 68th Regiments of the Line.

CAVALRY DIVISION: Brahaut.

1*st Brigade:* De Bernis—5th Hussar and 12th Chasseur Regiments.

2*d* " De la Mortière—3d and 5th Lancer Regiments.

Total—39 Battalions, 18 Squadrons, 15 Batteries.

6th Army Corps: Marshal CANROBERT.

Chief of the Staff: General HENRI.

1ST DIVISION: Bisson.

1*st Brigade:* Pechot—9th Battalion of Rifles, 4th and 10th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Leroy de Dais—12th and 100th Regiments of the Line.

2D DIVISION: Tixier.

1*st Brigade:* Archinard—9th and 14th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Maurice—20th and 31st Regiments of the Line.

3D DIVISION: Lafont de Villiers.

1*st Brigade:* De Sonnay—75th and 94th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Colin—93d and 94th Regiments of the Line.

4TH DIVISION: Levassor-Sorval.

1*st Brigade:* De Marguenat—25th and 26th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " De Chanaleilles—28th and 70th Regiments of the Line.

CAVALRY DIVISION: De Fénélon.

1*st Brigade:* Tilliard—1st Hussar and 6th Chasseur Regiments.

2*d* " Savaresse—1st and 7th Lancer Regiments.

3*d* " De Béville—5th and 6th Cuirassier Regiments.

Total—49 Battalions, 26 Squadrons, 20 Batteries.

7th Army Corps: General FELIX DOUAY.
Chief of the Staff: General RENSON.

1ST DIVISION: Conseil Dumesnil.

1*st Brigade:* Nicolai—17th Battalion of Rifles, 3d and 21st Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Maire—47th and 99th Regiments of the Line.

2D DIVISION: Liébert.

1*st Brigade:* Guiomar—6th Battalion of Rifles, 5th and 37th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " De Labastide—53d and 89th Regiments of the Line.

3D DIVISON: Dumont.

1*st Brigade:* Bordas—52d and 72d Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " Desportes—82d and 83d Regiments of the Line.

CAVALRY DIVISION: Ameil.

1*st Brigade:* Cambriels—4th Hussar, 4th and 8th Lancer Regiments.

2*d* " Du Coulombier—6th Hussar and 6th Dragoon Regiments.

Total—38 Battalions, 22 Squadrons, 15 Batteries.

CAVALRY RESERVE.

1ST DIVISION: Du Barrail.

1*st Brigade:* Margueritte—1st and 3d Regiments Chasseurs d'Afrique.

2*d* " De Lajaille—2d and 4th Regiments Chasseurs d'Afrique.

2D DIVISION: Bonnemains.

1*st Brigade:* Girard—1st and 4th Cuirassier Regiments.

2*d* " De Brauer—2d and 3d Cuirassier Regiments.

3D DIVISION: De Forton.

1*st Brigade:* Prince Murat—1st and 9th Dragoon Regiments.

2*d* " De Grammont—7th and 10th Cuirassier Regiments.

Total—48 Squadrons, 6 Batteries.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

1 Regiment Field-Artillery (12-pounders), 8 Batteries.
1 " Horse " (4-pounders), 8 Batteries.
3 Mountain-Batteries from Algeria converted into Field-Artillery.

Total, 19 Batteries.

RECAPITULATION.

Imperial Guard,	24	Battalions,	26	Squadrons,	12	Batteries.
1st Corps,	55	"	30	"	20	"
2d "	39	"	18	"	15	"
3d "	52	"	31	"	20	"
4th "	39	"	18	"	15	"
5th "	39	"	18	"	15	"
6th "	49	"	26	"	20	"
7th "	38	"	22	"	15	"
Cavalry Reserve,	—	"	48	"	6	"
Artillery Reserve,	—	"	—	"	19	"
	—	"	—	"	—	"
	335	"	237	"	157	"

At the outbreak of the war the average strength of a battalion was not more than 600 men, of a squadron 105 horses. Thus we attain 201,000 infantry, in round numbers 25,000 cavalry, or together, 226,000 infantry and cavalry, with 942 guns. Experience shows that a good fourth of the

number of combatant infantry and cavalry must be added to the ration-list for gunners, engineers, train and different administrative branches, so that we should reach here a number of from 280,000 to 290,000 men.

It remains now to be remarked :—

Firstly, That the following never came into action in the first positions taken up:

Of the 6th Corps—three infantry regiments, which were afterwards attached to the 12th Corps, and the whole of Fénélon's division of cavalry;

Of the 7th Corps—Liébert's, Dumesnil's, and Ameil's divisions;

Of the cavalry reserve—the 4th Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique, which arrived at Commercy from Toulon, and was then obliged to retire upon Chalons to join M'Mahon;

Therefore altogether about 26,000 men, infantry and cavalry.

Secondly, As regards the distribution of the artillery, we differ, after careful inquiry, from other accounts—as, for instance, from that given in 'La Campagne de 1870 jusqu'au 1 Sept., par un Officier de l'Armée du Rhin.'

There were, namely, practically five times as many batteries attached to each Army Corps as it had divisions of infantry—that is to say, fifteen to a Corps of three divisions, and twenty to a Corps of four; and as each division had three batteries, including the mitrailleuse, there remained six batteries for the artillery reserve of a Corps of three divisions, and eight batteries for one of four. The cavalry divisions attached to a Corps also received their artillery (one or two batteries) from its reserve.

The three mountain-batteries of the great artillery reserve never arrived in the first positions, but joined the 12th Corps in the Camp of Chalons.

The artillery of the 6th Corps (Canrobert) did not arrive at Metz, but the batteries for the Corps were newly formed

from the abundant material at hand in the fortress; while M'Mahon utilised the proper artillery of the 6th Corps to fill up the large gaps in that of the 1st, 5th, and 7th Corps.

Thirdly, On the morning of the 16th of August, General Margueritte was detached with his brigade of Chasseurs d'Afrique, the regiment of Guides of the Guard, and one battalion of the Grenadier Regiment of the Guard, to escort the Emperor from Longeville les Metz to Verdun. Margueritte afterwards joined M'Mahon's army in the march to Sedan, and there we shall again find him.

After the first disasters, there was formed in the Camp of Chalons, at first under the command of General Trochu, the

12th Corps: General LEBRUN.
Chief of the Staff: General GRELLY.

1ST DIVISION: Grandchamp.
- *1st Brigade:* Cambriels—Marching Battalion of Rifles, and 34th Regiment of the Line.
- *2d* " De Villeneuve—58th and 72d Regiments of the Line.

2D DIVISION: Lacretelle.
- *1st Brigade:* Bernier—14th, 20th, and 31st Regiments of the Line.
- *2d* " Marquisan—2d and 4th Marching Regiments.

3D DIVISION: Vassoigne.
- *1st Brigade:* Reboul—1st and 2d Regiments of Marine Infantry.
- *2d* " Martin des Paillières—3d and 4th Marching Regiments of Infantry.

CAVALRY DIVISION: Fénélon.
- *1st Brigade:* Savaresse—1st and 7th Lancer Regiments.
- *2d* " De Béville—5th and 6th Cuirassier Regiments.

Total—42 Battalions, 16 Squadrons, 15 Batteries.

Remarks.—1. It was originally intended that the 12th Corps should receive a division of the Mobile Guards of the

Seine, but these troops were sent back to the Camp of St Maur near Paris, as M'Mahon had need of their equipment to supply the wants of the 1st, 7th, and 5th Corps.

2. The three regiments of Bernier's brigade were those of Bisson's division (6th Corps) which were unable to reach Metz.

3. Fénélon's cavalry division belonged originally to the 6th Corps; one brigade, Tilliard, was detached from it to join the great cavalry reserve of M'Mahon's army.

4. The artillery of the 12th Corps consisted of

2 Batteries which had returned from Rome.
3 Converted Mountain-Batteries (destined before for the Great Artillery Reserve).
4 Batteries of Marine Artillery.
6 Improvised Marching Batteries.

The components of the 13th Corps, Vinoy—the advanced-guard of which had arrived at Mezières on the 1st of September, and which then hastily retreated to Paris—as well as those of the 14th Corps, will be given later on in the distribution of the Army of Paris.

II.—Review of M'Mahon's Army at the Time of the Battle of Sedan.

Commander-in-Chief: Marshal M'Mahon.
Chief of the Staff: General Faure.

1st Corps: General Ducrot.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel Robert.
56 battalions, 30 squadrons.
The 83d Regiment had remained in Strasburg, but in exchange the 1st Corps had received the 1st Marching-Regiment and the 1st battalion of Franc-tireurs from Paris.

5TH CORPS: De Failly, afterwards De Wimpffen.
32 battalions, 18 squadrons.
Lapasset's brigade of this Corps had been obliged to retire with the troops of the 3d Corps upon Metz.

7TH CORPS: Felix Douay.
38 battalions, 13 squadrons (Jolif du Coulombier's brigade was wanting).

12TH CORPS: Lebrun.
42 battalions, 16 squadrons.

CAVALRY RESERVE.
1st Division: Bonnemains. 16 squadrons.
2d " De Margueritte.
1st Brigade: Tilliard, formerly with the 6th Corps.
2d " Margueritte, 1st, 3d, and 4th Regiments Chasseurs d'Afrique. The 4th only joining the brigade during the march on Sedan.
} 22 squadrons.

RECAPITULATION.

1ST CORPS,	56 battalions,	30 squadrons.
5TH "	32 "	18 "
7TH "	38 "	13 "
12TH "	42 "	16 "
CAVALRY RESERVE,	— "	38 "
Total,	168 "	115 "

Remarks.—1. Assuming the battalions to be 600, and the squadrons 100 strong, the foregoing numbers give a total of 100,000 infantry and 11,500 cavalry, or together, 115,000 infantry and cavalry. But this estimate would be rather too high than too low, for the infantry and cavalry of the 1st and 5th Corps, and also the Cavalry Reserve, had been greatly

reduced in numbers. Many of the battalions had barely 400, and the squadrons 50 men. Most of the battalions of the 7th and 12th Corps were, it is true, stronger, 700 men, and even more; but still this did not compensate for the deficiencies elsewhere. The 1st battalion of the Franc-tireurs of Paris, very neatly equipped, but consisting of most strange elements, marched out along the Boulevards 400 strong, including some 50 or 60 men who already followed in cabs. The mixed components of the battalions of the marching regiments also could not be regarded by a quiet spectator without a feeling of deep concern.

According to our previous assumption, the ration-list would amount to 140,000; and this is the exaot strength given by the officer of the Army of the Rhine (Campagne de 1870, jusqu'au 1 Sept.)

2. The artillery of M'Mahon's army ought, according to the number of its divisions, to have numbered 66 batteries, but the amount given is only 48.

III.—Distribution of the Forces in Paris at the Beginning of November 1870.

Commander-in-Chief:	General Trochu.
Chief of the Staff:	General Schmitz.
Commandant of Artillery:	General Guiod.
Commandant of Engineers:	General Chabaud la Tour.
Intendant-General:	Wolf.

First Army: Clement Thomas.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel Montagut.

266 battalions of Sedentary National Guard (distributed according to the sectors).

Cavalry Legion: Colonel Quiclet.

Artillery Legion: Colonel Schölcher.

SECOND ARMY: DUCROT.

Chief of the Staff: General Appert.
Commandant of Artillery: General Frébault.
Commandant of Engineers: General Tripier.

1st Army Corps: VINOY, afterwards BLANCHARD.
Chief of the Staff: General De Valdan.

1ST DIVISION: De Malroy.
1st Brigade: Martenot. 10th (Côte d'Or) and 26th (Ille et Vilaine) Mobile Guard Regiments.
2d " Paturel. 121st and 122d Regiments of the Line.*

2D DIVISION: De Maudhuy.
1st Brigade: Valentin. 109th and 110th Regiments of the Line, Mobile Guards of the Departments.
2d " Blaise. 111th and 112th Regiments of the Line.

3D DIVISION: Blanchard. Afterwards Faron.
1st Brigade: Comte. 113th and 114th Regiments of the Line, Mobile Guards of the Departments.
2d " De la Mariouse. 35th and 42d Regiments of the Line, 35th Mobile Guard Regiment (Vendée).

2d Army Corps: RENAULT.

Chief of the Staff: General Ferri Pisani.

1ST DIVISION: Susbielle.
1st Brigade: Bonnet. } 115th, 116th, 117th, 118th, Regiments of the Line.
2d " Lecomte. }

2D DIVISION: Berthaut.
1st Brigade: Bocher. } 119th, 120th, 123d, 124th, Regiments of the Line.
2d " Boutier. }

3D DIVISION: De Maussion.

* All regiments of the line bearing numbers higher than 100 were hastily-organised marching regiments.

1*st Brigade:* Courty.
2*d* " Avril de Lenclos. } 125th, 126th, 127th, 129th, Regiments of the Line.

3*d Army Corps:* D'Exéa.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel De Belgaric.

1st Division: De Bellemare.
1*st Brigade:* Fournés.
2*d* " Colonieu.

2d Division: Mattat.

1*st Brigade:* Faron.
2*d* " Daudel. } 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, Regiments of the Line; and in addition, in Faron's brigade, Mobile Guards from the Departments.

Cavalry Division of the Second Army: De Champéron.
1*st Brigade:* De Gerbrois. 1st and 9th Chasseur Regiments.
2*d* " Cousin. (?)
Regiment of Mounted Gendarmerie: Colonel Allaveine.

Third Army: At first directly under the command of Trochu; afterwards under Vinoy.

1st Division: Soumain.
1*st Brigade:* Dargentolle.
2*d* " De la Charrière.

2d Division: De la Roncière, Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the Sailors, and also of the district of St Denis.

1*st Brigade:* Lavoignet.
2*d* " Hanrion.
3*d* " Lamotte Tenet (Captain of frigate). } In addition, the 128th and 135th Regiments of the Line, National Guards of Paris, Mobile Guards of the Department Hérault.

3d Division: De Liniers.
1*st Brigade:* Filhol de Camas.
2*d* " De Chamberet.

4TH DIVISION: De Beaufort.
1st Brigade: Dumoulin.
2d " André (Captain of frigate).
5TH DIVISION: Corréard.
1st Brigade: Champion.
2d " Porion.
6TH DIVISION: D'Hugues.
1st Brigade: Bray (Captain of frigate).
2d " Bro.
7TH DIVISION: Pothuau (Rear-Admiral).
1st Brigade: Le Mains.
2d " Salmon (Captain of line-of-battle ship).
CAVALRY DIVISION OF THE THIRD ARMY.
1st Brigade: De Bernis.
2d " Blondel.

IV.—TABLE OF THE ARMY CORPS AND DIVISIONS WHICH WERE FORMED IN FRANCE, OUTSIDE PARIS; AND OF THE GENERALS WHO COMMANDED THEM IN SUCCESSION.

15TH ARMY CORPS, commanded successively by De la Motterouge, D'Aurelle des Paladines, Martin des Pallières, Martineau Deschesnez.
1st Division: De Chabron, Martin des Pallières, Durrieu.
2d " Martineau Deschesnez, Rebilliard.
3d " Peitavin.
Cavalry Division: Reyau, Galaud de Longuerue.

16TH ARMY CORPS: D'Aurelle des Paladines, Pourcet, Chanzy, Jaurèguiberry.
1st Division: Pourcet, Céren.
2d " Barry.
3d " Bourdillon, De Curten.
Cavalry Division: Ressayre, Michel.

17TH ARMY CORPS: Durrieu, De Sonis, De Colomb.
1st Division: De Brémond d'Ars, De Vaisse Roquebrune.
2d " Dubois de Jancigny.
3d " Deflandre, De Jouffroy d'Albano.
Cavalry Division: Galaud de Longuerue, Guépratte, De Sonis, De Viel d'Espeuilles.

18TH ARMY CORPS: Bourbaki, Billot.
1st Division: Feillet, Pilatrie.
2d " Penhoat.
3d " Bonnet.
Cavalry Division: De Brémond d'Ars.

19TH ARMY CORPS: Dargent.
1st Division: Bardin.
2d " Girard.
3d " Saussier.
Cavalry Division: Abdelat.

20TH ARMY CORPS: Crouzat, Clinchamp.
1st Division: De Polignac.
2d " Thornton.
3d " Segard.

21ST ARMY CORPS: Jaurés.
1st Division: Rousseau.
2d " Colin.
3d " De Villeneuve.
4th " Gougeard.
Cavalry Division: Guillon.

22D ARMY CORPS: Lecointe.
1st Division: Derroja.
2d " Dufaure du Bessol.

23D ARMY CORPS: Paulze d'Ivoy.
1st Division: Payen.
2d " Robin, Isnard.

24TH ARMY CORPS: Bressolles.
1st Division: D'Ariés.
2d " Commagny.

3d Division: Carré de Busserolles.
Detached Division: Cremer.

25TH ARMY CORPS: Pourcet.
1st Division: Bruat.
2d " De Chabron.
3d " Ferri-Pisani.
Cavalry Division: Tripard.

26TH ARMY CORPS: Billot.
1st Division: D'Ariés.
2d " De Formy de la Blanchetée.
3d " De Bouillé.
Cavalry Division: De Boério.

We now propose giving the distribution of the French Army of the East (First Army of the Loire) and of the Army of the West (Second Army of the Loire); but we have been unable, in spite of all endeavours, to obtain similar details of the Army of the North.

V.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE EAST IN JANUARY 1871.

Commander-in-Chief: General BOURBAKI, afterwards General CLINCHANT.

Chief of the Staff: General BOREL.

15th Army Corps: General MARTINEAU DES CHENEY, afterwards General PEITAVIN.

1ST DIVISION: D'Asthuge.
1st Brigade: Minot—1st Marching Regiment of Zouaves, 12th Mobile Guard Regiment (Nièvre), one battalion of Mobile Guards from Savoy.
2d " Questel—4th Marching Battalion of Rifles, Algerian Tirailleurs, 18th Mobile Guard Regiment (Charente).

2D DIVISION : Rébillard.

1*st Brigade :* Le Camus—5th Marching Battalion of Rifles, 39th Line Regiment of the Foreign Legion, 25th Mobile Guard Regiment (Gironde).

2*d* " Choppin-Mercy—2d Marching Regiment of Zouaves, 30th Marching Regiment, 29th Mobile Guard Regiment (Maine et Loire).

3D DIVISION : Peitavin.

1*st Brigade :* Formy de la Blanchetée—3d Marching Battalion of Rifles, 16th Regiment of the Line, 33d Marching Regiment, 32d Mobile Guard Regiment (Puy de Dôme).

2*d* " Martinez—27th and 34th Marching Regiments, 69th Mobile Guard Regiment (Ariège).

CAVALRY DIVISION : Longuerue.

1*st Brigade :* —— 11th Regiment of Mounted Rifles, 6th Hussar, and 6th Dragoon Regiments.

2*d* " Boërio—1st Marching Regiment of Mounted Rifles, 2d Lancer and 3d Cuirassier Regiments.

3*d* " Fillon—5th Lancer Regiment, 1st Marching Regiment of Cuirassiers.

(Mobilised National Guards of the Department Gard were also allotted to the Corps, but not assigned to any division.)

18*th Army Corps :* General BILLOT.

1ST DIVISION : Feillet-Pilatrie.

1*st Brigade :* De Robert—9th Battalion of Rifles, 42d Marching Regiment, 19th Mobile Guard Regiment (Cher).

2*d* " —— 44th Marching Regiment, 73d Mobile Guard Regiment (Isère et Loire), one squadron of the 3d Lancer Regiment.

2D DIVISION : Admiral de Penhoët.

1*st Brigade :* Perrin—12th Battalion of Rifles, 52d Marching,

80th Mobile Guard Regiment (Deux Sèvres, Ardèche, Isère).

2*d Brigade:* Perreaux—African Light Infantry, 77th Mobile Guard Regiment (Maine et Loire, Tarn, Allier), one squadron of the 5th Marching Regiment of Dragoons.

3D DIVISION: Bonnet.

1*st Brigade:* —— 4th Marching Regiment of Zouaves, 81st Mobile Guard Regiment (Charente Inférieure, Indre, Cher).

2*d* " —— 53d Marching Regiment, 82d Mobile Guard Regiment (Vaucluse, Var et Drome), one squadron of the 3d Lancer Regiment.

CAVALRY DIVISION: De Brémond d'Ars.

1*st Brigade:* Charlemagne—2d Marching Regiment of Hussars, and 3d Marching Regiment of Lancers.

2*d* " —— 5th Dragoon and 5th Cuirassier Regiments.

20th Army Corps: ——

1ST DIVISION: De Polignac.

1*st Brigade:* Brisac—50th Marching Regiment, 4th Mobile Guard Regiment (Loire), 55th Mobile Guard Regiment (Jura).

2*d* " Godefroy—67th (Haute Loire) and 24th (Haute Garonne) Mobile Guard Regiments, 4th Battalion of the Mobile Guards of the Saone and Loire, and Franc-tireurs from the Upper Rhine.

2D DIVISION: Thornton.

1*st Brigade:* De Bernard de Peigneurens—34th Mobile Guard Regiment (Deux Sèvres), 2d Battalion of the Mobile Guard of Savoy, 25th Battalion of Rifles.

2*d* " Vivenot—3d Marching Regiment of Zouaves, 68th Mobile Regiment (Upper Rhine).

3D DIVISION : Ségard.

1*st Brigade :* Durochat — 47th Marching Regiment, 78th Line Regiment, Mobile Guards from the Meurthe.

2*d* " Simonin—Mobile Guard Regiment from Corsica, 58th Mobile Guard Regiment (Vosges), Mobile Guards from the Pyrenees, Franc-tireurs from the Allier and from Nice, Miners from the Loire, Mobile Engineers from Tours.

CAVALRY : —— 7th Regiment of Mounted Rifles, 2d Marching Regiment of Lancers, 6th Marching Regiment of Cuirassiers.

24th Army Corps : THIBEAUDIN DE COMMAGNY.

1ST DIVISION : D'Aries.

1*st Brigade :* —— 16th Battalion of Rifles, 63d Marching Regiment.

2*d* " —— 3d Legion of the Rhone, 1st Regiment Mobilised National Guards of the Doubs.

2D DIVISION : ——

1*st Brigade :* Irlande—21st Battalion Rifles, 60th and 61st Marching Regiments.

2*d* " Bramas—14th Mobile Guard Regiment (Yonne), 87th Mobile Guard Regiment (Lozère, Tarn et Garonne), 2d Regiment of Engineers.

3D DIVISION : De Busserolles.

1*st Brigade :* } —— 4th Battalion of the Mobile Guards of the Loire, 89th Mobile Guard Regiment (Var), 1st and 2d Legion Mobilised National Guards of the Rhone.

2*d* "

CAVALRY : —— 7th Marching Regiment of mixed cavalry, one squadron of the 6th, and one of the 10th, Dragoon Regiments.

GENERAL RESERVE : Admiral Pallee de la Barrière—20th Marching Regiment, 38th Line Regiment of Marine Infantry, 3d Marching Regiment of Dra-

goons, 2d Marching Regiment Chasseurs d'Afrique, and a detachment of the 5th Marching Regiment of Lancers.

INDEPENDENT DIVISION: Cremer.

1*st Brigade:* Millot—Battalion of the Mobile Guards of the Gironde, 32d and 57th Marching Regiments.

2*d* " —— 3d Company Eclaireurs of the Rhone, 83d Mobile Guard (Aude-Gers), 86th Provisional Marching Regiment, Eclaireurs of the Saone and the Loire, and a company of Volunteer Rifles.

VI.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE WEST.

Commander-in-Chief: General CHANZY.
Chief of the Staff: General VUILLEMONT.
Commandant of Artillery: General ROBINOT MARCY.
Commandant of Engineers: General JAVAIN.

16*th Army Corps.*

1ST DIVISION:

1*st Brigade:* Maurandy—8th Marching Battalion of Rifles, 36th Marching Regiment, 8th Mobile Guard Regiment (Charente Inférieure).

2*d* " Deplanque—37th Marching Regiment, 33d Mobile Guard Regiment (Sarthe).

2D DIVISION: Barry.

1*st Brigade:* Gaulard, afterwards Desmaisons—3d Marching Battalion of Rifles, 31st Marching Regiment, 22d Mobile Guard Regiment (Dordogne).

2*d* " Bérard—38th Marching Regiment, 66th Mobile Guard Regiment (Mayenne).

3D DIVISION:

1*st Brigade:* Bourdillon—8th (?) Marching Battalion of

Rifles, 39th Marching Regiment, 67th Mobile Guard Regiment (Haute Loire).

2d Brigade: Seatelly—40th Marching Regiment, 71st Mobile Guard Regiment (Haute Vienne).

CAVALRY DIVISION: Ressayre (afterwards Michel).

1st Brigade: Tripart—1st Marching Hussar Regiment, 2d Mixed (light) Marching Regiment.

2d " Digard—6th Lancers and 3d Mixed (light) Marching Regiment.

3d " Abdelal (afterwards Tucé)—3d Marching Regiment of Cuirassiers, 4th Marching Regiment of Dragoons, 4th Mixed (light) Marching Regiment.

17th Army Corps.

1ST DIVISION: De Roquebrune.

1st Brigade: Paris (afterwards Bevard)—41st Marching Regiment, 74th Mobile Guard Regiment (Lot et Garonne).

2d " Faussomagne—11th Battalion of Rifles, 43d Marching Regiment, 72d Mobile Guard Regiment (Cantal, Yonne).

2D DIVISION: Dubois de Jancigny (afterwards Paris).

1st Brigade: Koch—10th Battalion of Rifles, 48th Marching Regiment, and afterwards the 80th Mobile Guard Regiment (1st Battalion Isère), and the 64th Marching Regiment (1st Battalion).

2d " Tribouville—51st Marching Regiment, 85th Mobile Guard Regiment (Gers).

3D DIVISION: De Flandre (afterwards De Jouffroy).

1st Brigade: De Jouffroy d'Abbasse, afterwards Didier—1st Battalion of Rifles, 45th Marching Regiment, 70th Mobile Guard Regiment (Lot).

2d " Sautereau—46th Marching Regiment, 76th Mobile Guard Regiment (Ain, Aude, Isère).

CAVALRY DIVISION: De Longuerue (afterwards Guépratte, and then D'Espeuilles).

1*st Brigade:* De Landreville—6th Mixed Light Regiment, 4th Marching Regiment of Lancers, 5th Mixed Regiment of the Line.

2*d Brigade:* Guépratte (afterwards Barbut)—4th Mixed Light Regiment, 4th Cuirassier Regiment, 7th Cuirassier Marching Regiment.

19*th Army Corps:* Dargent.

1ST DIVISION: Bardin.

1*st Brigade:* Ritter—55th and 66th Marching Regiments, 96th Mobile Guard Regiment (1st Battalion Rhone), 1st Battalion Charente.

2*d* " Luzeux—71st Marching Regiment, 1st and 2d Legion of Mobilised Troops of the Gironde.

2D DIVISION: Girard.

1*st Brigade:* Robert—22d Marching Battalion of Rifles, 64th Marching Regiment, 1st Legion of Mobilised Troops from the Seine Inférieure.

2*d* " De Brême—65th and 70th Marching Regiments, Mobile Guard, Battalion from Charente Inférieure.

3D DIVISION: Saussier.

1*st Brigade*: Roy—10,000 men distributed in the Department Eure.

2*d* " ——— 8000 men distributed in the Department Calvados, 12th Regiment of Mounted Rifles.

CAVALRY DIVISION: Abdelal.

1*st Brigade:* Kerhué—3d Regiment of Hussars, 4th Marching Regiment of Hussars.

2*d* " De Vougues de Chanteclair—8th Marching Regiment of Dragoons, 9th Marching Regiment of Cuirassiers.

21*st Army Corps*: Jaurés.

1ST DIVISION: Rousseau.

1*st Brigade*: Roux—58th Marching Regiment, 13th Battalion of Rifles, 1st Mobile Guard Battalion, Deux-Sèvres, 1st Mobile Guard Battalion, Loire Inférieure, 1st Battalion of Mobilised Troops of the Sarthe.

2*d* " De Villars—Three Companies from the 26th and three from the 94th Marching Regiments, one Mobile Guard Battalion from Corrèze, two Mobile Guard Battalions from the 90th Regiment (Sarthe and Corrèze), two Companies from the 49th Marching Regiment, one Battalion of Mobilised Troops from the Sarthe.

2D DIVISION: Collin.

1*st Brigade*: De la Marlière—10th Battalion of Marine Infantry, 63d Mobile Guard Regiment (Eure et Loir), six Mobile Guard Battalions from Ille and Vilaine, 4th Mobile Guard Battalion of Eure et Loir, 56th Marching Regiment.

2*d* " Des Moutis—49th Mobile Guard Regiment, two Companies from the 94th Regiment of the Line, 59th Marching Regiment, one Battalion of the 41st Regiment of the Line, 9th Battalion of Marine Infantry.

3D DIVISION: De Villeneuve.

1*st Brigade*: Stéphanie — 78th Mobile Guard Regiment, 4th Battalion Calvados, 4th Battalion Finisterre, 1st Battalion Loire Inférieure, 15th Mobile Guard Regiment (Calvados), 6th Battalion of Marine Fusiliers.

2*d* " Du Temple—1st, 4th, and 5th Battalions (30th Regiment), and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the Mobile Guard of La Manche, one Battalion from Gard, one Battalion Côtes-du-Nord, 3d Battalion of Marine Fusiliers.

4TH DIVISION (Brittany): Gougeard.

1*st Brigade:* —— 3d Battalion of Mobilised Troops from the Loire Inférieure, one Battalion of the 62d, one Battalion of the 97th Regiment of the Line, one Battalion of Mobilised Troops of Ille-et-Vilaine, and a detachment from the 25th and 26th Regiments of the Line.

2*d* " —— One Battalion of the 19th Regiment of the Line, two Battalions of the Mobile Guard of the Mayenne, a detachment from the Foreign Legion, one Battalion of Mobilised Troops of the Morbihan, and one Battalion of the Mobile Guard of the Loire Inférieure.

Detached to St Georges du Plain: Battalions from Brest, Morbihan, Quimper, St Brieuc, Loire Inférieure, the Vendée, and Lannion.

CAVALRY DIVISION: Guillon—8th Hussar Regiment, 1st Marching Regiment of Hussars, 3d Mixed Light Regiment, 8th Marching Regiment of Cuirassiers, 6th Marching Regiment of Cuirassiers, 8th Mixed Light Regiment.

RESERVE OF THE CORPS.

Brigade: Collet — Mobile Guard Battalion of Deux Sèvres, Mobile Guard Battalion of Gard, 9th Battalion Marine Infantry, Detached Marine Fusiliers.

" Effantin—5th Battalion of Marine Fusiliers, Volunteers of the West, two Marching Squadrons of Mounted Gendarmes, two Squadrons of the 6th Dragoon Regiment, one Squadron of the 5th Hussar Regiment, two Squadrons of Hussars.

26th Army Corps: Billot.

1ST DIVISION: D'Aries.

1*st Brigade*: Hue de la Colombe — 80th Marching Regiment, one Legion of Mobilised Troops (Basses Pyrénées), 27th Marching Battalion of Rifles.

2*d* " Delatouche—81st Marching Regiment, one Legion of Mobilised Troops (Basses Pyrénées).

2D DIVISION: Formy-Blanchetée.

1*st Brigade*: Villain—82d Marching Regiment, one Legion of Mobilised Troops (Gers), 28th Marching Battalion of Rifles.

2*d* " Perrin—85th Marching Regiment, one Legion Mobilised Troops (Gers).

3D DIVISION: De Bouillé.

1*st Brigade*: —— 86th Marching Regiment, one Legion of Mobilised Troops (Indre-et-Loire), 29th Marching Battalion of Rifles.

2*d* " —— 87th Marching Regiment, one Legion of Mobilised Troops (Indre-et-Loire).

CAVALRY DIVISION: Boerio.

1*st Brigade*: Létuvé—10th and 11th Marching Regiments of Cuirassiers.

2*d* " Pollard—10th Marching Regiment of Dragoons, 6th Marching Regiment of Lancers.

VII.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE GERMAN FORCES.

The following tables show generally the distribution of the German forces at the time of the great battles in August about Metz; but the troops which shortly afterwards joined the Third Army and the besieging force at Strasburg are also added. The composition of the detachments afterwards formed of the Army of the Meuse, of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's force, and of the Army of the South, has been already given in the text.

Commander-in-Chief: King WILLIAM of Prussia.
Chief of the Staff: General of Infantry, Baron von MOLTKE.
Quartermaster-General: Lieut.-General von PODBIELSKI.
Inspector-General of Artillery: General of Infantry von HINDERSIN.
Inspector-General of Engineers: Lieutenant-General von KLEIST.

FIRST ARMY.

Commander-in-Chief: General of Infantry, Von Steinmetz.
Chief of the Staff: Major-General von Sperling.

7th Army Corps: General of Infantry, Von Zastrow.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel von Unger.

13TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Glümer.
25th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von der Osten Sacken — 13th and 73d Regiments.
26th " " Major-General von der Goltz— 15th and 55th Regiments.
" 7th Battalion of Rifles.
" 8th Regiment of Hussars.

14TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Kamecke.
27th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von François— 39th and 74th Regiments.
28th " " Major-General von Woyna— 53d and 77th Regiments, 15th Regiment of Hussars.

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

8th Army Corps: General of Infantry, Von GÖBEN.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel von WITZENDORFF.

15TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Weltzien.
29th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Wedell— 33d and 60th Regiments.
30th " " Major-General von Strubberg— 28th and 67th Regiments.

8th Battalion of Rifles.
7th Regiment of Hussars.

16TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Barneckow.

31st Brigade of Infantry: Major-General Count von Gneisenau—29th and 69th Regiments.

32d " " Colonel von Rex—40th and 72d Regiments.

9th Regiment of Hussars.

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

1st Army Corps: General of Cavalry, Baron von MANTEUFFEL.
Chief of the Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel von der BURG.

1ST DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Bentheim.

1st Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Gayl—1st and 41st Regiments.

2d " " Major-General Baron von Falkenstein—3d and 43d Regiments.

1st Battalion of Rifles.
1st Regiment of Dragoons.

2D DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Major-General von Pritzelwitz.

3d Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Memerty—4th and 44th Regiments.

4th " " Major-General von Zglinitzki—5th and 45th Regiments.

10th Regiment of Dragoons.

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

3D DIVISION OF CAVALRY: Lieutenant-General von der Gröben.

6th Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Mirus—8th Cuirassier and 7th Uhlan Regiments.

7th " " Major-General Count Dohna—5th and 14th Uhlan Regiments.

1ST DIVISION OF CAVALRY: Lieutenant-General von Hartmann.

1st Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Lüderitz—2d

Cuirassier, 4th and 9th Uhlan Regiments.

2d Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Baumgarth—3d Cuirassier, 8th and 12th Uhlan Regiments.

Total of the 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions—40 Squadrons.

(The guns of the Cavalry Divisions are included in those of the Army Corps.)

SECOND ARMY.

Commander-in-Chief: General of Cavalry (afterwards Field-Marshal), Prince FREDERIC CHARLES.

Chief of the Staff: Major-General von STIEHLE.

Guard Corps: General of Cavalry, Prince AUGUST of Würtemberg.

Chief of the Staff: Major-General von DANNENBERG.

1ST DIVISION OF INFANTRY OF THE GUARD: Major-General von Pape.

1st Brigade of Infantry of the Guard: Major-General von Kessel — 1st and 3d Regiments of Foot Guards.

2d " " " Major-General Baron von Medem — 2d and 4th Regiments of Foot Guards, and the Fusilier Regiment of the Guard.

Battalion of Rifles of the Guard.

Regiment of Hussars of the Guard.

2D DIVISION OF INFANTRY OF THE GUARD: Lieutenant-General von Budritzki.

3d Brigade of Infantry of the Guard: Colonel Knappe von Knappstadt — 1st and 3d Regiments

of Grenadiers of the Guard.

4th Brigade of Infantry of the Guard: Major-General von Berger — 2d and 4th Regiments of Grenadiers of the Guard.

Battalion of Rifles of the Guard.
2d Regiment of Uhlans of the Guard.

CAVALRY DIVISION OF THE GUARD: Lieutenant-General Count von der Goltz.

1st Brigade of Cavalry of the Guard: Major-General Count Brandenburg I. — Life Guards and Cuirassier Regiment of the Guard.

2d " " " Lieutenant-General Prince Albrecht of Prussia—1st and 3d Regiments of Uhlans of the Guard.

3d " " " Major-General Count Brandenburg II. — 1st and 2d Regiments of Dragoons of the Guard.

Total—29 Battalions, 32 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

3d Army Corps: Lieutenant-General von ALVENSLEBEN.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel von VOIGTS-RHETZ.

5TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Stülpnagel.

9th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Döring—8th and 48th Regiments.

10th " " Major-General von Schwerin—12th and 52d Regiments.

3d Battalion of Rifles.
12th Regiment of Dragoons.

6TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General Baron von Buddenbrock.

11th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Rothmaler—20th and 35th Regiments.

12th " " Colonel von Bismark—24th and 64th Regiments.

2d Regiment of Dragoons,

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

4th Army Corps: General of Infantry, Von ALVENSLEBEN.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel von THILE.

7TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General Gross von Schwarzhoff.

13th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Borries—26th and 66th Regiments.

14th " " Major-General von Zychlinski—27th and 93d Regiments.

4th Battalion of Rifles.

7th Regiment of Dragoons.

8TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Schöler.

15th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Kessler—31st and 71st Regiments.

16th " " Colonel von Scheffler—96th and 86th Regiments.

12th Regiment of Hussars.

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

10th Army Corps: General of Infantry, Von VOIGTS-RHETZ.

Chief of the Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel von CAPRIVI.

19TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Schwarzkoppen.

37th Brigade of Infantry: Colonel Lehmann—78th and 91st Regiments.

38th " " Major-General von Wedell—16th and 57th Regiments.

9th Regiment of Dragoons.

20TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Major-General von Kraatz-Koschlau.
39*th Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General von Woyna—56th and 79th Regiments.
40*th* " " Major-General von Diringshofen, 17th and 92d Regiments.
10th Battalion of Rifles.
16th Regiment of Dragoons.
Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

11*th Army Corps:* General of Infantry, Von MANSTEIN.
Chief of the Staff: Major BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF.

18TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General Baron von Wrangel.
35*th Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General von Blumenthal —36th and 84th Regiments.
36*th* " " Major-General von Below—11th and 85th Regiments.
9th Battalion of Rifles.
6th Regiment of Dragoons.
25TH (Grand Duchy of Hesse) DIVISION: Lieutenant-General Prince Louis of Hesse.
49*th Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General von Wittich—1st and 2d Regiments, 1st battalion of Rifles.
50*th* " " Major-General von Lynder—3d and 4th Regiments, 2d battalion of Rifles.
25*th* (Grand Duchy of Hesse) *Cavalry Brigade:* Major-General von Schlotheim—1st and 2d Cavalry Regiments.
Total—23 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

12*th* (*Royal Saxon*) *Army Corps:* General of Infantry, the CROWN-PRINCE OF SAXONY (after him Prince GEORGE).
Chief of the Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel von ZEZSCHWITZ.

23D DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General Prince George of

Saxony (after him Major-General von Montbé).

45*th Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General von Kraushaar—100th, 101st, and 108th Regiments.

46*th* " " Major-General von Montbé—102d and 103d Regiments.

1st Regiment of Cavalry.

24TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Major-General Nehrhoff von Holderberg.

47*th Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General Leonhardi—104th and 105th Regiments, 12th Battalion of Rifles.

48*th* " " Major-General von Schultz—106th and 107th Regiments, 13th Battalion of Rifles.

2d Regiment of Cavalry.

SAXON DIVISION OF CAVALRY: Major-General Graf Z. Lippe.

23*d Brigade of Cavalry:* Colonel Kong von Nidda—Cavalry Regiment of the Guard, 17th Regiment of Uhlans.

24*th* " " Colonel Senfft von Pilsach—3d Cavalry and 18th Regiment of Uhlans.

Total—29 Battalions, 24 Squadrons, 96 Guns.

2d Army Corps: General of Infantry, Von FRANSECKY.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel von WICHMANN.

3D DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Major-General von Hartmann.

5*th Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General von Koblinski—2d and 42d Regiments.

6*th* " " Colonel Von der Decken—14th and 54th Regiments.

2d Battalion of Rifles.

3d Regiment of Dragoons.

4TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General Hann von Weyhern.

7th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General Du Trossel—9th and 49th Regiments.

8th " " Major-General von Kettler—21st and 61st Regiments.

11th Regiment of Dragoons.

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

5TH DIVISION OF CAVALRY: Lieutenant-General Baron von Rheinbaben.

11th Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Barby—4th Cuirassier, 13th Uhlan, and 19th Dragoon Regiments.

12th " " Major-General von Bredow—7th Cuirassiers, 16th Uhlans, and 13th Dragoon Regiments.

13th " " Major-General von Redern—10th, 11th, and 17th Hussar Regiments.

Total—26 Squadrons.

6TH DIVISION OF CAVALRY: Lieutenant-General Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

14th Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Diepenbroick-Grüter—6th Cuirassier Regiment, 3d and 15th Uhlan Regiments.

15th " " Major-General von Rauch—3d and 16th Hussar Regiments.

Total—20 Squadrons.

The following troops also joined the investing force before Metz, and were placed under the command of Prince Frederic Charles:—

The Reserve Division of Lieutenant-General von Kummer.

The Combined Line Brigade: Major-General von Blankensee—19th and 81st Regiments.

3D DIVISION OF LANDWEHR: Major-General Baron Schuler von Senden.

5th Brigade of Landwehr: Major-General von Ruville. The two battalions from each of the 6th, 18th, and 46th Landwehr Regiments, formed into two regiments of three battalions each.

6th " " Colonel von und zu Gilsa. The battalions of the 19th, 58th, and 59th Regiments, formed into two regiments of three battalions each.

1st Reserve Regiment of Dragoons.

Total—18 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 24 Guns.

THE ARMY CORPS OF THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG-SCHWERIN (afterwards the XIII. Corps.)

Chief of the Staff: Colonel von KRENSKI.

17TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Schimmelmann.

33d Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Kottwitz—75th and 76th Regiments.

34th " " Colonel von Manteuffel—89th and 90th Regiments.

14th Battalion of Rifles.

17th Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Rauch—17th and 18th Dragoons, 11th Uhlan Regiment.

2D DIVISION OF LANDWEHR: Major-General von Selchow.

3d Brigade of Landwehr: Colonel von Arnoldi. The battalions of the 8th, 12th, 48th, and 52d Landwehr Regiments, formed into two regiments of four battalions each.

4th " " Colonel Ranisch. The battalions of the 20th, 24th, 60th, and

64th Landwehr Regiments, formed into two regiments of four battalions.

4th Reserve Regiment of Uhlans.

Total—29 Battalions, 16 Squadrons, 54 Guns.

THIRD ARMY.

Commander-in-Chief: General of Infantry (afterwards Field-Marshal), the CROWN-PRINCE OF PRUSSIA.

Chief of the Staff: Lieutenant-General von BLUMENTHAL.

5th Army Corps: Lieutenant-General von KIRCHBACH.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel von der ESCH.

9TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Major-General von Sandrart.

17*th Brigade of Infantry*: Colonel von Bothmer—58th and 59th Regiments.

18*th* " " Major-General von Voigts-Rhetz—7th and 47th Regiments.

5th Battalion of Rifles.

4th Regiment of Dragoons.

10TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Schmidt.

19*th Brigade of Infantry*: Colonel von Henning auf Schönhoff—6th and 46th Regiments.

20*th* " " Major-General Walther von Monbary — 37th and 50th Regiments.

14th Regiment of Dragoons.

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

11*th Army Corps*: Lieutenant-General von BOSE.

Chief of the Staff: Major-General STEIN VON KAMINSKI.

21ST DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Major-General von Schachtmeyer.

41*st Brigade of Infantry*: Colonel von Koblinski—80th and 87th Regiments.

42*d* " " Major-General von Thile—82d and 88th Regiments.

11th Battalion of Rifles.
5th Regiment of Dragoons.

22D DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Gersdorff.
43*d Brigade of Infantry:* Colonel von Kontzki—32d and 95th Regiments.
44*th* " " Major-General von Schkopp—83d and 94th Regiments.
13th Regiment of Hussars.
Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

1*st Bavarian Army Corps:* General of Infantry, Baron von der TANN.
Chief of the Staff: Lieutenant-General von HEINLETH.

1ST DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Stephan.
1*st Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General Dietl—Guard and 1st Regiments, 2d Battalion of Rifles.
2*d* " " Major-General von Orff—2d and 11th Regiments, 4th Battalion of Rifles.
9th Battalion of Rifles.
3d Light Horse Regiment.

2D DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General Count zu Pappenheim.
3*d Brigade of Infantry:* Major-General Schumacher—3d and 12th Regiments, 1st Battalion of Rifles.
4*th* " " Major-General Rudolf Baron von der Tann—10th and 13th Regiments, 7th Battalion of Rifles.
4th Light Horse Regiment.

Cuirassier Brigade: Major-General von Tausch—1st and 2d Cuirassier Regiments, 6th Light Horse Regiment.

Total—21 Battalions,* 20 Squadrons, 96 Guns.

2d Bavarian Army Corps: General of Infantry, Von HARTMANN.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel Baron von HORN.

3D DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General von Walther.

5th Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Schleich—6th and 7th Regiments, 8th Battalion of Rifles.

6th " " Major-General Diehl—14th and 15th Regiments, 3d Battalion of Rifles.

1st Regiment of Light Horse.

4TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY: Lieutenant-General Count von Bothmer.

7th Brigade of Infantry: Colonel Börries von Wissel—5th and 9th Regiments, 6th Battalion of Rifles.

8th " " Major-General Maillinger—one battalion from the 1st, 5th, 7th, 11th, and 14th Regiments; 5th Battalion of Rifles.

10th Battalion of Rifles.
2d Light Horse Regiment.

Uhlan Brigade: Major-General Baron von Mulzer—1st and 2d Uhlans, 5th Light Horse Regiment.

Total—22 Battalions, 20 Squadrons, 96 Guns.

WURTEMBERG FIELD DIVISION: Lieutenant-General von OBERNITZ.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel von BOCK.

1st Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Reitzenstein—1st and 7th Regiments, 2d Battalion of Rifles.

2d " " Major-General von Starkloff—2d and 5th Regiments, 3d Battalion of Rifles.

* The Bavarian regiments took the field, as a rule, with but two battalions; only in a few detached cases with three.

3d Brigade of Infantry: Major-General Baron von Hügel—3d and 8th Regiments, 1st Battalion of Rifles.

Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Count von Schéler—1st, 3d, and 4th Cavalry Regiments.

Total—15 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 36 Guns.

6th Army Corps: General of Cavalry, Von Tumpling.
Chief of the Staff: Colonel von Salviati.

11th Division of Infantry: Lieutenant-General von Gordon.

21st Brigade of Infantry: Major-General von Malachowski—10th and 18th Regiments.

22d " " Colonel von Eckartsberg—38th and 51st Regiments.

6th Battalion of Rifles.
8th Regiment of Dragoons.

12th Division of Infantry: Lieutenant-General von Hoffmann.

23d Brigade of Infantry: Colonel Gündell—22d and 62d Regiments.

24th " " Major-General von Fabeck—23d and 63d Regiments.

15th Regiment of Dragoons.

Total—25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 90 Guns.

4th Division of Cavalry: General of Cavalry, Prince Albrecht of Prussia.

8th Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Hontheim—5th Cuirassier and 10th Uhlan Regiments.

9th " " Major-General von Bernhardi—1st and 6th Uhlan Regiments.

10th " " Major-General von Krosigk—2d and 14th Hussar Regiments.

Total—24 Squadrons.

5th Division of Cavalry: Lieutenant-General Count Stolberg-Wernigerode.

3d Brigade of Cavalry: Major-General von Colomb—1st Cuirassier and 2d Uhlan Regiments.

4th " " Major-General Baron von Barneckow—1st and 5th Hussar Regiments.

5th " " Major-General von Baumbach—4th and 6th Hussar Regiments.

Total—24 Squadrons.

SIEGE CORPS BEFORE STRASBURG

(from which the 14th Army Corps was afterwards formed).

Lieutenant-General (after the fall of Strasburg): General of Infantry, Von WERDER.

Chief of the Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel von LESGCZYNSKI.

BADEN FIELD DIVISION: under the command successively of Lieutenant-General von BEYER, LAROCHE DU JARRYS, and Von GLUMER.

1st Brigade of Infantry: General Laroche du Jarrys, after him Prince William of Baden—1st and 2d Regiments.

2d " " Major-General Baron von Degenfeld—3d and 4th Regiments.

3d " " Major-General Keller—5th and 6th Regiments.

Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Laroche-Starkenfels—1st, 2d, and 3d Regiments of Dragoons.

Total—18 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 54 Guns.

PRUSSIAN LANDWEHR DIVISION OF THE GUARD: Major-General Baron von LOËN.

1st Brigade of Landwehr of the Guard: Colonel Girodz von Gaudy—1st and 2d Landwehr Regiments of the Guard.

2d Brigade of Landwehr of the Guard: Colonel von Röhl—1st and 2d Grenadier Landwehr Regiments of the Guard.

2d Reserve Hussar Regiment.

Total—12 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 24 Guns.

1ST (LANDWEHR) RESERVE DIVISION: Major-General von TRESKOW.

Combined Brigade of the Line: Major-General von der Goltz—30th and 34th Regiments.

1st Landwehr Brigade: Colonel von Buddenbrock—Two battalions from the 14th, 21st, 54th Landwehr Regiments formed into two regiments of three battalions each.

2d " " Major-General von Avemann—Two battalions of the 26th, 61st, and 67th Landwehr Regiments, in two regiments of three battalions each.

2d Reserve Regiment of Uhlans.

Total—18 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 30 Guns.

After the capture of Strasburg the following troops joined Werder's command, while the Landwehr of the Guard marched to join the force before Paris:—

4TH (LANDWEHR) RESERVE DIVISION: Major-General von SCHMELING.

Combined Infantry Brigade: 2d East Prussian combined Landwehr Regiment (from the four battalions of the 4th and 5th Landwehr Regiments), 25th (line) Regiment.

East Prussian Landwehr Brigade: 1st and 3d combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiments (from

the eight battalions of the 1st, 3d, 43d, 45th Landwehr Regiments).

4th Reserve Cavalry Brigade: 1st and 3d Reserve Uhlan Regiments.

Total—15 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 36 Guns.

Detachment under Major-General von DEBSCHITZ.

One battalion from the 10th and 84th Landwehr Regiments respectively.

Two battalions from the 50th, 7th, and 47th Landwehr Regiments respectively.

Two squadrons from the 6th Reserve Uhlan Regiment.

Total—8 Battalions, 2 Squadrons, 12 Guns.

RECAPITULATION.

		Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
FIRST ARMY.	7th Corps,	25	8	90
	8th "	25	8	90
	1st "	25	8	90
	3d and 1st Cavalry Division,	—	40	—
SECOND ARMY.	Guard Corps,	29	32	90
	3d Corps,	25	8	90
	4th "	25	8	90
	10th "	25	8	90
	9th "	23	12	90
	12th "	29	24	96
	2d "	25	8	90
	5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions,	—	56	—
	Kumner's Division,	18	4	24
	13th Corps,	29	16	54
		303	240	984
THIRD ARMY.	5th Corps,	25	8	90
	11th "	25	8	90
	1st Bavarian "	21	20	96
	2d " "	22	20	96

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
Würtemberg Division,	15	12	36
6th Corps,	25	8	90
4th and 2d Cavalry Divisions,	—	48	—
Werder's Baden Division,	18	12	54
Landwehr of the Guard,	12	4	24
1st Reserve Division,	18	4	30
4th " "	15	8	36
Debschitz	8	2	12
	507	394	1638

If the battalion be taken at 1000 and the squadron at 150 men strong, we obtain a total number of 507,000 infantry and 59,100 cavalry. This gives 10 horsemen to every 86 foot-soldiers. The sum of the cavalry and infantry together is 566,000 men, and to arrive at the number on the ration-list we must add about 144,000 men for the artillery, engineers, train and administrative departments. The ration-list will therefore contain 710,000 men.

This will then be about the number of German soldiers that France had to feed on the average after September. Doubtless the German troops sustained losses and sent back sick and wounded to Germany; but reinforcements* were not wanting: and, moreover, we have not included in our calculation the troops which were brought into France for garrison and etappen duties.

Neither do we speak here of the migration of the civil population which took place from Germany into France—of the mass of officials of all kinds from the rank of prefect to that of office-messenger, of the contractors with their thousands of clerks, of the literary hangers-on of the army, of the

* Among these we must reckon the 65th Regiment of Infantry, left behind originally to garrison Cologne; the 68th in Coblentz; the 70th, left in Saarlouis and Mayence; and further, the 4th and 8th Bavarian Regiments, which remained at first in Germersheim, but entered France during the course of the month of August.

suttlers and dealers who bought up any good booty, down to the hyenas of the battle-field; and of all that repulsive retinue which clings to great armies of all nations.

We only know that all this retinue lived much more from the pockets of the German soldiers than from their own.

Amendments and Additions.

While from the very commencement of the war there was not any difficulty in procuring abundant official material from the German side for the compilation of this work, the matter on the French side was very different. I can truly say that I spared no trouble to obtain reliable accounts from France; and during my stay in that country in August and in the beginning of September 1870, I collected everything that could in any way serve my purpose. But even the official despatches, which at that time I had the opportunity of seeing, treated important facts with such an Imperial lightness that one could easily be led astray in regard to details. Such, at least, was my case in regard to the battles of the 16th and 18th of August, and in regard to the positions occupied in them by the French Corps.

Afterwards, and principally because of the appearance of the first volumes of this book, much matter has been sent to me by both French and German officers—later still, I received printed works from France; and I now give in the following additions all that seems to me to be essential for the explanation and elucidation of the foregoing text. On the German side I have little to add, and in general I may say that all my military correspondents from both sides have acknowledged the correctness of the picture I have given of the war. I therefore owe them especial thanks that they

nevertheless have not thought it superfluous to call my attention to details, and to obscurities in my representation. Some of these correspondents, to whom I feel particularly indebted, pointed out how I could notice their remarks in the text. But this unfortunately was no longer possible, owing to the advanced state of the printing of the portions referred to. Finally, all my correspondents agree in saying that everything essential is correct, and therewith I may be well content.

My correspondence concerning this book has also become extremely large from other reasons; for besides the information for which I have above expressed my thanks, and which has been of real use to me, I have likewise received a mass of letters from Germany which pretend to instruct me politically, and demand that I should amend my views. The majority of these I have been unable to answer, because they were anonymous; others, which were duly signed, from want of time. The writers will therefore pardon me if I answer them collectively in the following lines.

The chief accusation made against me in the above-mentioned letters was that of "persecuting the Jews." To this I can only answer that my numerous friends among the Jews have heartily laughed at the charge brought against me.

Another impeachment which runs through most of the correspondence is my "partiality for the French." To comply with the wishes of the writers of these letters, I must have continually repeated that the French were an immoral, decayed, idle, worthless, and good-for-nothing nation; the Germans, on the other hand, the essence of every virtue known, or yet to be known. Now it is in general a great folly to characterise an entire nation as either virtuous or vicious. As regards the French specially, I may state that my partiality for them springs greatly from the fact that I have found among them a great fund of morality, and this among all classes. In every great nation there will be a few

hundreds of thousands of worthless characters, and such is the case also in France. But those men who, because of this, straightway conclude that the whole French nation is corrupt and abominable, cannot possibly know France. But I know it, and I protest with my whole heart against such statements, which are utterly devoid of truth. Apart from this reason for my partiality for the French, I have no other.

I could add much more, but I refrain from doing so, from the same reasons that have long induced me not to write prefaces to my books; and in making these few remarks, I merely wished to fulfil an act of courtesy which I could not have done in any other way.

First Volume.

Page 72.—In July 1870 each French regiment of Cuirassiers, Lancers, Dragoons, and Chasseurs d'Afrique, mobilised 4 squadrons, each regiment of Hussars and Mounted Rifles 5 squadrons—each squadron having 3 officers, 120 men, and 105 troop-horses.

Page 83.—For the actual distribution of the Artillery in 1870, see Appendix, Ordres de Bataille.

Page 88.—When the war was begun, the French had altogether 120 rifled 8-pounders (*pièces de* 8), but these were only distributed by degrees among the Corps.

Page 132.—For the actual distribution of the German cavalry in 1870, see Appendix, Ordres de Bataille.

Page 150, 6th line.—Instead of "sister" read "cousin" of Hortense de Beauharnais.

Page 164, 9th line.—Instead of "13th of June" read "13th of July."

Page 171.—On the 14th of July a notice was given for the mobilisation of the North German Army; the regular order

for the same was only issued after the receipt of the French declaration of war on the 19th, and the regiments did not receive it until the 20th of July.

Page 241, Battle of Weissenburg.—On the 25th of July M'Mahon had supported Ducrot's division before Wörth, Douay's at Hagenau, Raoult's and Lartigue's at Strasburg, Septueil's brigade of cavalry at Sulz, Nansouty's at Seltz, and Michel's by infantry in reserve. On the 2d of August Douay was sent to Weissenburg, and there on the evening of the 3d he received general information of the advance of the Germans. He then wished to retire, but received from Ducrot positive orders to remain where he was, and to accept battle. Douay had not any cavalry at all with his detachment. On the 4th of August, having received definite intelligence of the approach of the Germans, he again wished to retreat, but was now no longer able to do so. On the other side, however, the report that the French were engaged in cooking when the Germans attacked is confirmed. The French give Douay's loss at 1200 killed and wounded (therefore not including prisoners), and that of the Germans at 1500 men.

Page 247, The Battle of Wörth.—On the evening of the 4th M'Mahon called up Conseil Dumesnil's division as a reinforcement for the expected battle. This division of the 7th Corps had already arrived at Kolmar, but had been at once recalled to Mülhausen upon information having been received of the concentration and movement of German troops in the Black Forest. Liébert's division had also been sent to Mülhausen, while Dumont's was still in process of formation at Lyons. Barely arrived in Mülhausen, Conseil's division was embarked on the railway between 8 P.M. and 10 P.M. on the 4th, arrived at Hagenau at 2 P.M. on the morning of the 5th, marched thence to Reichshofen, and arrived on the evening of the same day at Elsasshausen. The artillery of the division received the counter-order while on the march from Kolmar to Mülhausen, retraced its steps

to the former place, and there embarked on the railway to the north.

At 8.30 P.M. on the 5th of August M'Mahon received a despatch from Napoleon which placed the 5th Corps at his disposal, and thereupon he at once telegraphed to De Failly to join him. When at 7 A.M. on the 6th of August M'Mahon received Ducrot's report stating that this latter general was attacked, he immediately, not expecting that the real battle would take place before the morrow, despatched an officer of engineers to De Failly at Bitche, where the messenger arrived at 1 P.M.

At the end of July De Failly had Guyot de Lespart's division to the east of Bitche, Goze's division and Maussion's brigade of Labadie's division to the west of the same town, and finally Lapasset's brigade at Saargemünd. On receipt of M'Mahon's telegram of the 5th, he at once set Guyot de Lespart in march upon Niederbronn; but Guyot was again ordered to halt when near Philippsburg, because De Failly himself now feared that he might be attacked from Zweibrücken. However, on the urgent representations of the engineer officer, who arrived at 1 P.M., De Failly again directed Guyot to proceed; and this latter accordingly arrived near Niederbronn at 5 P.M., where he somewhat assisted M'Mahon's retreat — especially as the Germans assumed that there were greater forces in rear of him.

The Battle of Saarbrücken on the 6th of August (Spicheren-Forbach).—Frossard did not receive any orders to evacuate the position of Spicheren on the 6th (page 261); on the evening of the 5th, the engineers of the Corps received orders to commence to throw up works to strengthen the position. Accordingly on that same night shelter-trenches were dug on the heights, and on the morning of the 6th similar works were constructed on both sides of the road to Saarlouis. On the morning of the 6th Laveaucoupet's division stood on the heights of Spicheren, Vergé's by Stiring on the left of the

road, and Bataille's in reserve on the plateau of Oetingen. At the commencement of the action Frossard himself was in Forbach transacting with the mayor business which had no relation to the conduct of the war, and thus it came to pass that the divisional commanders were left completely to themselves. The three divisions, Laveaucoupet, Vergé, and Bataille, had not more than a total of 20,000 men on the 6th of August, the first reserves of the Corps having reached the Golden Bream on the 4th of August. 200 men arrived at Forbach during the course of the battle.

On the 4th of August Bazaine had received the chief command over the 2d, 3d, and 4th Corps "pour les opérations militaires seulement." He at once directed the 3d Corps to support Frossard, and by the 6th of August its division stood thus—Montaudon's at Saargemünd, Castagny's at Folcklingen, Metmann's at Beningen and Merlenbach, and Decaën's in rear at St Avold. None of these divisions marched to the support of Frossard: Metmann's, which was ordered to the front, never came into action, but halted at Morsbrook, in the very strange belief that the whole action was only an outpost affair.

Our statement (page 263) that the direction of the wind prevented Zastrow and Glümer from hearing the thunder of the cannon on the Spicheren heights is confirmed from both sides; and a French officer remarks that this very wind, which prevented the Germans from hearing, must have carried the sound doubly and trebly distinctly to Bazaine.

Laveaucoupet's division alone retained any order, and covered at the last the retreat to the plateau of Kehrbach. All the others were in confusion. Frossard's Corps retired in the first place upon Saargemünd, and thence upon Puttelange, where it arrived at 4 P.M. on the 7th of August.

Frossard lost on the 6th 3000-4000 killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners. Laveaucoupet alone lost 163 officers and 1800 men killed and wounded.

Page 292.—Immediately after the affair at Weissenburg, Canrobert received orders to direct his Corps upon Metz—the infantry by train, the cavalry by road. The two brigades of Fénélon's cavalry division, which were in the Camp of Chalons, proceeded as far as St Ménéhould, but turned back on the 8th of August, being recalled into the Camp on receipt of telegraphic despatches bringing news of Wörth and Forbach.

Page 304, The Battle of Borny.—During the 7th, 8th, and 9th of August, the 2d, 3d, and 4th Corps, the Guard, and Lapasset's brigade, which had been separated from the 6th Corps, fell back upon Metz. The 6th Corps also marched thither from Chalons. On the 13th of August, after holding a council of war, Bazaine resolved to quit Metz. On the night between the 13th and 14th of August the 6th Corps stood on the left bank of the Seille before Fort St Privat, the 2d Corps from Fort Queleu to Ars, the 3d Corps before Borny, the 4th Corps before Fort St Julien, and the Guard in reserve behind Borny.

Laveaucoupet's division of the 2d Corps was destined to garrison the detached forts of Metz, but with the rest of his troops Frossard commenced to cross over to the left bank of the Moselle at 3 A.M. on the 14th. Decaën followed him with the 3d Corps; but as the last brigade was marching off at 3.30 P.M., the German attack commenced. Decaën at once turned again and formed front to his rear, as also did Ladmirault, although two of his divisions had already crossed over to the left bank of the river. These were, however, recalled, and the whole Corps marched to the sound of the cannon. The 3d and 4th Corps did not recommence the passage of the Moselle until after the battle was concluded. The 2d, 6th, and Guard Corps did not turn back when they heard the noise of battle, but on the contrary quietly continued their movement to the left bank. Still, owing to the disorder which prevailed, the head of the 2d

Corps did not reach Point du Jour until the evening of the 14th of August.

Page 309, 10th line.—The paragraph should read: The 6th division of cavalry (D. W. of Mecklenburg) formed a northern neighbouring group, pushed forward towards Metz on the right bank of the Moselle, north of the 3d Corps.

Page 311, 3d line.—For "5th" read "6th" division of cavalry.

Page 315, The Battle of Vionville, 16th of August.—On the morning of the 15th of August, the Corps which were already on the left bank of the Moselle continued their march upon Rezonville. In the evening the 2d Corps bivouacked between Rezonville and Vionville, to the south of the road; the 6th at the same place, but to the north of the road; and the Guard near Gravelotte.

The 3d Corps (now Lebœuf) marched only on the morning of the 16th by Longeville and Moulins les Metz upon Gravelotte, while De Cissey's and Grenier's divisions of the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) moved along the road to Briey, but were then to gain the one to Estain by Doncourt. Forton's division of cavalry was meanwhile ordered to reconnoitre along the road to St Mihiel, and Du Barrail's along that to Estain.

When the attack of the Germans was commenced on the morning of the 16th, only Margueritte's brigade, which had escorted the Emperor on his journey to Verdun, had reached Mars la Tour, while Forton's division of cavalry and Frossard were surprised by the Prussians at Vionville. Ladmirault heard the noise of the cannon as he arrived at St Privat la Montagne, on his march along the Briey road, and at once turned in the direction of the sound upon Doncourt and Bruville, and he it was (and not Lebœuf) who came into action on Canrobert's right. In pages 319, 320, 321, and 322, therefore, it should always read Ladmirault in place of Lebœuf. Lebœuf certainly also received orders from Bazaine to wheel to his left against Mars la Tour, but Ladmir-

ault came first upon the battle-field, and Lebœuf remained virtually in reserve. Ladmirault had only two of his divisions with him, the third (Lorencez) had been crossed, in the terrible disorder which prevailed, by a pontoon-train upon the heights of Lessy, and could not get to the front. Ladmirault's two divisions lost on the 16th of August 3000 men—the 3d Corps, Lebœuf, only 100. The total loss of the French is given by themselves at 800 officers and 16,000 men—prisoners and missing included.—(See p. 323.)

Page 316, 9th line.—For "battalions" read "batteries."

Page 328, The battle before Metz on the 18th of August.—Bazaine gives the following reasons for taking up the positions at Amanvilliers after the battle of the 16th:—1. Scarcity of water at Gravelotte and in the neighbourhood; 2. The necessity of obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition and provisions, especially of projectiles for the 4-pounder guns; 3. The necessity of sending the wounded back into Metz.

Page 328.—On the plan of the battle on the 18th of August the French positions are wrongly given. They should be A, 6th Corps (Canrobert); B, 4th Corps (Ladmirault); C, 3d Corps (Lebœuf); D, 2d Corps (Frossard); E, a portion of the Guard—in reality only a brigade of Voltigeurs of the Guard was posted there without artillery, to serve as a reserve for Lebœuf, who had to defend the long extent of front from La Folie to Point du Jour, and this brigade never came into action. The great mass of the Guard, the Grenadiers, Zouaves, Chasseurs, 2d brigade of Voltigeurs, together with the artillery and cavalry, remained upon the heights of Plappeville. At 2.30 P.M. it was directed to advance through the thin wood of Lorry, and along a good road towards Amanvilliers; but for some unknown reasons it was immediately ordered to halt again. A few batteries of the Guard alone covered Ladmirault's retreat in the evening.

The participation of each Corps in the battle has now been differently given. Ladmirault proved himself to be the best

at Amanvilliers. The 2d and 3d Corps felt themselves perfectly secure in their positions. Our attention has been called to the fact that it was just the 6th Corps (which had to hold the weak point, the right wing) which was of the weakest composition, because it had neither its cavalry nor a sufficient force of artillery.

Bazaine had ordered the position of Amanvilliers to be artificially strengthened, but the troops were occupied during the whole of the 17th in finding out and establishing themselves in their camping-grounds, and it was only on the 18th of August, and then for the most part after the battle had commenced, that shelter-trenches were dug. Even these were constructed without any connection with one another, Every commander acted for himself, and there was again a total absence of any general leadership. Bazaine did not give any orders, and the Corps commanders were utterly ignorant of what was taking place near them.

Page 339, 12th line.—For "10th Corps" read "9th Corps."

Page 354, Results of the first three battles before Metz, 14th to 18th August.—Bazaine asserts that he did not lose more than 25,000 men, killed and wounded, on the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August; and the officer of the Army of the Rhine (La Campagne de 1870 jusqu'au 1 Sept.) says that this estimate was verified after the capitulation of Metz. But how many prisoners were lost? And does not much still remain to be verified—on both sides?

Page 375.—In place of "St Aubert" read "St Hubert." It was not the 60th regiment of the 2d Corps, as was stated in the official despatches, but the 80th regiment of the 3d Corps, which held St Hubert in the battle before Metz on the 18th of August. The 80th regiment marched on the morning of the 17th of August to Point du Jour, and its second battalion (Commandant Molière) occupied St Hubert and the

neighbourhood. On the 18th this battalion suffered greatly from the artillery-fire from the direction of Gravelotte, and seemed in danger of being annihilated. The projecting position of St Hubert could not be seen from the shelter-trenches between Moscow and Point du Jour, much less could it be supported thence. After three o'clock in the afternoon, Molière's battalion evacuated St Hubert, after having lost 300 out of its 700 men.

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Page 16.—The main body of M'Mahon's Corps fled from Wörth in the greatest disorder to Saverne. At six o'clock on the evening of the 7th of August, M'Mahon there ordered a farther retreat, and on the morning of the 8th reached Saarburg, on the 9th Blamont, and on the 10th Luneville. At this last place he determined to fall back towards Neufchâteau and the railway from Chaumont to Blesmes. On the 11th he was in Bayon sur Moselle, on the 12th in Haroué, on the 13th in Vicherey, and on the 14th in Neufchâteau. There he embarked some of his troops on the railways, and these reached the Camp of Chalons on the 15th; other detachments continued their march to Joinville and St Dizier, whence they also were forwarded by train to the Camp.

De Failly had received news of the defeat at Wörth on the evening of the 6th, and thereupon ordered a retreat to be commenced on the 7th. But on receiving further intelligence he commenced his march during the night between the 6th and 7th, leaving his baggage in Bitche and Lapasset's brigade to their fate. At 7 P.M. he arrived at Lützelstein, on the following day, the 8th, at Lixheim, on the 9th

at Saarburg, on the 10th at Arracourt, and on the 11th at Luneville. On the 19th and 20th his troops arrived in the Camp of Chalons, principally by the railway from Chaumont; but Goze's division marched thither on foot from Vitry.

Page 19.—On the 7th of August, General Felix Douay, commanding the 7th Corps, received a telegram from the headquarters of Napoleon III. directing him to throw one division into Strasburg, and to cover Belfort with the other two. But Douay had already given Conseil's division to M'Mahon, and Dumont's was only in process of formation at Lyons; so that he had really only Liebert's division, a brigade of cavalry, and the artillery reserve of the 7th Corps with him. These troops he concentrated at Belfort on the 8th, and caused them to commence to work on its detached forts. On the 13th of August Dumont's division also arrived at Belfort. On the 16th, however, Douay received a telegram from Palikao directing him to proceed by rail with all his troops to Paris; but an hour afterwards a second despatch arrived ordering him to bring all his forces to Chalons, and he therefore at once commenced the movement thither.

Page 20.—According to the "officer of the Army of the Rhine," a council of war took place on the 17th of August, at which Napoleon, M'Mahon, Trochu, Schmitz, and Berthaud were present, and at which it was resolved to retire the whole of M'Mahon's army upon Paris. And yet Bazaine's position was in general known!

Page 22.—For the final composition and strength of M'Mahon's army see Appendix, Ordres de Bataille.

Page 35.—On the 28th of August the movements were at first continued in accordance with M'Mahon's resolve of the 27th to escape from the Prussians. But afterwards, consequent on the despatches from Palikao, urging the march to the relief of Bazaine, this determination was altered, and thereby great disorder arose. The 12th Corps

marched on the 28th upon La Besace, the 1st to Le Chêne; the 7th was marching northwards upon Chagny when it received counter-orders at 8 A.M. near Quatre Champs, and consequently turned upon Boult au Bois; the 5th Corps moved upon Belval; Bonnemain's division was near Grandes Annoises, and Margueritte's near Sommauthe.

For the 30th all the Corps still on the left bank of the Meuse received orders to retire to the right at any cost—the 5th upon Mouzon, the 7th upon Villers, the 1st upon Remilly, and Bonnemain's division to follow it.

Page 37.—The artillery of the 12th Corps took an important part in the action of the 30th, but only one regiment of its infantry joined in it.

Page 41.—Felix Douay (7th Corps) had a most arduous march on the 30th of August. When he heard the firing near De Failly, his first impulse certainly was to march to its succour; but on mature consideration he abandoned the idea, as in any case he would arrive too late. Conseil's division, which was to escort the trains of the 7th Corps to Mouzon, became engaged with the Germans pursuing De Failly, and suffered materially. Douay found the bridges which had been prepared across the Meuse at Remilly so miserably constructed that he despaired of being able to transport his whole Corps across the river by them during the night between the 30th and 31st, and he therefore ordered his 2d division to descend the Meuse upon Sedan.

The 1st Corps (Ducrot) arrived at Carignan between 3 and 4 P.M. on the afternoon of the 30th of August.

Page 42.—De Failly lost all his camp equipage and baggage at Beaumont.

Page 44.—The Saxon Corps crossed at Létanne by a bridge of boats to the right bank of the Meuse.

Page 56.—After eight o'clock Ducrot undertook various but disconnected attacks upon the 24th (Saxon) division, and during these the French Riflemen closed at times to

within 150 paces of the Saxon artillery. On this occasion the Saxons captured three mitrailleuses.

Page 210 and following, The Battle of Noisseville.—According to the summary report of Bazaine, the French army of Metz took up a position on the 19th of August inside the detached forts. On the 26th, the 4th and 6th Corps and the Imperial Guard crossed over to the right bank of the Moselle, as Bazaine desired to attempt to break out on that side of the river. A storm, however, prevented the undertaking. Thereupon a council of war was assembled in the farm of Grimont, and this for various more or less debateable reasons decided that the army should remain before Metz. But as it was to be foreseen that there would soon be a scarcity of supplies for such a mass of men, the concentration of which round Metz had not been at all calculated upon before the commencement of the war, it was determined that frequent sorties should be made, mainly in order to collect provisions and annoy the enemy. On the 30th of August Bazaine received a despatch from Napoleon III. (probably of the 25th of August) in which he stated that on the day after the morrow (?) he would be on the Aisne, and would thence, according to circumstances, come to the relief of Bazaine—in general, he would march upon Montmédy. Thereupon Bazaine, contrary to the resolution of the council of war of the 26th, concentrated his whole army on the 31st on the right bank of the Moselle before Forts Queleu and St Julien, intending again to break through on that side towards Thionville—the 3d, 4th, and 6th Corps by way of Bettlainville, the 2d and Guard on their left by Malroy. On this occasion he specially chose the right bank, because on the left the Germans had broken down all the bridges over the Ornes. For the immediate objective of the battle of Noisseville he selected the capture of the heights of St Barbe.

All our remarks concerning the beginning of the 31st of August are doubly and trebly confirmed.

After the failure of the sortie of the 1st of September, Bazaine sent the 4th, 6th, and Guard Corps back again to the left bank of the Moselle, and the French commenced to intrench themselves in their most advanced positions.

Page 228.—Bazaine only informed his army of the occurrences of the 1st and 4th of September on the 16th, and then in an order of the day which said as little as possible.

Page 229.—Bazaine states that he endeavoured to put himself in communication with the Government of National Defence by means of emissaries who left Metz on the 15th and 25th of September with short despatches, but that he received no answers, and his messengers, did not return.

From the statements of Marshal Bazaine himself, it is easy to see that he was by no means so ignorant of what was going on outside Metz as he wished to make the world believe. At any rate, he had an infallible means at his command of obtaining absolutely correct information; for he had merely to request permission from Prince Frederic Charles to send out one or more officers, who could have returned with precise intelligence of the state of things in France. The Germans throughout showed themselves very obliging in all such trifles, and there is therefore no reason to assume that the request would have been refused. At all events, such a demand was permissible; but, as far as we know, none such was ever made.

The loss of the Army of Metz in killed, wounded, and missing (prisoners), between the 14th of August and the beginning of October, is given by Bazaine at 25 generals, 2099 officers of all ranks, and 40,339 non-commissioned officers and men.

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Page 44.—General Lecointe received the command of the 22d Corps; General Paulze d'Iroy of the 23d.

Page 135.—In his very remarkable speech in the Versailles Assembly, General Trochu formally denied that he resigned the post of Governor of Paris, because he had said on the 6th of January, "The Governor of Paris will never capitulate." Before this speech the conduct of General Trochu was perfectly explicable, but we must confess that now we can give no explanation of it. We cannot discover the smallest harmony between his thoughts and his deeds, or between his acts of the day and of the morrow. As regards the disclosed plan of throwing 50,000 men upon Rouen, we can only keep silence.

Page 189.—Originally only the 18th, 20th, 24th Corps, Garibaldi and Cremer, were destined to operate in the East, and the 15th Corps was only afterwards joined to them. On the 5th of January 1871, Gambetta hoped that Bourbaki would have relieved Belfort by the 12th at the latest. He was then to turn against Paris, while Chanzy at the same time operated from the west against the capital, and sought to establish communication with Faidherbe.

THE END.

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